SECRET/NODIS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS "Chron" June 8-13, 1967

Systematic declassification review of material in this folder was completed by the Department of State on:

12/1/95 EB

(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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VZCZCLDN558
RR RUEHC
DE PUDTCP 397W 1641556
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FM AMEMBASSY CAPETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCP/AMEMBASSY LONDON
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
ZEN/AMCONSUL CAPETOWN
ZEN/AMCONSUL DURBAN
ZEN/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORT ELIZABETH
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAPETOWN 1261

SUBJECT: SA PORTS FEEL EFFECT OF SUEZ CLOSURE

1. PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER CABINET MEMBERS LOSING NO OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC SPEECHES TO STRESS THAT ME CRISIS AND SUEZ CLOSURE EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF SEA ROUTE AROUND CAPE, AND BY EXTENSION, SA'S IMPORTANCE TO WESTERN POWERS. VORSTER IN RECENT SENATE SPEECH CALLED ATTENTION UK-SA RENEWAL SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH "SA AGAIN ACCEPTED GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTING THIS SEA ROUTE". HE THEN ADDED, AS KEY POINT, " IT IS SIMPLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM OUR ACTION IN THIS RESPECT DO NOT SEE THAT WE MUST BE ASSISTED IN CARRYING OUT THIS TASK AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AND NOT BE IMPEDED IN DOING SO".

PAGE 2 RUDTCP 397W C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. SAG OFFICIALS AND MPS ARE FOLLOWING UP THIS ARGUMENT WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS AND RELATING IT TO US ARMS EMBARGO. BRITISH NO DOUBT RECEIVING MUCH HEAVIER PRESSURE, ASSISTED BY ARRIVAL YESTERDAY OF THREE-SHIP BRITISH NAVY SQUADRON WHICH WILL, WE LEARN, ENGAGE IN JOINT COMMUNICATIONS EXERCISES WITH SA NAVY AT TERMINATION OF VISIT.

3. IN TERMS ACTUAL OPERATIONS, SA PORT ACTIVITY

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1967 JUN 13 PM 1 21

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APPROACHING FEVER PITCH, WITH GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY PULLING OUT ALL STOPS TO COPE WITH UP TO 300 SHIPS (PRESS ESTIMATE) NOW AT SEA WHICH MAY CALL AT CAPE TOWN, DURBAN, PORT ELIZABETH AND EAST LONDON INSTEAD OF TRANSITING SUEZ. DOCK SHUNTING, SPECIAL BUNKERING PLANS, AND STAFFING UP FOR ROUND CLOCK DOCK OPERATIONS ARE AMONG MEASURES TAKEN BY CAPE TOWN PORT AUTHORITIES. CAPE TOWN AND DURBAN REPORTEDLY GEARED HANDLE ADDITIONAL 45 CALLERS DAILY, WITH FORMER PLANNING TO SERVE 24 CALLERS PER DAY WITH BUNKERS. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSIT OF LARGE PASSENGERS LINERS, WITH 45,000 CANBERRA FIRST TO ARRIVE, HAVE BEEN MADE DESPITE DISRUPTION VALUABLE WORKING QUAYS AND WAREHOUSING OPERATIONS. DESPITE ALL-OUT EFFORT, INFLUX WILL OVERBURDEN PORTS. AS EXAMPLE OF CNGESTION IN PEAK PERIODS, 18 SHIPS WERE ANCHORED IN TABLE BAY AWAITING BERTHS ON JUNE 2. PRESENT PRESSURE MAY WELL SPUR PLANS FOR LONG-RANGE HARBOR DEVELOPMENT.

PAGE 3 PUDTCR 397W C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. EMB NAVAL ATTACHE REPORTS FIRST OF DIVERTED US MERCHANT SHIPS, SOME ON USG CONTRACTS FOR SUPPORT VIET NAM, DUE BEGIN ARRIVING JUNE 18. PORT AUTHORITIES ADVISE HIM THESE SHIPS, LIKE OTHERS, WILL BE DEALT WITH ON FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVED BASIS. AUTHORITIES APPEAR UNINTERESTED IN REVIVING IRRITATIONS OF FDR VISIT. ATTACHE LEARNS THERE IS NO DANGER OF SHORTAGE IN BUNKERING SUPPLIES FOR MONTH OR MORE.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Action

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34

PAGE 01 TEL AVIV 04117

1967 JUN 13 PM 1 37

VZCZCQVA043
OO RUEHC RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUQMVL 4117 1641710
ZNY SSSSS
O 131700Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
RUEHDT/USUN IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4117

EXDIS

1. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION THIS NOON FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN GAVE ME FOLLOWING TRANSLATION OF A NOTE HANDED BY

THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW TO THE FINNISH EMBASSY (PROTECTING ISRAELI INTERSTS) AT 1045 HOURS JUNE 13: QUOTE ACCORDING TO RECEIVED INFORMATION ISRAEL CONTINUES THE INVASION OF SYRIA. ON THE EVENING AND NIGHT OF 11 JUNE ISRAEL TROOPS OCCUPIED THE SETTLEMENT OF RAFIQ, JAWADA AND DZHISR-ISTABEL. THE ARABIAN ORIGINAL POPULATION IS DRIVEN AWAY FROM GAZA, JERUSALEM AND FROM OTHER REGIONS.FOR THE REGIONS TAKEN

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4117 S E C R E T
BY THE ISRAELI TROOPS AN OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. MILITARY GOVERNORS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED FOR TOWN AND DISTRICTS. ALL SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE SAME PRACTICE ADOPTED THAT THE HITLERITE INVADERS FOLLOWED IN THOSE REGIONS WHICH WERE THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SHALL HAVE NO ILLUSION: ISRAEL WILL BE MADE ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH SHE COMMITS. BY CONTINUALLY SHOWING ITS CONTEMPT FOR THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE U,N. REGARDING IMMEDIATE TERMINATING OF ALL WAR OPERATIONS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE PEACE LOVING COUNTRIES. BY ACTING SO SHE COMMITS A FATAL MISCALCULATION. ISRAEL TAKEN UPON HERSELF THE WHOLE BURDEN OF THE RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT FOR ITS TREASON, FOR ALL THE CRIMES SHE HAS COMMITTED AGAINST PEACE AND THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLES. UNQUOTE.

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2. EBAN MADE NO ATTEMPT INTERPRET SIGNIFICANCE THIS NOTE OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBE IT AS FURTHER STEP IN SOVIET PRESSURE CAMPAIGN. BARBOUR

passed S/S-O 6/13/67; 1:56 PM.
passed WHITEHOUSE 6/13/67; 2:30 PM.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T RABAT 5492

LIMDIS

1. FONMIN LARAKI TOLD ME LAST NIGHT NASSER AND BOUMEDIENNE PRESSING HARD FOR IMMEDIATE ARAB SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM. APPARENTLY, MOST IF NOT ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING TUNISIA, HAVE AGREED. KING SENT MESSAGE YESTERDAY TO NASSER GOM DOES NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE SUMMIT SHOULD BE HELD BEFORE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN KUWAIT TO PREPARE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK. LARAKI SAID KING FEELS SUMMIT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD SERVE NASSER'S PURPOSES AND ASSIST BOUMEDIENNE IN HIS DRAMATIC EFFORTS TO REPLACE NASSER AS LEADER OF THE ARAB NATIONS. GOM FEELS SUMMIT NOW LIKELY BE DOMINATED BY EXTREMISTS WHO WOULD STEAMROLL DISASTROUS SERIES OF RESOLUTIONS WHICH CAN ONLY EXACERBATE SITUATION AND WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO AN EFFECTIVE ARAB POSITION IN SETTLING PRESENT CRISIS.

2 COMMENT: KING CONSIDERS URGENT NEED FOR ARAB MODERATES TO PREVENT EXTREMISTS FROM RETAINING CONTROL ARAB POLICY. HOWEVER, POSITION SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY EXISTENCE OF MANY FACTORS HOSTILE TO MODERATES IN PRESENT SITUATION, INCLUDING DEEP HUMILIATI(OF THE ARABS, ISRAELI POST7CEASE FIRE THRUST INTO SYRIA, SEIZURE OF SACRED SANCTUARIES OF ISLAM BY ISRAELIS IN OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM, SUBSTANTIALLY UNCONTESTED STATEMENTS OF ISRAELI LEADERS ON INTENTION TO FOLLOW MILITARY HOSTILITIES BY TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION AND DEEP-SEATED BELIEF AMONG MOST ARABS THAT US AND UK INDIRECTLY AND DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ISRAELI MILITARY PROWESS AND SUCCESS AGAINST ARABS.

3.. IN MY VIEW, IT IS HIGHLY ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONSIDER WAYS AND MEANS OF DISCREETLY SUPPORTING THE MODERATES. EMBASSY HAS ALREADY LISTED LEADING PRIORITIES IN THIS RESPECT. IT NOW BECOMES URGENT THAT WE PUSH AHEAD ON THESE IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE.
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PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA USIA NSA COMAC CINCSTRIKE,
6/13/67 7:15 AM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RR RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 4115 1641825
ZNY CCCCC
R 131805Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4115

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EXDIS

GOI WEST BANK-GAZA POLICY

1. RELIABLE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE, IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE PURELY PERSONAL AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION UNQUOTE REMARKS TO EMBASSY OFFICER TUESDAY, GAVE US GLIMPSE OF BEHIND THE SCENES DEBATE IN GOI ON WHAT GOI POLICY RE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD BE.

2. SOURCE SAID THAT ISRAEL'S ACQUISITION WEST BANK SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES SOME PEOPLE IN GOI WERE LOSING THEIR HEADS. THEY WERE SAYING NOW THAT WE HAVE THIS TERRITORY WE OUGHT TO ANNEX IT. SOURCE SAID HE WAS KEEPING HIS HEAD AND WAS PUTTING FORWARD HIS OWN IDEAS IN SPECIAL GOI COMMITTEES SET UP TO DISCUSS WEST BANK-GAZA

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4115 C O N F I D E N TI A L
POLICY. HE REGRETTED TO SAY VIEWS HE WAS PROPOUNDING STILL DID NOT HAVE MAJORITY SUPPORT. SUBSTANCE HIS THINKING WAS THAT NUB OF ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WAS ISSUE ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH PALESTINE ARABS. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ISRAEL HAD IT WITHIN ITS POWER TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE IF IT PROCEEDED WISELY.

3. SOURCE SAID FIRST STEP WAS FOR GOI TO IDENTIFY RESPECTABLE LEADERS ON WEST BANK (QUOTE NOT QUISLINGS, BUT REAL NATIONALISTS UNQUOTE). THESE LEADERS SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT OUTSIDE FORCES OR PRESSURES COULD GIVE THEM ANY ALTERNATIVE TO DEALING WITH ISRAEL. SOURCE HAD PREVIOUS DAY TALKED TO ANWAR KHATIB (FORMER GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM, WHO HE SAID WAS NOT BEING DETAINED) AND HAD FOUND HIM RESPONSIVE TO SOURCE'S IDEAS. SOURCE WAS CONVINCED THERE WERE MANY OTHERS WHO WOULD BE READY TO FORM UNDER ISRAELI TUTELAGE NATIONAL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT.

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SOURCE DWELT ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BANKERS AND SAID WEST BANKERS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE EAGER TO JOIN ONCE AGAIN WITH HUSSEIN AND HIS HALF MILLION BEDOUIN.

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 4115 C O N F I D E N T I A L
4. SOURCE SAID AUTONOMOUS PALESTINE STATE WOULD HAVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY PARTIALLY QUOTE MORTGAGED UNQUOTE DUE TO REQUIREMENTS OF ISRAELI SECURITY. BUT ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER COMPENSATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT COULD OFFER TRANSIT RIGHTS BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH IN HIS SCHEME WOULD BE PART OF THE PALESTINE STATE. DISCUSSING GAZA, SOURCE INDICATED THERE WERE SOME IN GOI WHO WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF ABSORBING GAZA INTO ISRAEL AFTER HAVING FIRST TRANSFERRED PALESTINE REFUGEE POPULATION FROM GAZA TO WEST BANK. SOURCE FOUND IDEA POPULATION TRANSFER REPELLENT AND SAID THIS WOULD STILL LEAVE ISRAEL WITH THE 80,000 NON-REFUGEE POPULATION OF GAZA. AND IF THERE WAS ONE THING ISRAEL DID NOT NEED IT WAS MORE ARABS.

5. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION SOURCE KEPT REFERRING TO CONTRIBUTION USG COULD MAKE IN HELPING ISRAEL CONSTRUCTIVELY RESOLVE PROBLEMS POSED BY GAZA AND WEST BANK. MOST IMPORTANT US CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE TO PROVIDE FUNDS WITH WHICH TO COMPENSATE ORIGINAL PALESTINE REFUGEES FOR LOSS OF THEIR PROPERTY IN 1948. COMPENSATION OF REFUGEES WAS INDEED

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AN INTEGRAL PART OF SOURCE'S SCHEME.

6. SOURCE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY IDEA OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTH THAT VARIOUS WEST BANK-GAZA PROPOSALS PRESENTLY COMMAND IN HIGH COUNCILS OF GOI. SOURCE SAID THAT CONFUSION IN GOI POLICY ON WEST BANK HAD BEEN MANIFEST IN CONTRADICTORY ADVICE GIVEN ARAB WEST BANK INHABITANTS. IN SOME CASES THEY HAD BEEN URGED TO STAY. IN OTHERS THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN AN OPTION OF STAYING OR LEAVING, WHICH IN CIRCUMSTANCES TENDED TO BE ENCOURAGEMENT TO LEAVE. SOURCE HAD BEEN BUSY DURING PRECEDING DAYS IN DIRECTING POLICY LINES OF KOL ISRAEL ARAB BROADCASTS, AND HAD PERSONALLY VETOED BROADCASTS ON THE ARABIC SERVICE OF

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THE MILITARY GOVERNOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO JERUSALEM RESIDENTS THAT ANY WHO WISHED TO GO TO JORDAN NEEDED ONLY TO REGISTER AT MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS. HE EXERCISED HIS RIGHT OF VETO ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT RELATED TO GENERAL ISRAELI POLICY ON THE WEST BANK WHICH WAS NOT YET DECIDED.

7. SOURCE THOUGHT THAT THIS POLICY WOULD BE FIXED WITHIN

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NEXT WEEK OR TWO. OF COURSE, HE SAID, GOI MIGHT SIMPLY DECIDE TO QUOTE PLAY IT BY EAR UNQUOTE.

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

Action

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Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 4118/1 1641815
ZNY SSSSS
P 131730Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4118 SECTION ONE OF TWO

NODIS

REF: STATE 210497 AND 210499.

1. I SAW FONMIN EBAN IN JERUSALEM THIS NOON AT MY REQUEST IN EFFORT ELICIT ISRAELI THINKING ON QUESTIONS URGENTLY FACING US NOW THAT CEASE FIRE IS IN OPERATION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE'S 210499 I SAID WE NOW DESIRE TO TURN TO NEXT STEPS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT WE URGENTLY NEED TO KNOW GOI'S POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE. I EMPHASIZED THE PRESSURES WE FACE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REQUIRE ISRAELI TROOPS TO WITHDRAW TO PREVIOUS LINES. NOTING THAT OUR POSTURE IS THAT DEFINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WE HAVE TABLED, I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING AS MUCH ISRAELI PRECISION AS TO ITS THINKING AS POSSIBLE AT EARLIEST MOMENT. AS TO UNITED STATES POINTS OF DEPARTURE I MENTIONED PRESIDENT'S REAFFIRMATION ON MAY 23 OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRIORITAL INTEGRITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA, THE NECESSITY TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF PEACE ELIMINATING CLAIMS BY EITHER SIDE OF THE RIGHT TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS BECAUSE OF BELLIGERENCY, U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN RELATION TO THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE OVERRIDING NECESSITY THAT THROUGH MAGNAMIMOUS AND IMAGINATIVE POLICIES THE FOUNDATIONS LAID FOR A GENUNIE RECONCILIATION AMONG PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

2. EBAN APOLOGIZED THAT THERE MUST OF NECESSITY BE A LACK OF PRECISION IN ISRAEL'S THINKING AS TO DETAILED POLICIES BECAUSE OF THE DRAMATIC, RAPID CHANGE KWHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE AND HAD RAISED OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WERE INCONCEIVABLE BEFORE AND FOR WHICH ISRAEL UNPREPARED. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THIS HOUR OF DANGER IS ALSO AN HOUR OF OPPORTUNITY AND IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MOVE FORWARD TO PEACE AND NOT BACKWARD TO BELLIGERENCE. HE ADDED THAT SINCE THE EARLIER

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EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER JUST PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, THE SITUATION HAD IN FACT BEEN DISRUPTED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOW TO RECONSTRUCT BUT WE MUST BUILD ANEW. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE POINT OF REFERENCE CANNOT REALLY BE THE PRE-JUNE 4TH SITUATION.

3. WHAT ISRAEL WANTS IS QUITE SIMPLE: (A) SECURITY AND (B) PEACE. NEITHER OF THESE HAS BEEN ENJOYED BEFORE. INVOLVED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS ARE PROBLEMS IN THE JURDICIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND TERRITORIAL FIELDS. ISRAEL HAS NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY EACH IN DETAIL. HE REITERATED THAT THE DISRUPTION IS SO COMPLETE THAT THEY CANOT REBUILD BUT MUST ERECT A NEW EDIFICE. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. RESOLUTION TABLE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS FORWARD LOOKING IN LINE WITH THIS CONCEPT.

4. EBAN SAID AN INTERMEDIATE STATUS BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE. WHAT MUST BE DONE IS WORK OUT A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS. THIS IN ITSELF HAS SOME NEGATIVE AND SOME POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS. THE ADOPTION OF THE BACKWARD LOOKING RESOLUTION TABLED BY THE SOVIETS IN CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO PREVIOUS LINES IS INCONCEIVABLE. HOPEFULLY IT WILL BE RESISTED WITH THE HELP OF WORLD OPINION BUT IF NOT ISRAEL WILL RESIST IT ALONE. EBAN AGAIN APPEALED THAT WE NOT WASTE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY AND TRY TO RETURN ISRAEL TO THE STRAIGHT JACKET OF 1957. THE NATIONAL WILL IN ISRAEL IS RESOLUTE AND UNANIMOUS IN REJECTING SUCH A CONCEPT.

5. EBAN SAID THAT AS HE SEES THE SITUATION AT PRESENT THERE ARE TWO QUESTION: (A) HOW TO BUILD AND (B) WHAT IDEAS EXIST AS TO THE SHAPE IN WHICH THE AREA SHOULD BE REBUILT. AS TO HOW TO BUILD, ISRAEL FEELS STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS TO ACHIEVE VIABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE. A SOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY OUTSIDE POWERS. IN DIRECT DIALOGUE ISRAEL AND EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD TOGETHER DETERMINE FRONTIERS, ATTITUDES TOWARDS EACH OTHER, ETC. IF EGYPT SHOULD SUGGEST ANOTHER FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION, IT SHOULD BE TOLD IT HAS THE WRONG ADDRESS AND IT SHOULD APPROACH ISRAEL. TO MY COMMENT SUGGESTING SOME SKEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER EGYPT AND THE OTHERS WULD IN FACT SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OR MIGHT NOT MERELY SULK IN THEIR TENTS BEHIND THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENT, EBAN EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT EGYPT WOULD BE UNDER SUFFICIENT INDIGENOUS PRESSURE TO ELIMINATE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND ALL THAT HAD PRECEDED IT TO SEEK NEGOTIATIONS. AS TO IDEAS ABOUT THE SHAPE OF THE NEW STRUCTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EBAN SAID THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN URGENT CONSULTATIONS TO WORK OUT SPECIFIC IDEAS ON EACH OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. HE COULD NOT AS YET INDICATE THE OUTCOME OF THESE DISCUSSIONS

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BUT SUGGESTED THAT IN FORMULATING SOME OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED HE MIGHT GIVE SOME CLUES AS TO PRESENT THINKING. QUESTIONS RELATING TO EGYPT ARE, HOW CAN EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIVE TOGETHER? HOW CAN AN ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENCE IN TWO WATERWAYS BE ASSURED? HOW CAN SINAI BE PREVENTED FROM BECOMING ANOTHER SPRINGBOARD FOR ATTACK AND PERHAPS MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL, WHAT ABOUT GAZA? AS TO SYRIA, HOW CAN ISRAEL ENSURE THAT IT IS NOT PERPETUALLY UNDER SYRIAN GUNS, OR IN A POSITION WHERE SYRIA CAN CUT OFF ITS WATER SYSTEM. MOST COMPLEX OF ALL, HE SAID, IS JORDAN AND/OR THE PALESTINIAN WEST BANK. HE ASKED WHETHER IT IS INTELLIGENT TO ENDEAVOR TO REPRODUCE THE UNITY BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN OR SOME SORT OF SEPARATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL AND JORDAN. HOW CAN RELIGIOUS INTERESTS IN JERUSALEM BE ASSURED AND ALSO THE SANCTITY AND UNIT OF THE ISRAELI HOLY PLACES? HE INDICATED CLEARLY ISRAEL COMPLETELY RULES OUT THE POSSSIBLITY OF RE-DIVISDING THE CITY OF JERUSALEM NOW THAT IT HAS BECOME UNIED.

6. EBAN THEN TURNED TO TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR SPEED PARTICULARLY UNDER THE PRESSURES CREATED BY UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES REPEATING AGAIN THAT IT IS TACTICALLY MOST DESIRABLE FOR THE PARTIES DIRECLY INVOLVED TO GET TOGETHER AND THAT HE HOPED VERY SHORTLY FOR MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS ON THE PROBLEMS CONCERNED, HE URGED THAT IN THE MEANTIME A HOLDING OPERATION OF AT LEAST SHORT DURATION BE UNDERTAKEN AND THAT THE WORLD NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIETS. HE AGAIN SAID IT WOULD BE MOST TRAGIC IF THE SOVIET DOCTRINE REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WERE ACCEPTED. ISRAEL WILL HASTEN THE CRYSTALIZATION OF ITS IDEAS TO PERMIT MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTATION WITH US. ONE PROBLEM HE DESCRIBES AS ALMOST SOLVED, JERUSALEM IS IN FACT UNITED BY THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL AND BARBOUR

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MING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

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Action

CONTROL: 11319
RECD: June 13, 1967
3:16 pm

Info PP RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 4113/2 1641840
ZNY SSSSS
P 131730Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4113 SECTION TWO OF TWO

NODIS

SPIRITUAL INTEREST THERE REMAIN. ON THESE HE THOUGHT IT WISE NOT TO BE SPECIFIC TOO QUICKLY.

7. FINALLY, EBAN CONCLUDED BY SUMMARIZING ISRAEL'S POSITION AS WANTING PEACE AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND RECONGNIZED THAT DETAILS REQUIRE EARLY BUT INTENSIVE STUDY.HE URGED WE NOT BE TOO FATALISTIC AS TO TIMING. WE MUST GAIN SOME TIME BUT ALSO MUST ACT RAPIDLY.

8. AS A POSTSCRIPT, EBAN SAID HE MAY GOFGAIN TO UNITED NATIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4113/2 S E C R E T
BUT BEFORE DOING SO HE WANTS TO FORMULATE ISRAEL'S IDEAS. HE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE PUTTING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS BUT RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S INTERESTS ARE GREATER THAN OTHERS.

FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT INTERNATIONAL OR NAVAL GUARANTEES COULD BE OBTAINED FOR THE STRAITS? THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE HAD NOT HELPED ON THAT POINT IN THE PAST BUT SOME OTHER GUARANTEES MIGHT BE SOUGHT. ALSO ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD THE VARIOUS RELIGIONS IN JERUSALEM WAS OF GREAT INTEREST INTERNATIONALLY AND PROBABLY SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A QUICK ISRAELI DECLARATION.

GP-3 BARBOUR
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

Action

Info

RR RUEHC
DE RUDKBT 5507 1641715
ZNY SSSSS
R 131655Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T RABAT 5507

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1967 JUN 13 PM 1 30

NODIS

1. I SAW LARAKI NOON TODAY FOLLOWING A MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH KING. KING IS ANXIOUS THAT LARAKI BE ABLE GIVE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BROADEST POSSIBLE PICTURE OF ARAB ATTITUDES AND APPROACH TO NEAR EAST SOLUTION. ACCORDINGLY, OVER NEXT THREE OR FOUR DAYS HE WILL BE HAVING PERSONAL EMISSARIES VISIT ARAB CAPITALS. AS SOON AS THEIR REPORTS RECEIVED THEY WILL BE PUT IN LARAKI'S HANDS. SINCE THIS WILL ENTAIL SOME DELAY I DO NOT EXPECT THAT LARAKI WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE THE WEEKEND.

2. A FURTHER REASON FOR KING'S DISPATCH OF EMISSARIES TO NEAR EAST CAPITALS MAY BE TO ARGUE THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IS A NECESSARY PRELIMINARY TO SUMMIT

AND THAT LATTER SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL MOROCCAN EMISSARIES HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY INFORM KING ABOUT SITUATION. WE KNOW KING IS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE SUMMIT HELD BEFORE MODERATES AND WEST HAD DETERMINED THEIR POSITIONS AND AT WHICH, ACCORDINGLY, RADICALS WOULD DOMINATE AND WHICH ALSO GIVE SOVIETS. ACTING THROUGH THE RADICALS, AN OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE THROUGH SUPPORT OF ARAB POINTS OF VIEW.

3. ANOTHER REASON IS, I SUSPECT, KING ALSO TAKING AN INTENSIVE INVENTORY REGARDING NASSER'S PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL. INCIDENTALLY, LARAKI STATED UAR-INSPIRED 10 POINT MEMORANDUM IS DEAD, AT LEAST INSOFAR AS ITS ANTI-US PORTIONS ARE CONCERNED.

4. I WILL ADVISE DEPARTMENT OF LARAKI'S TRAVEL PLANS AS SOON AS THESE ARE CONFIRMED. TASCA

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

C24

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Action

CONTROL: 10800
REC'D: JUNE 13, 1967, 5:58 A.M.

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUDKBT 5491 1640955
ZNY SSSSS
O 130944Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T RABAT 5491

NODIS

REF: STATE 210334

I TOLD FONMIN LARAKI SECRETARY WOULD BE PLEASED RECEIVE HIM AFTER HIS RETURN FROM LUXEMBOURG ON WEDNESDAY. LARAKI SAID HE WILL ALSO VISIT LONDON FOR PARALLEL CONSULTATION WITH THE BRITISH. AS DEPT AWARE, BALAFREJ WILL COVER PARIS AND MOSCOW. TASCA
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

VZCZCEUB648NEA291
00 RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 0883 1640750
ZNY CCCCC
0 P 300745Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
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RUFPBW/CINCUSAFE
T
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0883 JUN 67.
REF YOUR 121240Z REGARDING SUEZ CANAL.
1. AMEMB TEL AVIV MSG 4093 TO SECSTATE REPORTED QUOTE GOI NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION DEFINITELY CONFIRM OR DENY WHETHER CANAL ACTUALLY OBSTRUCTED. IT INCLINED THINK NOT RPT NOT. GOI SAYS IT HAS NOT SUNK ANY CRAFT IN CANAL AND DOES NOT BELIEVE EGYPTIANS HAVE BUT ON LATTER POINT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO BE CATEGORIC ISRAELI FORCES HAVE BEEN TO CANAL AND HAVE IT UNDER OBSERVATION AT SOME POINTS FROM A DISTANCE BUT NO TROOPS ACTUALLY STATIONED

Info
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NEA-9
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10

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1967 JUN 13 AM 4 14

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0883 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ON IT. UNQUOTE.
2. PATRICK MASSEY, REUTER CORRESPONDENT QUOTE WITH ISRAELI FORCES ON THE SUEZ CANAL UNQUOTE WROTE IN 13 JUN JERUSALEM POST QUOTE THE SWING BRIDGE ACROSS THE CANAL TO ISMAILIA IS WEDGED IN THE CLOSED TO ROAD TRAFFIC POSITION. ITS PIVOTAL MECHANISM WAS DAMAGED BY GUNFIRE AND THE BRIDGE HOUSE WAS WRECKED UNQUOTE. GP-3.
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/13/67, 4:45 A.M.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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80 Origin
SS Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, PARIS

Jun 13 8 07 PM '67

STATE 210830

32

EXDIS

Subject: Middle East: Algerian attitude re US and UK involvement.

1. Assistant Secretary Leddy handed French Ambassador Lucet June 12 following intelligence report:

QTE The following information was received from a source in Algeria prior to UAR acceptance of cease-fire.

QTE President of the Revolutionary Council Boumediene and his Foreign Minister Bouteflika along with the majority of the Revolutionary Council, which has been in session, are convinced that the United States and the British are aiding and backing the Israelis in the struggle in the Mid East. They specifically believe that American and British technical support was a decisive factor in the Sinai battle and that this enabled the Israelis to destroy the United Arab Command (UAC) air force on the ground. Because of the topography of the area, the air force is a controlling factor and they consider the subsequent defeat of the Egyptian armor and infantry was inevitable.

QTE They

Drafted by:	Tel Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EUR:FBX:RAnderson:blh 6/13	2191	EUR - John M. Leddy

Clearances:

AFN - Mr. Root M - R.T.Grey S/S - Mr. Walker

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QTE They accept Nasser's allegations in this regard and hold the United States responsible and are determined to avenge the defeats and are definitely engaged to carrying on the war.

QTE Nasser and Boumediene have had repeated telephone conversations and the former is now preparing to carry on the war. The Algerians on their side are preparing to equip a three division force to commit to the reduction of Zionism.

QTE The Algerian people are proceeding to full mobilization including internal defense. Anti-aircraft batteries in the Port area and along the beach of the city of Algiers to the east will fire, probably during the night of June 10.

QTE President Houari Boumediene has been persuaded of American backing to the Israelis by evidence supplied in a written report which Bouteflika brought back from Nasser. Moreover, the Syrians claim to have shot down a British bomber and advise they are forwarding photographs of it to Arab governments.

QTE The Revolutionary Council considers that the Algerian people in majority desire this war against Zionism and that they are prepared to die and that they have no delusions about a short war but expect a long and trying one.

QTE The Algerians have been critical of the Soviet attitude but have now received information from Nasser that the Soviets will, on a political basis, stand firm with the Socialist countries and specifically will

resupply

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resupply Egypt and replace the materiel losses suffered in the Sinai. UNQTE.

2. Leddy commented that allegations were totally false, as GOF, Soviets and others knew very well. He then pointed out that while Algerians may have found it necessary for political reasons to pursue this line in wake of histilities, it was very important for them to be under no illusions about events of the past week as success of efforts to establish peace and stability in the area must be based on facts, not fancy. He hoped that in view of their relationship with the Algerian leadership, the French might find opportunities to put these points across.

3. Lucet agreed that accusations were false and not conducive to arriving at a peaceful settlement, and will forward report and Leddy comments to Quai immediately. In this connection, he had QTE heard UNQTE, but with no confirmation yet from Quai, that in a meeting about two days ago with Algerian Ambassador, de Gaulle told him QTE to keep quiet and not do anything foolish UNQTE. Lucet said he would let Leddy know if he received anything further on this conversation.

END.

KATZENB[illegible]

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHCX/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUESUC/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUESNA/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RULPAL/FOR POLAD USCINCSO
RUESMO/AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY
RUEHDT/USUN
STATE GRNC
E

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 3264

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

1. URUGUAYAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DIPLOMATIC DIRECTOR FOLLE INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER OF MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED FROM URUGUAYAN EMBASSY MOSCOW. ACCORDING FOLLE A NUMBER OF CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE CALLED TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY AND TOLD THAT SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED ISRAELIS THEY MUST WITHDRAW BEHIND LINES ESTABLISHED BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT. SOVIETS REPORTEDLY SAID THEY WOULD GUARANTEE FREE PASSAGE IN GULF OF AQABA. SOVIETS REPORTEDLY SAID IN CASE ISRAEL REFUSES WITHDRAW, SOVIETS WILL RESUME LARGE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ARAB NATIONS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY NEW AIRCRAFT.

2. EACH COUNTRY, ACCORDING FOLLE, WAS DIRECTED TO REPLY TO SOVIETS REGARDING OFFICIAL REACTION ABOUT STATEMENT VIA LOCAL SOVIET EMBASSY. FOLLE SAID THIS FIRST TIME SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS EVER REQUESTED REPLY VIA LOCAL EMBASSY, WHEN ISSUE FIRST RAISED MOSCOW
HOYT
GP3
B1

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 6/12/67 7:23 PM
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, USIA 6/12/67 7:30 PM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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DE RUQTAN 4942 1632150
ZNY TTTTT
P 122135Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
T O P S E C R E T TEHRAN 4942

SUBJECT: SOVIET PLANES TO IRAQ

REFERENCE TEHRAN 4924

1. FONMIN UNDERSECRETARY AFSHAR INFORMED ME LATE EVENING TWELFTH THAT WHEN AMBASSADOR PIRASTEH CALLED ON ACTING IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TO PROTEST IRAQI FAILURE COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS SET BY IRAN FOR GRANTING OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION, IRAQI OPENED CONVERSATION BY GIVING AIRCRAFT NUMBERS, IRAQI PILOTS NAMES ETC., INFO REQUIRED TO SECURE OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION. PIRASTEH SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PLANES ALREADY IN IRAQ, FACT WHICH FONMIN DENIED, PROCEEDING THEN VERIFY HIS DENIAL BY CALL TO CHIEF STAFF IRAQI AIR FORCE WHO ALSO DECLARED NO RPT NO SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT RECEIVED PREVIOUS DAY IN IRAQ. ALL AIRFIELDS IN VICINITY BAGHDAD CHECKED TO SEE IF ANY SOVIET PLANES ARRIVED. NONE REPORTED. IRANIANS MYSTIFIED BY SOVIET AMB'S REPORT TO SHAH. THEY SPECULATE THAT PLANES MENTIONED BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR AS INTENDED FOR IRAQ HAVE ACTUALLY GONE TO SYRIA OR UAR. QUESTION THEN IS WHY DID SOVIET AMBASSADOR TAKE TROUBLE TO INFORM SHAH OF RUSE FOR GETTING PLANES ACROSS IRAN.

2. ACCORDINGLY, AFSHAR RENEWED WITH CONSIDERABLE URGENCY THEIR PLEA MADE TO ME YESTERDAY FOR ANY INFO OUR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES MAY HAVE ON ADVENT OF NEW SOVBLOC MILITARY AIRCRAFT INTO ARAB COUNTRIES.

3. I SAID I WOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS ON HIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON THOUGH IT WAS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE SUPPLY MUCH OF TYPE OF DATA THAT IRAN WANTED.

4. WOULD BE GRATEFUL ANY INFO THIS TOPIC WHICH I MIGHT PASS TO KEY IRANIANS. THACHER

Note: Handled EXDIS per S/S-O

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RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 60
RUCIJUA/CTF 63
RUFRF/NAVSUPPACT NAPLES
RXTGC/USNATREPHAFMED MALTA
RUCIJUA/USS TIDEWATER
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEHCR/AMEMB VALLETTA
RUQMAT/AMEMB ATHENS
RUQKE/CHMAAG ATHENS
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUENAAA/CNO
BT

010542

1967 JUN 12 PM 534

C O N F I D E N T I A L DEF 7707 NATO CONFIDENTIAL TO NATO ADDEE FROM OASD(PA) SIGNED GOULDING USEUCOM FOR PAO.
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, USS LIBERTY

PAGE 2RUEPJS 0510 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REFERENCE: COMSIXTHFLT MSG 102235Z JUN 67 ON SUBJECT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE FOR USS LIBERTY (NOTAL)

PARA TWO OF REFERENCE INDICATES THAT MISSION OF USS LIBERTY SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICC INCLUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS UNQUOTE. OFFICIALS RELEASING THIS INFORMATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK THE LIBERTY WAS ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS QUOTE TO ASSURE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US GOVERNMENT PPOSTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO ASSIST IN RELAYING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS AND OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE THIS LANGUAGE WAS USED IN DOD NEWS RELEASE MADE IN WASHINGTON ON 8 JUNE. GP-4
BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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MIDEAST CONFLICT: ARABLEAGUE INITIATIVE

AFP REPORTS JUNE 12 THAT DR. ADEL AMER, DIRECTOR OF PARIS ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE, HAS SENT OPEN LETTER TO "PRESIDENT OF RUSSELL TRIBUNAL". LETTER REPORTEDLY NOTED THAT MIDEAST CONFLICT HAD RAISED SAME QUESTIONS POSED BY VIETNAM WAR VIZ. (A) ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST ARABS; (B) IDF'S USE OF "METHODS (TREATMENT OF P.O.W'S) AND MEANS (PROSCRIBED WEAPONS SUCH AS NAPALM AND FRAGMENTATION BOMBS)" WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR TRIBUNAL'S INVESTIGATION AND JUDGMENT.

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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BT
S E C R E T PARIS 20112

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1967 JUN 12 PM 5:17

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS:

ACTION:AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE
INFO: DEPT OF DEFENSE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN

LUXEMBOURG FOR UNDERSECRETARY ROSTOW

REF PARIS 20111

MIDEAST CONFLICT: SUEZ CANAL

DEPTELS 210147 AND 210220; EMBTEL
QUAI'S POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR BEAUMARCHAIS
TOLD EMBOFFS JUNE 12 THAT FRENCH HAD NO RPT NO INFORMATION
BEYOND THAT CONTAINED SECOND REFDEPTEL ON CURRENT STATUS SUEZ
CANAL. QUAI CONSIDERED THAT IN CIRCUMSTANCES NOW OBTAINING,
PROLONGED AND DIFFICULT CRISIS HAD TO BE EXPECTED. SITUATION
PREVAILING IN CAIRO, ISRAELI PRESENCE ON BANKS OF CANAL, POSSIBILIT
BOATS ACTUALLY SUNK IN CHANNEL AS SOME REPORTS SUGGEST BASIS
FRENCH VIEW.
ACCORDINGLY FRENCH BELIEVE THAT INITIATIVE IN CAIRO ALONG LINES
SUGGESTED FIRST REFDEPTEL STILL PREMATURE AND PREFER LET SITUATION
RIPEN BEFORE REVIEWING OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM IN THIS RESPECT.
FRENCH HAD ALREADY ASKED EGYPTIANS ABOUT STATE OF CANAL, BUT HAD
RECEIVED NO RPT NO REPLY TO DATE (CF EMBTEL 20001).
BOHLEN
BT
Note; Advance Copy S/S-O 6/12/67
Passed: White House 6/12/67
NOTE: NOT Passed to Addees listedn in text.

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O 122030Z JUNE 67 **SECRET** 10533
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3032 IMMEDIATE 1967 JUN 12 PM 5 14
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T PARIS 20111

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO FOLLOWING: AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE (ACTION) AND INFO IMMEDIATE TO THE FOLLOWING: DPET OF DEFENSE, LONDON, MOSCOW, USUN-NEW YORK

LUXEMBOURG FOR UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW

MIDEAST CRISIS: FRENCH VIEWS

DEPTELS 210147 AND 210127

1. EMBOFFS INFORMED QUAI'S POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR BEAUMARCHAIS AND QUAI'S LEVANT AFFAIRS CHIEF NANTEUIL OF US POLICY ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDEAST PER SECOND REFTEL ON JUNE 12.

2. QUAIOFFS HAD RECEIVED REPORT LUCET-ROSTOW CONVERSATION REPORTED FIRST REFDEPTEL. BEAUMARCHAIS INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR LUCET HAD BEEN SENT FRENCH GOVT'S VIEWS IN REPLY AND ADDED THAT COUVE EXPECTED DISCUSS THEM FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY IN LUXEMBOURG TUESDAY. BEAUMARCHAIS THEN SUMMARIZED FRENCH VIEWS AS FOLLOWS:

A. FRENCH HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIETS RESUPPLYING ARABS WITH ARMS; DOES US HAVE SUCH EVIDENCE? EMBOFFS SAID EMBASSY HAD NO DETAILS BUT THERE INDICATIONS SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN REARM ARABS. (ACTION REQUESTED: CAN DEPT SUPPLY DATA UNDERLYING PERTINENT PORTION PARA 5 DEPTEL 210147 FOR USE WITH QUAI?) BEAUMARCHAIS EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ME ARMS RECIPIENTS WERE CURRENTLY UNINTERESTED IN RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING. ARABS HAVE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS WITH CONSEQUENCES THEIR DEFEAT. ARMS PROBLEM THUS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE AS GREAT IMMEDIACY AS FOR EXAMPLE REFUGEE PROBLEM. BEAUMARCHAIS DID NOT FEEL THAT SITUATION AS HE DESCRIBED IT CONSTITUTED GOOD REASON FOR REFUSING NEW SHIPMENTS TO AREA.

B. BEAUMARCHAIS ACKNOWLEDGED FRENCH UNDER GREAT PRESSURE END FRENCH MIDEAST ARMS EMBARGO. HE SAID FRENCH HAD EMBARGOED ARMS TO MIDEAST "DURING CONFLICT"; LATTER HAD JUST CEASED; FRENCH NOW RETHINKING THEIR POSITION; THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED FIRM CONCLUSION ON WHAT THEY SHOULD DO; IT "POSSILBE" GOF WILL DECIDE RESUME CERTAIN SHIPMENTS IF HOSTILITIES DO NOT EURPT AGAIN (CF EMBTELS 19989 AND 20035); IN THIS CASE FRENCH WOULD MOST LIKELY RESUME FLOW GRADUALLY BEGINNING WITH SPARE PARTS RATHER THAN NEW PRODUCTS. FRENCH DO NOT WISH FOSTER ANOTHER ARMS RACE IN MIDEAST. EMBOFF OBSERVED THAT THERE NO REASON SUPPLYING ANYTHING TO COMBATANTS IF PROBLEM NOT IMMEDIATE. QUAIOFF THEN PROBED FOR INFO ON BRITISH POSITION. HAD UK

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S E C R E T

DROPPED EMBARGO? EMBOFFS POINTED TO FONSEC'S PERTINENT STATEMENTS IN HOUSE OF COMMONS NOTED THEY NOT OTHERWISE INFORMED UK CASE-BY-CASE DECISIONS, IF ANY.

C. BEAUMARCHAIS DID NOT RPT NOT THINK SOVIETS COULD SIT DOWN WITH WESTERN BIG THREE TO AGREE MIDEAST ARMS EMBARGO IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE NOTED SOVIETS UNLIKELY MAKE THEIR DECISION ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ARABS AS FUNCTION US, UK OR FRENCH DECISION; NOR DID HE APPEAR CONCERNED THAT WEST MIGHT GET OUT IN FRONT OF SOVIETS; NOR WOULD FRENCH BASE THEIR DECISION ON FUTURE THEIR EMBARGO NECESSARILY ON WHAT OTHERS LIKELY DO IN THIS AREA.

D. BEAUMARCHAIS SAID TWICE THAT FRENCH APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS MIDEAST ARMS QUESTION WITH US AND INTENDED REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH USG ON PROBLEM. HE FELT HOWEVER THAT IT STILL TOO SOON CONSIDER SUBSTANCE AND MAJOR RAMIFICATIONS THIS QUESTION, AS MUCH DUST NEEDED SETTLE FIRST. HE DID NOT RPT NOT ADMIT THAT RESUMPTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES MIGHT RAISE MORE DUST.

3. BEAUMARCHAIS COMMENTS ON SUEZ CANAL AND OTHER FRENCH VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL.

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BT

Note: Advance Copy S/S-) 6/12/67,
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DE RUFNCR 20113 1632040
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T PARIS 20113

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS:

ACTION:AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE
INFO: DEPT OF DEFENSE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN

LUXEMBOURG FOR UNDERSECRETARY ROSTOW

MIDEAST CRISIS: REFUGEES

EMBTELS 20111; 20112

QUAI'S POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR BEAUMARCHAIS
TOLD EMBOFFS JUNE 12 THAT HUMAN PROBLEMS GENERATED BY

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 20113 S E C R E T
ARAB-ISRAEL HOSTILITIES ARE AMONG MOST URGENT MATTERS CLAMORING FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. FRENCH HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY ARAB GOVTS IN CAPITALS FOR HELP AND THEY WOULD "DO LITTLE BILATERAL THINGS". ARAB AMBASSADORS IN PARIS SEEM PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CRISIS. FRENCH FEEL, BEAUMARCHAIS SAID, THAT HUMAN PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY REFUGEE QUESTION, UNRWA ACTIVITIES, ETC. SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SOONEST IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL.
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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
RUCIEUA/COMAC (POLAD)
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS (USOECD)
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQCPA/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUQPNAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUQTAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
RUALOT/ADEMBAAIY TOKYO
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 1332
PARIS FOR USOECD

SUBJECT: KUWAIT SITREP AS OF 1830 ZULU.

1. KOC MANAGER LEE MET AHMADI GOVERNOR AT 1600 ZULU. GOVERNOR SAID GOK HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY GETTING LABOR UNION AGREE RETURN TO WORK. HE RELFECTED GOK RELUCTANCE EXERT FULL POWER MARTIAL LAW FORCE WORKERS RETURN. GOK HAS, HOWEVER, PUT KUWAIT ARMY DRIVERS ON SHIFT 13. ON EVENING SHIFT THERE WAS A PARTIAL RETURN OF ARAB AND INDIAN EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING SOME TO GATHERING CENTERS. WESTERNERS STILL STANDING SHIFTS AT GATHERING CENTERS, HOWEVER. GOVERNOR ADMITTED GOK KNEW INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE HARRASSING KOC EMPLOYEES AND PREVENTING THEM FROM RETURNING TO JOB.

2. LEE'S TALK WITH GOVERNOR NOT AS REASSURING AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, BUT JUST AFTER I HAD RECEIVED HIS REPORT I CALLED OIL MINISTER ATEEGI AT HIS HOME AND GOT BETTER

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NEWS. I BEGAN BY READING PROPOSED ARAMCO STATEMENT ANNOUNCING RESUMPTION PRODUCTION IN SAUDI ARABIA (JIDDA 5282). ATEEGI SAID THERE NO NEED FOR SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT HERE SINCE KUWAIT HAS NOT STOPPED PRODUCTION. HE THEN INTROUDCED SUBJECT KOC STRIKE AND SAID GOK TAKING FIRM MEASURES END IT TOMORROW. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT GOK IS THIS EVENING INFORMING LABOR UNION OFFICIALS HAVE LABOR FORCE AT WORK TOMORROW OR ELSE THEY AND LABOR UNION SYSTEM IN KUWAIT WOULD SUFFER. I EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PART WORK FORCE WILL RETURN TOMORROW AND THAT FULL SHIFTS WILL BE AT WORK IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED KOC STORAGE CAPACITY MORE THAN WE HAD ORIGINALLY BELIEVED. PRODUCTION WITHOUT SHIPMENT AT PRESENT RATE CAN BE CARRIED ON FOR MINIMUM TEN DAYS RATHER THAN FOUR. PROBLEM OF WESTERNERS MANNING GATHERING CENTER OPERATIONS ON SUSTAINED BASIS NOW DETERMING FACTOR ON WHETHER KOC CAN CONTINUE OPERATION. IF ACTION PROMISED BY ATEEGI CARRIED OUT, SITUATION SHOULD EASE CONSIDERABLY OVER NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

4. ELSEWHERE KUWAIT CALM. WE HAVE NO FURTHER REPORTS FROM NEUTRAL ZONE.

5. LONDON PLEASE PASS HENSHAW AT KOC.

GP-3 COTTAM
BT

Note; Advance Copy S/S-O 6/12/67
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S E C R E T LONDON 10327

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1967 JUN 12 PM 4 12

EXDIS

REF: STATE 210210; USUN 5699

1. WHILE FONOFF.S MORRIS (HEAD, EASTERN DEPT.) AND EMBOFF DISCUSSING WEST BANK EXODUS LATE JUNE 12, LAMBERT (HEAD, UN DEPT.) CAME IN FOR UPGENT CONSULTATION. EMBOFF INVITED TO REMAIN.

2. FONOFF.S INFO SAME AS OURS - ABOUT 100,000 (AMMAN 4239). MORRIS QUITE AGITATED. CARADON HAD URGED SPECIAL HMG CONTRIBUTION TO UNRWA.

3. MORRIS TOOK DIM VIEW OF SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION IDEA. SAID IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS TO STOP WEST BANKERS FROM MOVING EAST. ADVOCATED STRONG SC RES. CALLING ON ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW BY "ENCOURAGING" EVACUTION. UK OFFICIALS SOUGHT U.S. VIEWS.

4.EMBOFF CONFIDED U.S. OFFICIALS LAST NIGHT THINKING ALONG LINE OF RAPID INJECTION PRESTGIOUS UN OR IRC PRESENCE TO CALM

INHABITANTS, INHIBIT POSSIBLE IDF FAREWELL OPERATION, ETC. SUGGESTED ANY CONDEMNATORY IMPLICATIONS BEST BE AVOIDED, AT LEAST UNLESS THERE HARD INFO IDF ACTION DIFFERENT FROM GOI PUBLIC STATEMENTS URGING WEST BANKERS TO STAY. ASSUMED UKUN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH USUN ON PROBLEM.

5. MORRIS AND LAMBERT DECIDED MORRIS WOULD DO FIRST DRAFT OF NON-CONDEMNATORY RES. TO BE PUT UP FOR HMG CLEARANCE TONIGHT.

GP-1. BRUCE

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
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PARIS ALSO FOR OECD

GOI NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION DEFINITELY CONFIRM OR DENY WHETHER CANAL ACTUALLY OBSTRUCTED. IT INCLIED THINK NOT RPT NOT. GOI SAYS IT HAS NOT SUNK ANY CRAFT IN CANAL AND DOES NOT BELIEVE EGYPTIANS HAVE BUT ON LATTER POINT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO BE CATEGORIC. ISRAELI FORCES HAVE BEEN TO CANAL AND HAVE IT UNDER OBSERVATION AT SOME POINTS FROM A DISTANCE BUT NO TROOPS ACTUALLY STATIONED ON IT.
BARBOUR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O 6/12/67 4:18 PM

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RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
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1967 JUN 12 1967 JUN 12 PM 1 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 18056

INDIAN MOTIVATION IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

1. BASIS FOR GOI POSITION:

AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM WHAT WE CONSIDER RELIABLE SOURCES GOI POSITION IN MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN FORMULATED IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF CABINET RATHER THAN AT LOWER LEVEL. COMMITTEE CONSISTS OF PRIMIN, DEPUTY PRIMIN, AND MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND HOME. WITHIN THIS GROUP WE UNDERSTAND ACTIVISTS FORMULATING POLICIES HAVE BEEN PRIMIN AND MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. MORARJI DESAI, DEPUTY PRIMIN,

HAS ARVDED AGAINST PRESENT POLICIES, THOUGH WE GATHER HE MAY NOT HAVE DONE SO WITH VERY MUCH VIGOR. OUR REPORTS FURTHER INDICATE THAT CHAVAN HAS NOT TAKEN POSITIVE POSITION PRO OR CON. FOLLOWING ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN GOI DECISION SUPPORT ARABS GENERALLY AND UAR IN PARTICULAR:

A. INDIA MUST HAVE SUPPORT WITHIN MUSLIM WORLD AGAINST PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO COUNTER PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS OBTAIN PAN-ISLANIC SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION ON KASHMIR.

B. ALONG WITH UAR AND YUGOSLAVIA, INDIA CONSIDERS ITSELF A LEADER OF THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD. THEREFORE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT TO DIPLOMATICALLY SUPPORT NASSER.

C. NASSER, AS LEADER OF THE "PROGRESSIVE" ARABS, IN CONTRAST TO FEUDALISTIC SAUDI-ARABIA, IS DESERVING OF INDIA'S SUPPORT.

D. MRS. GANDHI IS BELIEVED TO GO THROUGH A REASONING PROCESS OF FIRST CONSIDERING WHAT HER FATHER WOULD HAVE DONE IN A GIVEN SITUATION, AND SINCE HER FATHER HAD A LONG AND CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH NASSER SHE ACTED ACCORDINGLY.

E. GOI MAY WELL HAVE THOUGHT NASSER WOULD BE

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 18056 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ON WINNING SIDE.

2. INTERNAL EFFECT OF GOI POSITION:
OPPOSITION TO FOREGOING POLICY HAS BEEN UNANIMOUS FROM ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS. WITH OBVIOUS EXCEPTION OF COMMIE LINE ORGANS, PRESS HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN CRITICIZING GOI POLICY, LARGELY ON GROUND DISSERVICE INDIA'S OWN INTERESTS. TO LIMITED EXTENT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE OBTAIN INFORMATION RE CONGRESS PARTY SENTIMENT, IT APPEARS OPPOSITION WIDESPREAD ALTHOUGH LARGELY MUTED PUBLICLY IN INTEREST PARTY SOLIDARITY.
ARGUMENTS USED BY OPPOSITION AGAINST GOVERNMENT ARE:
A. THOUGH PROFESSING TO BE NON-ALIGNED, GOI IS ACTING AS THOUGH CLEARLY ALIGNED (WITH USSR AS WELL AS UAR) IN THIS MATTER.
B. ARAB NATIONS DID NOT SUPPORT INDIA IN 1962 OR IN 1965 AND THERFORE HARDLY DESERVING OF DEGREE SUPPORT INDIA HAS GIVEN IN RECENT WEEKS.
C. CRISIS FOMENTED PRINCIPALLY BY UAR RATHER THAN

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 18056 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ISRAEL AS IT WAS FORMER WHO REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL UNEF, CLOSED GULF OF AQABA, AND ISSUED THREATENING STATMENTS.
D. WHILE ARAB COUNTRIES ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION OF OBLITERATING STATE OF ISRAEL, GOI HAS IN PAST ACCEPTED ISRAELI EXISTENCE, AND IN SO DOING IS IN LINE WITH POSITION OF THE UN, COMMUNIST BLOC AND MOST OTHERNON-MUSLIM NATIONS.
E. IT WAS UNWISE FOR INFIA TO GO SBYFAR IN SUPPORT OF UAR IN A DIFFICULT COMPLICATED SITUATION WHEN INDIA'S PRIME INTEREST LAY IN PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA AND THE CONTINUED OPERATIONOF THE SUEZ CANAL.
F. BY ACTING TO APPEASE THE ARABS WHO ARE OF DUBIOUS IMPORTANCE TO INDIA, THEY RISKED SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE US AND UK, COUNTRIES OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO INDIAN DEVELOPMENT.

3. EXTERNAL FACTORS:
A. SOVIET -- WE GATHER FROM REPORTING USUN AND LOCAL CONTACTS THAT SOVIET ATTITUDE HAS BEEN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN GOI CALCULATIONS.

PAGE 5 RUSBAE 18056 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. CHINESE -- WE DOUBT GOI THOUGHT THROUGH CHINESE IMPLICATIONS BUT ARE CERTAIN THEY HAVE NOTED RECENT CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NASSER AND OFFER OF 150,000 TONS OF WHEAT AND $10 MILLIONLOAN "WITHOUT STRINGS AND WITHOUT ANY FIXED DATE FOR REPAYMENT."
C. YUGOSLAV -- WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT, AT LEAST INITIALLY , THERE WAS LITTLE COORDINATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVS AND GOI IN NEW DELHI. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR UVALIC, WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE DEPARTED ON TRANSFER, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN AT HIS POST FOR THE PRESENT.
D. UAR -- INDIAN SUPPORT FOR UAR HAS BEEN A GAIN IN NEGATIVE TERMS OF PRESUMABLY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR UAR TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN IN FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, FACT GOI ACCEPTS ISRAEL AS A STATE WITH A RIGHT TO EXIST SERVES TO LIMIT GOI SUPPORT (#) AND ARE A RATHER TESTY WHEN DNZD DONTED WITH DOMESTIC ATTACKS ON

PAGE 6 RUSBAE 18056 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THEIR POLICY. THEY FURTHER JUSTIFY GOI POSITION BY:
A. CITING PRESENCE 60 MILLION MUSLIMS IN INDIA AS JUSTIFICATION FOR SUPPORT TO UAR.
B. CLAIMING THAT INDIAN IRADWE WITH ARAB COUNIRIES IS ROUGHLY 200 TIMES THE SIZE OF INDIAN TRADE WITH ISRAEL.

5. US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
A. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, FONMIN CHAGLA HAS HONORED HIS COMMITMENT TO ME TO FIND OCCASION IN RAJYA SABHA TO NOTE US DENIAL OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT HOSTILITIES.
B. IN OFFICIAL BRIEFING FOR INDIAN PRESS, MEA SECRETARY AZIM HUSAIN, WHEN ASKED QUESTION OF GOI VIEW OF US AND UK DENIALS, SAID US AND UK STATEMENTS WERE ACCEPTED AS TRUE, BUT THEN PROCEEDED TO CAUTION PRESS AGAINST PUBLISHING HIS STATEMENT.

6. NEGATIVE INDIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL WAS INCREASED BY UNFORTUNATE STRAFING OF INDIAN CONTINGENT UNEF WITH NUMBER INDIAN DEAD. THIS INCIDENT GAVE GOVERNMENT OPPORTUNITY DEFLECT CRITICISM OF ITSELF BY VIGOROUS AND EMOTIONAL CRITICISM OF ISRAEL.
GP-3
GREENE

(#) Omission correction to follow.

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 11406

EXDIS

1. CINC LEBANESE ARMY. GENERAL BOUSTANY, TODAY, JUNE 12, SENT EMISSARY TO EMBASSY TO HELP USG'S HELP WITH REGARD FOLLOWING TWO ISRAELI REQUESTS WHICH HE HAS RECEIVED: (A) RETURN TO ISRAEL OF ISRAELI PILOT CAPTURED IN LEBANON LAST WEEK AND (B) MEETING OF LEBANESE AND ISRAELI OXFICIALS (PERHAPS ILMAC) TO DISCUSS BORDER PROBLEMS.

2. BOUSTANY ASKED USG TO DO ITS UTMOST TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS TO BE PATIENT FOR TIME-BEING UNTIL PRESENT TURMOIL IN LEBANON HAS CALMED DOWN AND SOME HEAT GONE OUT OF EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE. WHILE HE WISHED FERVENTLY TO AVOID ANY DIFFICULTIES WITH ISRAEL, INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON IS SO PRECARIOUS THAT WISDOM WOULD

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DICTATE PATIENCE UNTIL SITUATION SETTLES DOWN.

3. MEANWHILE BOUSTANY SENDS HIS PERSONAL ASSURANCES THAT PRISONER BEING WELL TREATED AND THAT PRISONER WILL BE RETURNED TO ISRAELIS AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

4. EMBASSY CONCURS COMPLETELY IN BOUSTANY'S PLEA THAT THIS IS NOT RIGHT TIME EITHER TO RETURN PRISONER OR HOLD MEETING WITH ISRAELIS. (BOUSTANY HAS PERSONALLY MADE CERTAIN THAT LEBANESE ARMY MAINTAINED STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ROLE. FURTHERMORE WE UNDERSTAND IT UPON BOUSTANY'S INSISTENCE THAT ALGERIANS WERE DENIED PERMISSION TO LAND BEIRUT AIRPORT ENROUTE TO SYRIA AND THAT SYRIANS WERE DENIED ENTRY INTO LEBANON DURING HOSTILITIES). WE BELIEVE THAT, IF GOL WERE TO MEET THESE ISRAELI REQUESTS AT THIS MOMENT WHEN MUSLIM ELEMENT MERE HIGHLY INFLAAMED. LEBANON WOULD IMMEDIATELY

BBECOME TARGET OF ABUSE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND WOULD BE FORCED TO ABANDON ITS MODERATE STAND.

PAGE 3 RUQMBE 11406 S E C R E T
5. WE HOPE THAT EMBASSY TEL AVIV WILL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS TO GIVE BOUSTANY AND GOL A LITTLE MORE TIME TO ALLOW THINGS TO SETTLE DOWN BEFORE ACTING ON ISRAEL'S REQUESTS, WPCIH THEY HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF MEETING ANYWAY. WE BELIEVE IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FROM STANDPOINT STABILITY (AND PERHAPS EXISTENVE) OF LEBANON AS WELL AS FUTURE LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

6. MEANWHILE COULDN'T ISRAELIS USE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AS GO-BETWEEN FOR EFFECTING RELEASE OF ISRAELI PILOT, THIS SAVING GENERAL BOUSTANY AND GOL MUCH DIFFICULTY AND EMBARRASSMENT?
GP-3.
MIDDLETON
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NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 1:43 p.m., June 12.
Passed White House at 2:29 p.m., June 12.

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4089

EXDIS

REF: STATE 210210 AND USUN 5699

1. AS REGARDS PARA 7 LST REFTEL I AGREE WITH SUGGESTION THAT SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSS RELIEF PROBLEM WITH ISRAELIS AND ARABS WITH VIEW TO SEEING WHAT UN AGENCIES COULD DO TO HELP. AS COMPLEMENTARY MEASURE, I AM PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4089 S E C R E T
WITH LINE OF THINKING SECOND REFTEL RE ESTABLISHMENT IMPARTIAL PRESENCE ON WEST BANK AND HOPE WE CAN MOVE THAT DIRECTION SOONESST. INSOFAR AS SUCH ACTION CONSIDERED SUBSTITUTE FOR KHAN TRIP, IT WOULD NOT EXPOSE US TO PROBLEM WHICH COULD ARISE IF KHAN WERE TO RECOMMEND AS RESULT GENERAL SURVEY THAT US EXTEND AID BILATERALLY TO COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BROKEN RELATIONS WITH US.

2. WE ALSO IN AGREEMENT PARA 3 LST REFTEL TO EFFECT GOI SHOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARE POPULATION IN AREAS IT OCCUPIES AND, AS REPORTED OUR 4042, WE BELIEVE IT HAS SUCH INTENTION. ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY ASKED FOR HELP FROM CARE TO FEED GAZA REFUGEES AND WE EXPECT THEY WILL REQUEST FURTHER AID WHEN THEY FEEL THEY NEED IT.

3. ALTHOUGH ISRAELIS ABLE SEE ADVANTAGES OF MAINTAINING ORDER ON EAST BANK, BITTERNESS HERE AGAINST GOJ AND JORDANIAN FORCES FOR ROLE IN SUPPORTING NASSER AND SHELLING BORDER KIBBUTZIM STILL RUNS HIGH. CONSEQUENTLY, LARGE RELIEF PROGRAM IN JORDAN COULD CAUSE RESENTMENT AND CRITICISM OF INITIATING COUNTRIES.

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CONTINUED USE OF UNWRA CRITERIA FOR RATIONS DISTRIBUTION, WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE LONG CONSIDERED SHAM, WOULD AGGRAVATE THEM FURTHER, ALTHOUGH DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM MIGHT BE UTILIZED INSOFAR AS IT HAS NO RELATION TO SUCH CONSIDERATIONS.

4. WE ARE GRATIFIED TO SEE THAT DEPT. IS THINKING IN TERMS OF AID THROUGH UN AND PRIVAE CHANNELS RATHER THAN THROUGH USG OFFICIAL CHANNELS. IN THIS WAY WE BELIEVE WE CAN HANDLE MORE EASILY POLITICAL DEBITS HERE OF HELPING ONE OF ISRAELS'S RECENTLY FALLEN ENEMIES. MOREOVER, AID THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE SOME USG HELP, IF DEEMED ESSENTIAL, TO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BOTH BEEN ENEMIES OF ISRAEL AND HAVE BROKEN RELATIONS WITH US.

GP-3. BARBOUR
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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 1:35 P.M., 6-12-67.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 2:22 P.M., 6-12-67.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUCHAREST 1642

1. FONMIN MANESCU SUMMONED ME AT 1330 JUNE 12 AND FROM HAND-WRITTEN NOTES MADE ORAL STATEMENT OF ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT RELATING TO NEAR EAST OF WHICH FOLLOWING WERE ESSENTIAL POINTS.

2. ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES HAVE SERIOUS CONCERN WITH NE SITUATION. CERTAIN STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FROM ISRAELI SIDE WHICH INDICATE INTENTION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MILITARY RESULTS SUCH AS TERRITORIAL ANNEXATIONS. SUCH STATEMENTS DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO CALMING TENSIONS AND TO REACHING NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN ROMANIAN VIEW ALL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO AVOID MEASURES WHICH COULD COMPLICATE SITUATION MORE AND SHOULD SEEK CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES MAY BE NEGOTIATED WITH VIEW TO ESTABLISH LASTING PEACE IN THAT AREA BASED ON JUSTICE AND CONSENT OF PEOPLES CONCERNED..

3. MANESCU REPEATED REFERENCE TO ISRAELI STATEMENTS AS LEAVING IMPRESSION DESIRE TO ACQUIRE TERRITORY AND MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN PRESENT SITUATION AND REITERATED ROMANIAN ATTITUDE NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE WHICH COULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON NEGOTIATION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN STATES IN NE. HE ASKED I CONVEY HIS STATEMENT TO US.

4. IN PROMISING TO DO SO, I SAID AS HIS GOVERNMENT ALREADY KNEW US GOVERNMENT FROM OUTSET HAD STRIVEN TO AVOID OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND WHEN STARTED TO BRING THEM TO IMMEDIATE END. I REFERRED TO PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS AND TO AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S SPEECHES IN UNSC AND POINTED OUT ON LATEST RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN THAT BODY HAD AS AN OBJECTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF STABLE PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

5. MANESCU SAID ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF ROMANIAN STATEMENT AND ARAB STATES WOULD BE AS WELL AS OTHERS.
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EXDIS

REF: STATE 210152, TEHRAN 4900

1. ZAHEDI RAISED AGAIN WITH ME EVENING ELEVENTH POSSIBILITY OF U.S. SENDING HIGH LEVEL EMISSARY TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WITH SHAH. SAID HE HAD ABANDONED IDEA OF GOING FOR BRIEF VISIT TO WASHINGTON SINCE HE FELT THIS WOULD ATTRACT TOO MUCH ATTENTION AND MIGHT BE MISUNDERSTOOD. HE STILL HOPED, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR U.S. REP ARRIVE, IF NOT BEFORE SHAH'S VISIT TO TURKEY (BEGINNING JUNE 16), THEN SHORTLY AFTERWARDS.

2. IN VIEW ANSARY'S PREFERENCE EXPRESSED LAST PARA DEPTREFTEL, I

PAGE 2 RUQTAN 4936 S E C R E T
DID NOT GIVE ZAHEDI DEFINITIVE REPLY BUT SIMPLY STATED IT MY IMPRESSION THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE ENGAGED FOR SOME TIME YET IN DIFFICULT TASK SORTING OUT VAST PROBLEMS LEFT IN WAKE ARAB-ISRAEL HOSTILITIES AND IN DETERMINING WHAT U.S. APPROACH SHOULD BE. THUS IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THERE MIGHT BE SOME DELAY BEFORE USEFUL DEFINITIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS COULD TAKE PLACE.

3. ZAHEDI SEEMED DISPPOINTED AT THESE COMMENTS. HE DID REMARK, HOWEVER, THAT SHAH NOT RPT NOT STRONGLY COMMITTED TO IDEA OF VISIT BY HIGH LEVEL U.S. REP. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT ANSARY HAD THAT DAY BEEN TRYING TO REACH HIM BY PHONE BUT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE MAKE CONTACT.

4. I EXPECT ANSARY WILL GET DEPARTMENT'S POSITION THROUGH TO SHAH (TO WHOM HE ASSERTS HE CAN SEND HIS MESSAGES "DIRECT") IN NEXT DAY OR SO.

THACHER
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 2234

1. DURING FAREWELL LUNCHEON PRIME MINISTER GAVE ME TODAY HE TALKED AT LENGTH ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND WAS FULL OF ADMIRATION FOR ISRAEL MILITARY EXPLOITS. HE SAID "BETWEEN YOU AND ME I AM GLAD TO SEE NASSER PULLED DOWN A FEW PEGS. I DO NOT LIKE THOSE BOASTING, BULLYING FELLOWS."

2. PUBLICLY, OF COURSE, OFFICIAL SENTIMENT HERE WAS CAUTIOUSLY PRO-ARAB FOR OBVIOUS REASONS: TEAS SALES. HOWEVER, NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS AND I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY FACT THAT MANY MINISTERS ON WHOM I HAVE BEEN PAYING FAREWELL CALLS HAVE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION AND AT LEAST ONE DELIGHT AT WAY THINGS HAVE TURNED OUT. MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WHO HAS REPUTATION OF ALWAYS SAYING WRONG

THING, SAID HE WISHED WAR HAD LASTED FEW DAYS MORE SO ISRAEL COULD HAVE CAPTURED CAIRO.

3. I HAVE ALSO FOUND CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT AMONG THINKING CEYLONESE FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CANAL.

4. OPPOSITION PARTIES AND MOST MUSLIMS HAVE BEEN OPENLY PRO-ARAB AND HAVE STAGED COUPLE OF PUBLIC MEETINGS CONDEMNING ISRAEL. HOWEVER, THESE HAVE NOT MADE MUCH IMPACT AND PREVAILING SENTIMENT APPEARS AGREE WITH TIMES OF CEYLON CHARACTERIZATION OF NASSER AS "DEFLATED WINDBAG."

GP-4. LYON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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S E C R E T AMMAN 4246

LIMDIS

REF: A. AMMAN'S 4181; B. AMMAN'S 4229

1. REFTEL A REPORTS MY MEETING WITH HUSSEIN ON AFTERNOON OF JUNE 9. WHEN REFTEL WAS DRAFTED I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO FURNISH A FULL REPORT OF THE MEETING. THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE PART OF THE CONVERSATION FOLLOWS.

2. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT THE SIMPLE FACT OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR WAS EXPECTED BY USG TO, AND HAD, DAMAGED US INTERESTS EXTENSIVELY IN THE AREA. BUT THE CHARGE OF US PARTICIPATION HAD DAMAGED OUR INTERESTS FAR MORE THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE.

3. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT UNLESS THIS TREND COULD BE REVERSED I DID NOT SEE, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WHAT INCENTIVE THERE WOULD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4246A S E C R E T
BE LEFT TO USG TO TRY TO ASSIST THE ARABS. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT THIS OBSERVATION APPLIED TO ALL THE ARAB STATES AND THAT USG ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANY INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATE WOULD BE PRIMARILY DETERMINED BY WHAT ACTION THAT ARAB STATE HENCEFORTH TOOK IN RELATION TO US INTERESTS.

4. HUSSEIN ASKED ME QUOTE CAN THE USG PROMISE TO GET ME BACK ON THE WEST BANK? UNQUOTE. I REPLIED QUOTE I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HONEST WITH YOUR MAJESTY. I CAN PROMISE YOU NOTHING SPECIFIC. I AM SPEAKING OF A FRAME OF MIND, A WILL, AN INCENTIVE. UNQUOTE

5. NEW SUBJECT. I COULD COMPREHEND A TEMPTATION TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARE HOPELESS, ISRAELIS AND ARAB ALIKE,

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AND THAT WE SHOULD FIND A WAY TO JUST WASH OUR HANDS OF THE SITUATION AND LET THEM SETTLE MATTERS AMONG THEMSELVES.

6. THIS EMBASSY DEFINITELY BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF THERE BEING AN EARLY PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS IF WE USE OUR INFLUENCE ACTIVELY NOW. ANOTHER BLOW UP IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR US. HENCE THE RECOMMENDATION MADE IN RETEL B.

7. WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN HERE TO TRY TO GET THE JORDANIANS TO STAY THE TRENDS WHICH ARE DAMAGING OUR INTERESTS. HUSSEIN HAS

FOR THE IMMEDIATE PRESENT A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE, BECAUSE OF HIS ARMY'S COURAGE, WHICH OFFER INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES.

8. IN REFTEL B WE RECOMMENDED THAT THE USG MAKE TWO DECLARATIONS. IN OUR OPINION, THESE STATEMENTS WOULD NOT HAMPER OUR FLEXIBILITY IN FUTURE. SUCH DECLARATIONS WOULD, WE HOPE, GIVE MODERATE ARABS COURAGE TO RESIST NASSER AGAIN TAKING THEM DOWN THE GARDEN PATH.

GP-1. BURNS
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:15 AM, 6/12/67.
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE AT 7:15 AM, 6/12/67.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5701

RE: ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH MISOFF LAST TWO DAYS, SHALIZI (AFGHAN, MEMBER UN ADEN MISSION) AND SADI (JORDAN) (PROTECT LATTER SOURCE: SADI MADE CLEAR HE SPEAKING INDIVIDUALLY, NOT ON BEHALF GOJ) HAVE SUGGESTED BEST SOLUTION NOW FOR WEST BANK AND FOR RELATED EVACUEE/REFUGEE PROBLEM MIGHT BE FOR WEST BANK TO REMAIN UNITED WITH ISRAEL. CURRENT WEST BANK POPULATION WOULD REMAIN AND OTHER PALESTINE REFUGEES WOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO NEW STATE HAVING SAME BORDERS AS OLD PALESTINE MANDATE.

2. IN REPLY TO MISOFF'S QUESTIONS, SADI SAID PALESTINE REFUGEES WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH ISRAELIS HAD MAJORITY OF POPULATION AND CONTROLLED GOVT. MOST REFUGEES HAD NO SAY IN GOVTS IN ARAB STATES ANYWAY. WHAT THEY WANTED WAS RETURN TO PALESTINE TO LIVE ONLY, NOT TO EXPEL ISRAELIS OR TO SET UP ARAB GOVT. SAID PRESENT MOMENT OFFERS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN WAY ACCEPTABLE TO PALREFS THEMSELVES, WHILE NOT ABOLISHING ISRAEL AS A STATE. SUCH A SOLUTION -- WHICH IS THE IMPORTANT PART OF WHAT ARABS HAVE ASKED FOR SINCE 1948 -- WOULD MEAN JEWS AND ARABS COULD LIVE IN PEACE INSIDE NEW STATE AND NEW STATE WOULD BE GIVEN RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE BY NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. IT COULD BE BEGINNING OF NEW REGIME IN ME.

3. MISOFF ASKED IF PALREFS WOULD INSIST ON RETURNING TO ACTUAL SITES OF THEIR HOMES, OR SIMPLY TO AVAILABLE SITES IN PROPOSED NEW STATE. SADI SAID LATTER. OBVIOUSLY CHANGES IN INTERIM WOULD FORECLOSE FOR MANY OR MOST RETURN TO ACTUAL HOME SITES. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS RETURN TO HOMELAND STATE. NOW MISOFF OBSERVED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENT BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT AND THAT ARABS IN ISRAEL HAD GENERALLY NOT ENJOYED DE JURE OR DE FACTO FIRST-CLAS CITIZENSHIP. ASKED SAID IF HE DIDN'T THINK SOME SORT OF AREA RESTRICTIONS ON ARAB RESIDENCE WOULD BE MOST LIKELY RESULT OF ISRAELIS ACCEPTED IDEA OF NEW STATEM SADI SAID PALREFS SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM TERRITORY NOW

CONFIDENTIAL

ISRAEL, THAT NEW STATE SHOULD BE DEMOCRATIC ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE BUT THAT INITIAL CONCENTRATION OF ARABS IN WEST BANK AND INEVITABLE DE FACTO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP WOULD BE ACQUIESCED IN BY ARABS WHO WOULD IN ANY CASE BE BETTER OFF THAN REFUGEE STATUS OF PAST 20 YEARS.

4. MISOFF ASKED HOW ISRAELIS COULD ACCEPT ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE STATE WHEN ARABS, ALTHOUGH IN MINORITY AT OUTSET (SADI ESTIMATED 2.5 MILLION JEWS, 1.8-2.0 MILLION ARABS TO START WITH), WOULD, OWING TO HIGHER PROLIFERATION RATE, SOON OUTNUMBER JEWS. SADI ADMITTED THIS WOULD BE PROBLEM IN GETTING ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO NEW STATE, BUT THAT MAYBE SOME GUARANTEES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE (HE DIDN'T SPECIFY WHAT). FELT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE OVERCOME IN INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING PEACEFUL AND STABLE REGIME IN ME.

COMMENT: BELIEVE SADI WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY. AS PALREF HIMSELF (ORIGINALLY FROM NEAR HAIFA) SADI HAS HAD PASSIONATE INTEREST IN PALESTINE PROBLEM AND REFUGEE QUESTION AND HAS PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN OF RESTORED PALESTINE STATE, ALTHOUGH UNTIL LAST WEEK THIS WAS ALWAYS IN TERMS OF STATE IN WHICH PALESTINE ARABS WERE DOMINANT. REMARKS WERE INTERESTING PARALLEL TO THOSE OF GEN DAYAN IN JUNE 11 CBS "FACE THE NATION" INTERVIEW.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

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Action

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4076

009921

1967 JUN 12 AM 6 02

REF: TEL AVIV 4073

1. GOI HAS JUST NOW, THAT IS 0845 GMT, CONFIRMED AND ELABORATED INFORMATION RE TROOP MOVEMENTS AND UNTSO SITUATION GIVEN IN REFTEL AT 0405 GMT THIS MORNING.

2. RE TROOP MOVEMENTS, GOI CHARACTERIZES REPORT OF LARGE-SCALE TANK COLUMN WITH AIR SUPPORT (HELICOPTERS OR PLANES) TO SOUTH AND EAST BEYOND CEASE FIRE POSITIONS AS QUOTE ABSOLUTE NONSENSE UNQUOTE. ISRAELIS ATTRIBUTE DIFFICULTY TO FACT THAT IN ABSENCE UN OBSERVERS NO RPT NO ACTUAL CEASE FIRE LINE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON GROUND. THERE WERE MINOR ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS INSIDE THE SECTOR THEY HELD WHEN CEASE FIRE INSTITUTED. THESE MOVEMENTS WERE FOR PURPOSES OF IMPROVING CAPABILITY HOLDING POSITIONS CEASE FIRE. ORDERS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL

RSR

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4076 S E C R E T
HAVE GONE OUT THIS MORNING NOT RPT NOT TO CONTINUE EVEN THIS TYPE REDEPLOYMENT DESPITE ISRAELI POSITIONS AT SOME POINTS ALONG CEASE FIRE LINE ARE NOT RPT NOT VERY SECURE DEFENSIVELY.

3. AS TO UN OBSERVERS, THE NINE TEAMS OF TWO MEN EACH, TOGETHER WITH ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS IN EACH CASE, BEGAN TO MOVE UP TO CEASE FIRE POSITIONS AT 0600 HOURS GMT THIS MORNING AND SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY NOW.
GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:15 AM, 6/12/67.
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE AT 6:15 AM, 6/12/67.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMJR/AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T USUN 5699

Info

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1967 JUN 12 AM 5 38

EXDIS

REF: STATE 210210.

FOL ARE USUN REACTIONS TO REFTEL:

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 5699 S E C R E T
1. AS REFTEL DEALS PRIMARILY WITH RELIEF FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY BECOME REFUGEES, USUN WOULD LIKE TO ADD SUGGESTION THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL EVEN NOW TO ATTEMPT FORESTALL FURTHER DEPARTURES FROM WEST BANK AREA. AS POSTS HAVE POINTED OUT, IT MORE DESIRABLE THAT AS MANY WEST BANK RESIDENTS AS POSSIBLE REMAIN IN THEIR HOMES, REDUCING PROPORTIONATELY FUTURE REFUGEE PROBLEM. ISRAEL AS WELL AS JORDAN HAS DECLARED THIS TO BE DESIRABLE. YET ESTIMATES SUGGEST SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS ALREADY DEPARTED AND INFO VARIES ON EXTENT TO WHICH DEPARTURES VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY (THOUGH OF COURSE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO FORESTALL VOLUNTARY AS WELL AS INVOLUNTARY DEPARTURES SINCE RESULT SAME IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC EFFECT ON JORDAN AND HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND RELIEF REQUIREMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL REFUGEES). WE THEREFORE SUGGESTION DESIRABILITY OF IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) IN (END UNDERLINE) WEST BANK TO A) TRY TO CALM FEARS OF THOSE WHO MAY BE LEAVING VOLUNTARILY, B) PROVIDE CHECK ON BEHAVIOR IDF ON GROUND TO PREVENT "ENCOURAGED" DEPARTURES, AND C) INHIBIT ANY SUCH ENCOURAGEMENT BY PERSUASION OR BY SENDING REPORTS TO SYG FOR PUBLICATION.

2. SUCH INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH KHAN SURVEY SUGGESTED REFTEL, BUT THIS, IF APPROVED BY SYG AND ACCEPTED

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BY PARTIES, WOULD PROBABLY TAKE SOME TIME TO ARRANGE AND WOULD HAVE DISADVANTAGE (IN ARAB MIND) OF APPEARING TO FOCUS ON NEEDS OF REFUGEES RATHER THAN REDUCING THEIR EXODUS ACROSS JORDAN. VALUE OF SUCH PRESENCE DEPENDS LARGELY ON SPEED WITH WHICH IT ESTABLISHED IF AIM IS TO (BEGIN UNDERLINE) FORESTALL (END UNDERLINE) DEPARTURES, AND VISIT BY KHAN TO WEST BANK WOULD NOT LIKELY BE OF EXTENT OR DURATION SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE AIMS IN PARA 1 ABOVE .

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 5699 S E C R E T
3. PERHAPS BEST WAY ACHIEVE THIS AND PERMIT RAPID REPORTING MIGHT BE TO URGE SYG APPOINT SPECIAL REP TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE IN AREA, AND, DRAWING INFORMALLY ON PERSONNEL RESOURCES OF UNRWA, REPORT REASONS FOR CURRENT EXODUS. (MERON (ISRAEL) INDICATED TO MISOFF JUNE 11 GOI QUITE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH UNRWA IN WEST BANK, BUT THAT UNRWA SO FAR HAD HAD "COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES.") SYG REP MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE CALLED FOR IN RES ALONG LINES OF DRAFT LA RES FOCUSSED ON HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CONFLICT. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES MIGHT BE BERNARDES (FORMER SYG REP IN CYPRUS, AND FORMER BRAZILIAN PERMREP AT UN) AND NIELSEN (FORMER NORWEGIAN PERMREP TO UN, NOW IN OSLO). APPOINTMENT COULD LEAD TO SYG REP WITH WIDER MANDATE IN AREA, WHICH, ACCORDING TO ITALIAN PERM REP, SYG HAS IN MIND. (THIS IS REASON HE HAS NOT WANTED SPINELLI GO TO AMMAN SINCE HIS MANDATE TOO NARROW.) INDIAN PERM REP HAS CALLED FOR SUCH SYG REP.

4. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH MIGHT GET MORE RAPID ACTION BUT HAVE LESS POLITICAL OR PUBLIC OPINION IMPACT MIGHT BE USE OF IRC WHICH ALREADY HAS OFFICE IN AMMAN AND MAY HAVE ONE ALSO IN TELAVIV.

5. MISSION BY KHAN OR HIS OFFICE TO ASSESS NEEDS OF REFUGEES MIGHT HAVE BETTER IMPACT IF SOME EFFORT OF TYPE OUTLINED ABOVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN. THERE IS CERTAINLY NEED TO GET AT PURE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM BUT WE NEED AVOID IMPRESSION WE ARE ACQUIESCING IN NEW GENERATION REFUGEES WITHOUT LOOKING AT CAUSES.

GOLDBERG

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/12/67, 5:50 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6/12/67, 5:55 A.M.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

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JUN 12 5 16PM '67

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy RABAT - IMMEDIATE
STATE 210334

NODIS

Reference Rabat's 5464.

You should inform Laraki that the Secretary is in Luxembourg for NATO Meeting, returning Wednesday night. We would be pleased receive him any time thereafter to hear what he has to say and to share with him our views on Near East crisis.

If Laraki prefers, the Secretary could meet him in Madrid Wednesday afternoon as an alternative to visiting Washington. We do not believe, and assume Laraki shares our view, that stopover by the Secretary in Morocco would be desirable at this time.

KATZENBACH

END

Drafted by: JPWalsh	Tel. Ext. 7741	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:
M - Mr. Rostow
AF - Mr. Palmer
WH - Mr. Bundy
NEA - Mr. Battle
S/S - Mr. Walsh
U-The Under Secretary

SECRET
Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 210233

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

48-S

Origin SS

ACTION: AMEMBASSY PARIS (FOR USOECD) IMMEDIATE

Info:

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STATE 210233

SUBJECT: SUEZ CANAL

FOR HINTON

Our feeling is that US should not rpt not get out in front in efforts to reopen Canal. Not only do we wish to avoid being in position of demandeur vis-a-vis Nasir, but US initiative would lessen chances Egypt will respond to European pressures and its own economic interest and reopen Canal in near future.

We have suggested to Paris through Lucet that France may wish to take lead on reopening now that ceasefire in effect and case can no longer be made under Treaty of 1888 for closure. For the moment we plan no rpt no further action other than encouragement from the sidelines.

END

Drafted by: M:TOEnders:mk 6/12/67	4231	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: E: Mr. Solomon

Clearances: RPE - Mr. Percival
NEA - Mr. Handley
L - Mr. Wehmeyer
S/S - Mr. ~~Thompson~~ Walsh

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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10231

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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46

Origin NEA

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI
INFO: Amconsul BOMBAY

Jun 12 10 39 AM '67

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STATE 210231

June 12 press here reports PriMin Gandhi criticized US aid policies in speech at Ambikapur and subsequently described Nasser as force for progress in remarks to journalists. Appreciate having soonest full details, and transcripts if possible, re these statements.

Exempt.

End

Drafted by: NEA/INC:CSCoon:dmm 6/12/67

Telegram transmission and classification approved by: 3728

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

INC - Mr. Heck
NEA/P - Mr. Brown

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

44
Origin S/S

ACTION: Amembassy LUXEMBOURG
INFO USUN

39

Info:

EXDIS

STATE 210224
TOSEC TWO

FOR THE SECRETARY

In your conversation with our European Allies, and particularly those on SC (Canada, Denmark, and UK) we think it important you stress we need more vocal support from them in SC, in addition to support on substantive resolutions. We have had to carry debate all this week almost unaided, and we would like you to urge our allies to pitch in with timely speeches at their initiative. Present posture plays into USSR and Nasser game of leaving us alone in support of Israelis. Present USSR propaganda effort in UN is powerful, orchestrated,and effective.

GP-1

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
~~IO:JSisco:ek:6-11-67~~ Clearances:	5243	M:EVROSTOW

NEA: Mr. Battle

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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210494

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

ACTION: Amembassy LUXEMBOURG TOSEC PRIORITY Jun 12 9 34 PM '67

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS Amembassy MOSCOW
USUN DOD
STATE-210494
EXDIS
TOSEC- 15

REF: ~~State 210147~~

REF: Paris 20111 and 20112 repeated TOSEC

1. Last Saturday Under Secretary Rostow asked Ambassador Lucet if we might possibly have the views of the French Government on two questions, by June 12 if at all possible. We understand that Ambassador Lucet discussed these questions with you at Danish reception on Saturday. The first question concerned a GOF initiative with Cairo regarding the reopening of the Suez Canal. The second question asked for GOF views on the substance and procedure on the problem of arms levels and arms limitations in the Middle East.

2. In call on Assistant Secretary Leddy June 12 Lucet made following points from instructions he had just received from Paris:

A. Re Suez Canal, French Government had spoken to UARG immediately following closure Canal. Egyptians said they closed Canal protect it from sabotage and hostile actions and that this was in interest of all who used the waterway. On

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NEA:UAR:GMBennsky/cff 6/12/67 5819

NEA:NEAR- Donald C, Bergus

S/S - Mr. Walker

EUR - Mr. John M Leddy

NEA

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SECRET

basis this response, France then decided not make formal written protest but its Ambassador Cairo recalled provisions Constantinople Convention and Egyptian declaration to UN of April 24, 1957. In light this background French Government does not believe it should take further initiatives at this time. To do so would only result UAR opening whole range of issues such as Israeli withdrawal behind armistice lines in return for reopening Canal.

B. Re arms control in Middle East, French Government agreed desirability of arms agreement for Middle East must be part overall political settlement in area and expected arms question would be eventually discussed in this context. As for immediate problem, French did not see how controls could be developed without consulting the Soviets who would argue that Arab position not same as Israelis since Arabs were victims of aggression and therefore had right to be resupplied.

C. As for proposal to consider use of UN and notification SYG re arms shipments to area, French government thought this would be vetoed immediately by Soviets.

3. Leddy questioned Ambassador Lucet regarding the status of French arms supplies to Israel. The Ambassador said he had nothing on this from Paris but thought arms shipments had

stopped on commencement hostilities but that some spares were now being shipped. He said he would check further with XXXXXXXXXXXX Quai d'Orsay.

4. Ambassador Lucet said for time being French Government was not able say more re questions raised by Rostow June 10. GP 1.

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin NEA

ACTION: CIRCULAR TO ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

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Amconsul ADEN
Amconsul DHAHRAN
Amconsul JERUSALEM
Amconsul ISTANBUL
Amconsul HONG KONG
US MISSION GENEVA
CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD
MAC FOR POLAD
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
CINCLANT FOR POLAD

FAA INT TRSY

STATE 210480 CIRCULAR

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITREP AS OF JUNE 12

1. Cease-fire holding. Embassy Tel Aviv reports implementation of UN cease-fire on Syrian front began this morning as 9 observer teams of two men each moved up to cease-fire line. Mopping up behind cease-fire line by Israeli forces is proceeding on all fronts.

2. Israel reports that in last weeks campaign they lost, on all fronts, 679 soilders killed, 2563 wounded. We have no overall figures for Arab casualities. Jordanian press reports claim Jordan alone suffered 15,000 killed and/or wounded.

3. Israeli public statements last few days suggest increasing determination use major Israeli military victory to extract political advantages from Arabs. According UPI Israeli DefMin Dayan said June 11 Israel should negotiate directly with defeated Arab nations on new territory lines and not

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/IAI:MSterner:pas:6/12/67	4523	NEA/IAI:ALAtherton Jr.

Clearances:

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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through UN, and if Arabs refused negotiate then there would be new map with Israelis staying where they are. Foreign Minister Eban and Labor Minister Allon also made clear (June 12) that Israel's political settlement with Arab States should be through direct negotiations without mediators. Allon indicated that in Israeli opinion 1949 Armistice Agreements are now dead.

4. Suez Canal remains closed. According Cairo news agency two ships that attempted transit canal today were turned away. Balance of evidence suggests ships have been sunk in Canal, physically blocking it.

5. Refugee flow from West Bank of Jordan to East Bank has reportedly slowed down with GOJ attempting to turn refugees back at Jordan river. GOJ sources believe 80,000 West Bank Refugees have reached Amman in past 4 days.

6. Political situation easing somewhat in most Arab capitals. Curfew lifted June 12 in Beirut with no further reports violence. Embassy Tripoli reports that atmosphere has improved in Tripoli June 11-12. In Kuwait oil workers continue to strike against Kuwait Oil Company. Two pipelines blasted in Getty oil installation, forcing it to close down. Saudi and Libian Government reportedly considering resuming flow of oil, (possibly continuing temporary band on exports to US and UK).

7. Security Council still has before it and has not acted upon Soviet and US resolution concerning next step toward reestablishing peaceful conditions. We

SECRET

have unconfirmed reports that Soviets are seeking diplomatic support for convening special emergency session of UN General Assembly to discuss Near East situation.

[redacted]

GP-3

END

KATZF[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

210451

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Origin S/S Info.

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY

JUN 12 7 44 PM '67

STATE - 210451

EXDIS

FOR CHARGE FROM HARRIMAN.

Paris 19929.

Please express to Foreign Minister Zahedi my appreciation for the promptness with which he reported on the Shah's conversation with DeGaulle as conveyed in reftel. Also request he express to Shah my deep gratitude for his courtesy and frankness on the two occasions when he received me in Paris. His cooperation in this crisis has been greatly appreciated by all concerned.

End

KATZ

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
S/AH:WAHarriman:hbs 6/12/67	3304	W. Averell Harriman

Clearance:

NEA - Mr. Battle

S/S - Mr. Walker

SECRET

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

210280

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

JUN 12 2 54 PM '67

81 Origin
SS Infor

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK FLASH

STATE 210280

MISUN

FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG FROM SISCO

1. Following paper is being considered in Control Group at 3:30 p.m. and will probably be discussed with President at 6:30 p.m. meeting. Request your comments to me telephonically soonest. Believe you will find paper/~~xxfixxx~~ reflects closely approach you and I have discussed in some detail over past 48 hours.

CODE RM. PLS TRANSMIT ATTACHED TEXT.

END

GP-3

KATZENBACH

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER SS

Drafted by: IO:JJSisco:mfk 6/12/67
Clearances:

Tel. Ext. 5241

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO - Joseph J. Sisco

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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ZNY SSSSS
O P 111850Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
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S E C R E T LONDON 10297

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1967 JUN 11 PM 4 01

EXDIS

REF: STATE 210141

1. AFTER RECEIPT AMMAN 4190 (SERVICED AS MISSING) AFTERNOON JUNE 11, EMBOFF REVIEWED KING HUSSEIN'S CONCERNS WITH FONOFF'S MOBERLY (DEPUTY HEAD, EASTERN DEPT.) TOLD MOBERLY AS FAR AS EMBASSY AWARE ONLY CANBERRAS IN ME ARE THOSE BASED ON CYPRUS AND COMMITTED TO CENTO, AND ONLY RAF HAWKER HUNTERS THOSE IN PERSIAN GULF AND ADEN. MOBERLY CHECKED WITH AIR OPERATIONS MOD WHO CONFIRMED. ALSO CONFIRMED ISRAELIS HAD NO HUNTERS.

2. EMBOFF SUGGESTED BRITS, IF THEY NOT ALREADY DONE SO, URGENTLY ASCERTAIN PRECISE MOVEMENTS THESE PLANES JUNE 5 AND 6. SAID WE WOULD BE IN FURTHER TOUCH IN WASHINGTON OR HERE ON HOW BEST TO SPIKE CHARGES OF US/UK INVOLVEMENT. WOULD WELCOME HMG'S IDEAS ASAP.

3. LATER MOBERLY SAID MOD RECONFIRMS NO RPT NO RAF PLANES NEAR AREA DURING HOSTILITIES. HUNTERS' FERRY ROUTE TO AND FROM GULF IS OVER TURKEY AND IRAN. CANBERRAS SOMETIMES FLY CYPRUS TO LIBYA AND BACK, AND ON "SPECIAL" (HIGHLY-CLASSIFIED) MISSIONS. THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF MOVEMENTS JUNE 5 AND 6 BEING MADE.

4. BEGIN NOFORN MALLET (DEPTUY HEAD, NORTH AND EAST AFRICA DEPT.) SHOWED EMBOFF DRAFT RPT DRAFT WISON - TO - BOURGUIBA LETTER SUGGESTING BOURGUIBA CONSIDER MAKING "CHARACTERISTICALLY COURAGEOUS" PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPPESSING CERTAINTY THAT NO UK/US AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. END NOFRORN

GP-2 KAISER

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-11-67 4:50 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6-11-67 4:50 PM

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Action SS Info

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1967 JUN 11 PM 2 41

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PP RUEHC RUFHBG
DE RUQMGU 6138 1621730
ZNY SSSSS
P R 111725Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T ANKARA 6138

EXDIS

LUXEMBOURG FOR SECRETARY

REF: ANKARA 6128, ANKARA 6135

1. ALTHOUGH TURKS HAVE WOBBLED ON OUR REQUEST THEY ACT AS PROTECTING POWER IN IRAQ, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD KEEP FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND IN ASSESSING WHY THEY HAVE ASKED US TO RECONSIDER:

2. TURKEY HAS BEEN WORKING HARD TO IMPROVED ITS RELATIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMGU 6138 S E C R E T
WITH IRAQ AND HAS TRIED TO CONVINCE IRAQ IT IS PLAYING MORE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL ROLE DESPITE CENTO AND US LINKS. WHATEVER WE MAY SAY ABOUT NON-POLITICAL NATURE OF PROTECTING POWER ROLE, TURKS UNDOUBTEDLY FEEL THEY WILL PREJUDICE THEIR POLITICAL POSITION IN IRAQ IF THEY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES ON OUR BEHALF. MY GUESS IS THAT TURK SUGGESTION WE WITHDRAW OUR REQUEST CAME AFTER TURK AMBASSADOR BAGHDAD URGED FONOFF TO RECONSIDER ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM IN VIEW PROBABLE ADVERSE REACTIONS IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

3. TURKS ALSO PROBABLY THOUGHT THAT SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY INCURRED IRAQI DISPLEASURE IN TURNING DOWN REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHT OF MIG-21'S FROM USSR TO IRAQ, ASSUMPTION OF PROTECTING POWER POSITION WOULD STRENGTHEN IRAQI SUSPICION TURKS ACTING AS FRONTMAN FOR US.

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4. FINALLY, AS FONOFF SYG KUNERALP TOLD ME, TURKS BELIEVE THEIR NON-INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT MAY ENABLE THEM TO PLAY USEFUL MEDIATORY ROLE BUT THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS ROLE WILL BE REDUCED IF THEY REPRESENT US INTERESTS IN IRAQ.
HART
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JUN 11 AM 8 38

E X D I S

SUBJECT: CURRENT IRANIAN VIEWS ARAB-ISRAEL SITUATION

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY PRESENT IRANIAN VIEWS UPON DIFFICULT PROBLEMS POSED BY RECENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AS DESCRIBED TO ME BY ZAHEDI.

2. RE OIL, ZAHEDI SAID HE HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR TO ARAB AMBASSADORS IMPOSSIBILITY IRAN'S PARTICIPATING IN ARAB BOYCOTT OF OIL SHIPMENTS TO US AND UK. WHILE IRAN GLAD ASSIST WITH RELIEF TO IRAQ AND JORDAN AND WOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT ARAB CAUSE ON PALESTINE, OIL MARKETING WAS IRAN'S AFFAIR TO BE MANAGED IN ACCORDANCE ITS OWN NATIONAL NEEDS. (WE KNOW OF COURSE EQBAL HAS ASKED CONSORTIUM RAISE PRODUCTION AS MUCH

AS POSSIBLE, NOT LOWER IT. TEHRAN 4895).

3. RE ISRAEL, ZAHEDI RECOGNIZED DIFFICULT PROBLEM THAT WILL BE POSED IN PERSUADING ISRAELIS RETIRE TO BOUNDARIES PREVAILING BEFORE RECENT CONFLICT. IF THEY DID NOT, PROSPECTS FOR JORDAN WERE OF COURSE VERY GLOOMY INDEED. SINCE THEIR PRINCIPAL REVENUES DERIVED FROM TOURISM IN OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM AND INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE OF WEST BANK, ECONOMY COULD HARDLY SURVIVE. IRAN WOULD FAVOR ISRAEL'S COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO FORMER BOUNDARIES THOUGH ZAHEDI RECOGNIZED DEEP JEWISH ATTACHMENT TO OLD CITY.

4. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL MUST HAVE CERTAIN GUARANTEES: COMPLETE FREEDOM WITH ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES GOVERNING USE OF GULF OF AQABA. SIMILARLY, THEY SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO USE SUEZ. MOREOVER THERE MUST BE SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE REFUGEE AND OTHER PROBLEMS WITH BROAD PROGRAM AIMED SETTLING ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM ONCE FOR ALL AND RELIEVING WORLD AND MID-EAST RECURRENT CRISES STEMMING THEREFROM.

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5. IRAN RECOGNIZES DEEP BITTERNESS NOW ENVELOPING ENTIRE ARAB WORLD AND BELIEVES IT COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE WITH FEISAL, HUSSEIN AND

PAGE 3 RUQTAN 4916 S E C R E T
PERHAPS AREF. ISRAELIS TOO, HOWEVER, HAVE HEAVY OBLIGATION MAKE END-
LESS PATIENT EFFORT HOLD OUT HAND OF PEACE AND COOPERATION TO ARAB
NEIGHBORS. THACHER
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
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RUOVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KUWAIT 1311

SUBJECT: KUWAIT ROUNDUP

1. TENSION RISING IN KUWAIT TOWN AND AROUND OIL INSTALLATIONS AS BITTER, SULLEN KUWAITIS AND EXPATRIATE ARABS REALIZE MAGNITUDE ARAB HUMILIATION. SEVERAL DEMONSTARTIONS IN SUPPORT NASSER OBSERVED JUNE 10 AND LARGE GROUP ROAMED STREETS LAST NIGHT. SECURITY POLICY EVERYWHERE IN EVIDENCE AND THERE HAS THUS FAR BEEN NO DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OR LOSS OF LIFE. US, UK AND SOVIET EMBASSIES UNDER HEAVY POLICE GUARD. GOK COS MUBARAK ATTEMPTING CONVINCE GOK CABINET MINISTERS THAT UAR AT FAULT IN PRESENT CRISIS, BUT THIS HAVING LITTLE EFFECT ON GENERAL PUBLIC.

2. LOCAL BANKS SURVIVED RUN WHEN THEY OPENED JUNE 10. NEW LEGAL TENDER EN ROUTE TO PROVIDE BACK-UP. ONE BRITISH BANK OF MIDDLE EAST (BBME) HOUSE NEAR OUR EMBASSY WAS VICTIM OF UNSUCCESSFUL MOLOTOV COCKTAIL ATTACK JUNE 9. WE HEAR THAT BBME BRANCH IN DUBAI WAS SACKED JUNE 9.

3. COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICE STILL AVAILABLE TO TEHRAN AND POINTS EAST. ONLY TRAFFIC WITH BEIRUT IS CHARTER. YESTERDAY 200 KUWAITI STUDENTS IN LEBANON WERE RETURNED BY KUWAIT AIRWAYS CHARTER FLIGHT.

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RSR

4. WORST SPOT FOR FOREIGNERS THUS FAR HAS BEEN ARABIAN OIL COMPANY (AOC) INSTALLATION AT KHAFJIE IN NEUTRAL ZONE WHERE LOCAL LABOR ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY PALESTINIAN. BRITISH, AMERICAN, DUTCH AND JAPANESE EMPLOYEES OF AOC, MCDERMOTT AND COLLINS HAVE BEEN RUN OUT OF KHAFJIE BY ANGRY PALASTINIANS. WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER AOC STILL PRODUCING. GETTY STILL PRODUCING IN NEUTRAL ZONE.

5. AMINOIL, WHICH PRODUCES IN NEUTRAL ZONE AND SHIPS FROM KUWAIT, HAS CLOSED DOWN PRODUCTION COMPLETELY OWING ABSENCE TOTAL ARAB WORK FORCE. AMINOIL PALESTINIANS DESPERATE FOR NEWS OF FAMILIES IN WAR AREA. THIS DESPERATION SHARED BY MOST OF APPROXIMATELY 70,000 - 80,000 PALESTINIANS IN KUWAIT.

6. GIANT KOC STILL PRODUCING BUT LABOR UNION HAS CALLED FOR STRIKE, AND KOC MANAGEMENT APPREHENSIVE THAT COMPLETE SHUT-DOWN MAY RESULT. THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS BECAUSE KUWAIT'S GAS PRODUCTION, WHICH RUNS ALL UTILITIES, STOPS WHEN OIL STOPS.

7. KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM CO. (KNPC) MANAGEMENT HAS TOLD TOTAL LABOR FORCE STAY HOME. ANTI-WESTERN LEAFLETS WERE PASSED TO THESE WORKERS YESTERDAY. KNPC ONLY COMMERCIAL OUTLET FOR GASOLINE.

COTTAM

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 5:15 A.M., 6/11/67
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA NSA, CINCSTRIKE AT 5:15 A.M., 6/11/67

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EA
EUR ME CRISIS: SC
IA TABOR (DEN) GAVE GOLDBERG FOL REPORT ON MTG NON-PERM MBRS
NEA WHICH TOOK PLACE IN RECESS IN EVENING SC MTG JUNE 10:
P
NSC 1. INDIA PROPOSED FOL RES:
JINR QUOTE THE SC,
ACDA HAVING HEARD THE LATEST REPORTS OF THE S YG WHICH CONFIRM
AID FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CE ASEFIRE ON THE PART OF ISRAEL
PC INCLUD ING THE AERIAL BOMBING OF THE DAMASCUS AREA AND THE
SR OCCUPATION OF THE TOWN OF KUNEITRA IN SYRIA,
ORM
TRSY CONDEMNS THE GOVT OF ISRAEL FOR THE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF
THE CEASEFIRE AND WARNS IT THAT IT HAS A GRAVE RESPONSIBILIT Y
FOR THESE VIOLATIONS;

RSR REQUESTS THE SYG TO ORDER A FULL INVESTIGATION OF OTHER
REPORTS OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS AND TO SUBMIT THE INFO TO
THE COUNCIL FOR FURTHER NECESSARY ACTION. UNQUOTE

2. SIX OR SEVEN OF 10 NON-PERMS SAID T HEY WOULD BE HESITANT TO SUPPORT SUCH RES NOW.

3. ARG, BRAZIL, CAN, DEN AND ETHIOPIA SAID THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONDEMN A GOVT.

4. ARG, BRAZ IL, CAN, DEN AND JAPAN SAID THEY FIND VIOL ATIONS BY BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL IN SYG'S REPORT, T HOUGH PERH APS D IFFERENT IN DEGREE. BUT ALSO THOUGHT REPORT S NOT CLEAR ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY CONDEMNATION.

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5. ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA WERE HESITANT TO SUPPORT ANY RES AT THIS POINT. ETHIOPIA SAID ANY RES SHOULD HAVE BROAD AGREEMENT.

6. MALI AND NIGERIA SPOKE IN FAVOR OF CONDEMNING AGGRESSION.

7. MOST THOUGHT IT NOT DESIRABLE FOR US TO PRESS ITS RES EITHER.

8. INDIA UNDERLINED DESIRABILITY OF COUNCIL PROCEEDING TO NEXT STEPS ALONG LINES FROM POINTS SET FORTH IN INDIAN SPEECH FRIDAY.

TABOR SAID HE HAD ALSO SEEN FEDORENKO (USSR). HE FAVORED CONDEMNING AGGRESSION, COULD ALSO CONSIDER INDIAN RES. FOUND RES WHICH US TABLED IN MTG "CONDEMNING ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF" ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE.

GOLDBERG SAID INDIAN TEXT WAS OF COURSE NOT AGREEABLE TO US. WE HAD PUT FORWARD RES CONDEMNING VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE AND CALLING FOR SCRUPULOUS ADHERENCE IN ORDER TO MEET CONCERNS WHICH HAD CAUSED SC TO BE CALLED AGAIN. BUT IF OTHER PREFERRED TO ADJOURN WITHOUT A NEW RES WE WOULD NOT OBJECT.

GP-4.

GOLDBERG

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 4:30 A.M., 6/11/67
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD
CINCSTRIKE AT 4:30 A.M., 6/11/67

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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55 Info:

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

JUN 11 6 40 PM '67

INFO : Amembassy AMMAN
" TEL AVIV
" BEIRUT
" LONDON
Amcongen JERUSALEM

STATE 210210

EXDIS

1. Clearly world community faces immense relief problem because of devastation and disruption from June 5 - 10 Near East war. Immediate measures to provide emergency food, medical care and the like on humanitarian grounds seem essential. Request your comments on following, especially on suggestions in para 7.

2. We see Jordan as most immediate problem. There is real question of whether GOJ will be able maintain order and continue essential government services on East Bank with population swollen by streams of homeless people flowing across the Jordan River toward Amman.

3. There will probably also develop severe problems of caring for population in over-run areas in Gaza and Sinai. For present, at least, Government of Israel must assume responsibility for their care.

4. Too early to assess situation in Syria at this writing.

5. We assume UNRWA will continue provide relief services for time being at

Drafted by: NEA/IAI	Tel 5241	Telegraphic transmission and
O/IJSisco/WDWolle:oh (June 11, 1967)	4422	classification approved by: M - Eugene Rostow

Clearances:

AID - Mr. Siegel
S/R - Mr. Wine
S/S - John P. Walsh
NEA - [illegible]

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least, though our reports on current situation in UNRWA camps and operations too sketchy to draw conclusions.

6. It would not be politically feasible or desirable for USG to seek additional funds from Congress for a large bilateral programs in Arab countries that have broken relations with us. There are in each of these countries modest UN programs, in addition to UNRWA, including WHO, UNICEF and FAO-World Food Program. There are also some voluntary agency programs. We believe it important that UN programs in these countries continue. These are programs funded either from regular budgets of the Specialized Agencies or voluntary programs to which we and other countries have already contributed. We are not planning any immediate increases in these programs since they would involve among other things time-consuming special arrangements with Specialized Agencies, and would confront us with funding problems.

7. We believe appropriate first step might be for Ambassador Goldberg to see the Secretary General promptly and to suggest that he discuss this problem with Israelis and the Arabs and ascertain whether they would like him to look into situation with a view to seeing what UN and its family of agencies can do to help. Another thought is that if affected countries seem interested in help, SYG might consider appointing Sadruddin Khan (in a personal capacity and not as UN High Commissioner of Refugees) to make quick survey of situation at request of area governments and to provide SYG and in turn Security Council with prompt report and recommendations. Upon receipt of report from Khan to Security Council, USG would be prepared consider sympathetically appropriate support.

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8. While setting up a relief operation through the UN, we also will be supporting private organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) already (June 8) despatched its first plane load of medical relief supplies.f League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) can also be expected to cooperate closely with ICRC but only after hostilities cease and situation somewhat more stable. U.S. support of Red Cross operations could take two forms: visible contributions of U.S. resources, e.g., CARE, MEDICO, PROJECT HOPE, etc. and tangible contributions of U.S. funds and supplies.

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UNCLAS MADRID 3470

1967 JUN 10 AM 8 57

REF: MADRID 3429 SUBJECT: GOS PRONOUNCEMENT ON MIDEAST CRISIS

1. TODAY'S PRESS HEADLINES STATEMENT BY INFORMATION MIN FRAGA ON GOVTS POSITION RE MIDEAST CONFLICT MADE FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING CHAIRED BY FRANCO. INFORMAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

A., THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOLLOWED THE PATTERN OF ITS PREVIOUS PLENARY SESSIONS: THE MOST CAREFUL EXAMINIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 7 WHICH HAS CONTINUED TO DESERVE CLOSE STUDY7AS WELL AS OF ITS POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS. THE GOVT, WHICH IS WATCHING CAREFULLY EVERY DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDEAST, HAS NOTHING TO ADD TO ITS RECENT OFFICIAL STATEMENT(SEE REFTEL) CONCERNING THE CONFLICT, WHICH NOW SEEMS TO BE SLACKENING. IT REAFFIRMS NOT ONLY ITS TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARAB PEOPLES, WHICH IT REITERATES AT ALL TIMES, BUT ALSO ITS DETERMINATION TO CONTIUE EXERTING WHATEVER EFFORTS IT IS ABLE TO IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THREATS TO WORLD

PAGE TWO RUDKMD 470 UNCLAS
PEACE AND ANY NEW DANGERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA, WHICH IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO US. IT MAKES KNOWN ITS DESIRE FOR PEACE, FOR THE PROMOTION OF A SPECIAL STATUTE FOR THE HOLY PLACES, AND FOR A JUST SOLUTION FOR THAT AREA, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB REFUGEES AND THE (QUESTION) OF THE WATERS OF THE JORDAN WHICH ARE AT THE BOTTOM OF THESE CONFLICTS.

B. BOTH INTERESTED PARTIES HAVE GREETED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION SPANISH PROTECTION OF NORTH AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE UAR AND THE MAURETANIAN MOSLEM REPUBLIC. THE GOOD RELATIONS OF SPAIN WITH THE US AND WITH THE ARAB PEOPLES CAN BE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE REOPENING OF THE DIALOGUE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE. UNQUOTE. WALKER
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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PLEASE INFORM BELGIAN GOVT FOR AMB DUPRET THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED PROVISIONAL PROTECTION US INTERESTS. THIS PURSUANT HIS GENERAL INSTRUCTION BE HELPFUL. HE ASKS THEM CONFIRM TO HIM.
DUNCAN
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 9:35 A.M. 6/10/67

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FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUDSVC/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
RUDSVK/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
RUDSPBK/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
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UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 3946

1967 JUN 10 AM 8 50

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SENT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NASSER JUNE 10:

2. MY DEAR BROTHER, IN YOUR HOUR OF TRIBULATION I WANT TO ASSURE YOU OF MY RESPECT AND UNYIELDING FRIENDSHIP. I DO UNDERSTAND THE HEAVINESS OF YOUR BIG AND NOBLE HEART. YOU HAVE TOLD YOUR PEOPLE THE TRUTH ABUT EGYPTS GREAT SETBACK. YOU HAVE NOBLY ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY. YOU HAVE OFFERED TO STEP DOWN IN THE LEADERSHIP OF YOUR COUNTRY. BUT WITH ONE VOICE THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT HAVE SAID NO.

3. YOUR PEOPLE NEED YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE WANT YOU. I AM ADDING A BROTHERLY VOICE TO THAT OF THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT. PLEASE, DEAR BROTHER, STAY ON AND CONTINUE SERVING YOUR PEOPLE. JUSTICE WILL ONE DAY BE DONE, FOR THE ARAB PEOPLE TOO HAVE RIGHTS. MILLAR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 9:41 a.m., June 10.

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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 6131

REF: BAGHDAD 2167

SECGEN KUNERALP TOLD EMBASSY
HE WOULD AUTHORIZE TURK
EMB BAGHDAD SOONEST TO APPROACH
IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO TAKE
OVER PROTECTION US INTERESTS
ON INTERIM BASIS PENDING
DEFINITE DECISION.

YOU CAN INFORM TURK EMBASSY BAGHDAD.

HART
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 8:42 a.m., June 10.
Passed White House, USIA at 8:52 a.m., June 10.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4055

EXDIS

FOR DAVIES.

DON PERETZ HAS BEEN HERE THIS WEEK AND HAS HAD OPPORTUNITIES TRAVEL AND TALK WITH ISRAELIS DENIED TO EMBASSY. HIS OBSERVATIONS ON WEST BANK REPORTED OUR 4051. HE HAS SUGGESTED HIS VIEWS MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT. WE AGREE AND SUGGEST YOU HAVE SOMEONE GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AT STATE UNIVERSITY NEW YORK BINGHAMTON AFTER HIS RETURN. HE PLANS DEPART FOR STATES TOMORROW. BARBOUR
BT

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH
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BT
S E C R E T RABAT 5459

1. WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR, UK AMBASSADOR AND FRENCH POLITICAL COUNSELOR I WAS SUMMONED BY FONMIN LARAKI AT NOON TODAY AT KING'S REQUEST.

2. LARAKI SAID KING HAD ASKED HIM CONVOKE THOSE PRESENT TO EXPRESS MOST PROFOUND CONCERN OVER DEVELOPING NEAR EAST SITUATION, SPECIFICALLY ISRAEL'S FAILURE ABIDE BY CEASE-FIRE AND PUNITIVE ATTACK ON DAMASCUS. KING ADDRESSING URGENT APPEAL TO THE FOUR POWERS TO OBTAIN (1) AN IMMEDIATE, EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE

AND (2) RETURN OF ISRAEL FORCES TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED BEFORE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

3. SOVIET AMBASSADOR POINTED TO SOVIET RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN SECURITY CGZNCEL AND DECLARATION BY MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN MOSCOW TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WEIGHT OF SOVIET UNION FULLY BEHIND THE TWO REQUESTS MADE BY KING.

SECRET

4. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SAID HE WISHED STRESS THAT UK COULD NOT CONTROL ISRAELIS.

5. I SAID HIS MAJESTY AND GOM WELL AWARE GREAT EFFORT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS MADE OBTAIN CEASEFIRE AND GOM COULD BE SURE USG WOULD PUT ALL ITS EFFORTS BEHIND UN TO OBTAIN JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

GP-3 TASCA
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA AT 8:40 A.M. 6/10/67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
STATE GRNC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 6128

000257

1967 JUN 10 AM 8 20

1. KUNERALP HAS JUST REQUESTED US RECONSIDER USING TURKEY AS PROTECTING POWER IRAQ, EMPHASIZING GOT PREPARED FULFILL ITS PLEDGE, HE NEVERTHELESS ASKED RECONSIDERATION ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A. TURKEY HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGE IN IRAQ AS IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BY BEING DETACHED IN PRESENT CONFLICT AND IN INTERESTS OF RESTORING STABILITY IN AREA AND ACHIEVING REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ITS ROLE COULD BE IMPORTANT TO BOTH OF US.

B. THAT ROLE LIKELY TO BE DIMINISHED IF TURKEY'S PRESTIGE WITH ARABS CUT DOWN BY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, WHICH GOT FEELS REPRESENTING US IN IRAQ WOULD ENTAIL.

PAGE 2 RUQMGU 6128 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. KUNERALP REITERATED WILLINGNESS GOT TO GO THROUGH WITH MATTER BUT HOPED HEAR FROM US SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. I INFORMED KUNERALP NEWSPAPERS HAD ALREADY HEARD RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT GOT REPRESENTING US IN IRAQ BUT WE WOULD ENDEAVOR CORRECT LOCAL IMPRESSION BY STATING ALL REPRESENTATIONAL MATTERS NOT YET CERTAIN.

4. ON LEAVING KUNERALP'S OFFICE ENCOUNTERED CUMHURIYET REPRESENTATIVE WHO ASKED IF AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT CORRECT. REPLIED NOTHING CERTAIN YET ON ANY OF THESE REPRESENTATIONAL MATTERS, INCLUDING IRAQ.

GP-3.
HART
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 8:23 AM 6/10/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 8:20 AM 6/10/67

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T KUWAIT 1304

E X D I S

REF: STATE 210122

1. AMIR PROPOSES BEDU CHICANERY BY CHANGING MANIFESTS TO PERMIT TANKERS TO CARRY OIL TO UK OR US. AMBASSADOR ARTHUR THINKS THIS RUSE ONCE DISCOVERED MAY LEAD TO PUBLIC DEMAND FOR STRONGER ACTION AGAINST COMPANIES AND THAT AMIR WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ACT. I ALSO CONSIDER IT RISKY.

2. INASMUCH AS GULF SELLS MOST OF ITS SHARE KOC CRUDE TO SHELL THE PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY A UK ONE IN FIRST INSTANCE. AMB ARTHUR WAS TOLD BY AMIR SEVERAL DAYS AGO AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK FOREIGN OFFICE ABOUT SECRECY WHICH I THINK SHOULD BE REVISED TO BRING KOC DIRECTOR LEE INTO ACT FOR CONSULTATION AT ONCE.

3. ARTHUR PROMISED CABLE MY VIEWS LONDON AND I AGREED TO LEAVE IT UK TO TELL US IN WASHINGTON AND/OR LONDON ON NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. HOPE YOU WILL DEAL WITH IT THAT WAY IN FIRST INSTANCE. SEEMS TO ME THERE IS TIME TO DEAL THIS WAY.

GP-1 COTTAM
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-10-67 8:10 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6-10-67 8:10 PM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4054

REF. TEL AVIV 4049

1. I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT GENERAL BULL IS ON HIS WAY FROM JERUSALEM TO TEL AVIV AT ISRAELI REQUEST. HE SHOULD BE HERE IN ABOUT A HALF AN HOUR. THIS CONFIRMS PREVIOUS REPORT THAT ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO ASK HIM TO SEE THAT CEASE-FIRE IS IMPLEMENTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I AM TOLD THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE SIMILAR REQUEST OF COLONEL JOHNSON.

2. ISRAELIS HERE SAY THEY BELIEVE FIRING HAS CEASED AS OF THIS MOMENT AND THEY DO NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY MORE OPERATIONS.

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, 6/10/67 8:08 AM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE 6/10/67 8:16 AM

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PASS ANKARA FOR INFO

REFS: BAGHDAD 2167 AND 2166.

1. IF TURKS DO NOT RPT NOT ACKNOWLEDGE DEFINITIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCENT PROTOCOL DE HEBISE BY TIME I SCHEDULED TO GO, I PROPOSE TURN KEYS OVER TO BELGIAN AMB DUPRET WITH LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL TO GOVT OF IRAQ PER 7 FAM 979.2.

2. FOR COMMO REASONS, BRIEF REPLY WHEATHER OBJECT.
DUNCAN
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/10/67 8:10 AM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USIA 6/10/67 8:15 AM

NOTE: PASSED TO ANKARA 6/10/67 8:35 AM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4199

1. AMMAN RADIO THIS MORNING BROADCAST CABLE FROM HUSSEIN TO NASSER STATING IN ESSENCE QUOTE BATTLE IS JUST BEGINNING... URGE YOU TO RESPOND TO NATION'S WISHES AND STAY ON... YOUR CONTINUANCE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN WIPING OUT SERIOUS EFFECTS OF OUR SETBACK ...AND IN OUR FUTURE MEETING TO PLAN OUR EFFORTS FOR FUTURE BATTLES. UNQUOTE

2. FOREGOING WAS BROADCAST HERE ABOUT ONE-HALF HOUR PRIOR TO RADIO CAIRO'S ANNOUNCEMENT NASSER HAD DECIDED WITHDRAW REISGNATION.

COMMENT: GOJ LEADERSHIP RECEIVED LAST NIGHT'S INITIAL REPORT OF NASSER'S RESIGNATION WITH CYNICISM. HUSSEIN'S CABLE WAS WELL TIMED GESTURE OF ARABISM, MADE IN FULL KNOWLEDGE IT WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT NASSER'S DECISION TO RESIGN.

GP-4. BURNS
BT

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 4052

REF: STATE 209662 AND TEL AVIV 4044

1. I AM INFORMED THAT EFFORTS TO LOCATE ANY TRANSCRIPT OF ESHKOL TALK WITH MAPAI PARTY GROUP HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.

2. HOWEVER, FOREIGN OFFICE ARRANGED FOR UPI CORRESPONDENT WHO HAD OBTAINED ORIGINAL STORY THIRD HAND TO HAVE PRIVATE INTERVIEW WITH ESHKOL AS RESULT OF WHICH UPI CABLED LAST NIGHT AT 2050 HOURS LOCAL FOLLOWING QUESTION AND ANSWER THIS SUBJECT.

QUOTE QUESTION, MR. ESHKOL, WHY WERE YOU CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE PRIMARILY TO RELY ON ITS OWN STRENGTH? ANSWER: WE HAVE ALWAYS HELD TO PRINCIPLE THAT NO RPT NO FOREIGN SOLDIERS HAVE TO DIE IN DEFENSE OF ISRAEL'S FREEDOM. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT A SMALL COUNTRY LIKE OURS HAS TO GO IT ALONE AT ALL COST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE US ON THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN IN THE CRISIS PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WAS A SOURCE OF DEEP ENCOURAGEMENT TO US UNQUOTE. BARBOUR

BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 7:05 AM 6/10/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, USUN AT 8:01 AM 6/10/67

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4063

EXDIS

REF: STATE 210085 AND 210034

1. I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE UNSEC'S STATEMENT TO HARMAN TO BITAN FOR EBAN AND ESHKOL IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. ESHKOL AT SYRIAN FRONT BUT EBAN AND DAYAN FOR WHOM MESSAGE EQUALLY IMPORTANT WERE IN TEL EUIVNXND WERE INFORMED AT ONCE.

2. REPORT OF CONVERSATION HAD ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED FROM HARMAN AND I HAD IMPRESSION THERE NO RPT NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES IF SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION IN RELATION TO SOVS DISREGARDED. I HAD BEEN PREACHING CRITICALITY SOV FACTOR SINCE 0645 HOURS THIS MORNING WHEN I SAW EBAN.

3. HOWEVER, BY TIME I RECEIVED REFTEL 210034, ISRAELIS

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4063 S E C R E T
HAD ALREADY CONCLUDED NECESSITY OBTAIN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE WHATEVER THE MILITARY POSITION ON THE GROUND, HAD CALLED IN BULL AND HAD GIVEN HIM FREE HAND TO G 5 IN TOUCH WITH SYRIANS TO ASCERTAIN THEIR POSITION AND TO MAKE ANY PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION HE WISHED. ISRAELIS AND SYG HAD NOTIFIED SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. ALTHOUGH SOV BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO HAVE CAUSED AS MUCH CONCERN IN GOI AS IT PERHAPS SHOULD HAVE (THIS PROBABLY MINIMUM CARD SOVS HAD TO PLAY SOMETIME TO SATISFY ARAB RESENTMENT AGAINST THEM), DETERIORATING SECURITY COUNCIL SITUATION, CL

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SIGNAL OF US RPT US ANXIETIES, AND ESSENTIALITY OF EXTRICATING THEMSELVES FROM OVER EXTENSION IN SYRIA WHICH BEING COMPOUNDED ON POLITICAL SCENE BY SYRIAN CHARGES OF ISRAELI ADVANCE ON DAMASCUS, CONVINCED ISRAELIS IMPLEMENTATION CEASEFIRE UNDER ANY AVAILABLE MACHINERY OF TOP PRIORITY.

5. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT, DRIVEN BY MILITARY NECESSITY OF ACHIEVING VIABLE MILITARY POSTURE FOR PROTECTION BORDER SETTLEMENTS, ISRAELIS PLAYED FOR TIME IN POLITICAL

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 4063 S E C R E T
MANEUVERS IN SECURITY COUNCIL TO HAIR RAISING PROXIMITY TO BRINK BUT ALSO EVIDENT TONIGHT THAT THEY THINK THEY HAVE GOTTEN AWARY WITH IT. THERE IS GENERALLY RELAXED ATMOSPHERE IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES AND EVERY INDICATION INTENTION TO HOLD TO CEASEFIRE.

GP-2. BARBOUR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-10-67 6:10 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6-10-67 6:13 PM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4049

9 1 5 2
JUNE 10, 1967
5:23 A.M.

1. FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMING ISRAELI EMBASSY WASH AND ISRAELI UN DELEGATION THERE ABSOLUTELY NO RPT NO FOUNDATION TO SYRIAN CHARGES THAT ISRAEL INTENDS ADVANCE ON DAMASCUS. ISRAEL'S ACTION IS LIMITED TO ATTEMPTING SILENCE GUNS BOMBARDING SETTLEMENTS AND PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT CEASE-FIRE IMMEDIATELY ON PRESENT LINE. ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL BULL AND ASKED HIM TO SEND OBSERVERS TO SYRIAN FRONT AT ONCE. IN ADDITION, PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL HAS LEFT FOR THE FRONT TO INSURE PERSONALLY THAT ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION IS LIMITED TO RESPNSE RPT RESPONSE.

2. AS TO MILITARY SITUATION STATE 210012 GOI SAYS ITS TROOPS ARE ON FIRST HEIGHTS AT NORTHERN END OF SYRIAN LINE BUT HAVE NOT HAD SIMILAR SUCCESS ON SOUTHERN END WHERE BOMBARDMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IS CONTINUING. AS TO QUNETRA ISRAELIS HAVE NOT RPT NOT CAPTURED IT. THEY DESCRIBE THEIR POSTURE AS FAR FROM QUNETRA IF NOT IN A GEOGRAPHIC SENSE IN THE SENSE OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITY IN VIEW OF THE TERRAIN.

3. GOI HAS RELUCTANTLY DECIDED IT MUST RPT MUST ACCEPT IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE-FIRE ON PRESENT LINE DESPITE FACT THIS WILL NOT RPT NOT PROVIDE FUTURE PROTECTION FOR SETTLEMENTS. DECISION MADE ON BASIS DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL AND OBVIOUS URGENCY CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION.

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 5:20 a.m. JUNE 10.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, AT 5:35 A.M. JUNE 10.

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SS RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
GPM RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
SP RUESUA/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5678

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JUNE 10, 1967
1:56 A.M.

AF SC MID-EAST CRISIS
ARA
EA REF: USUN 5672 AND 5660, 5664, 5655
EUR
NEA FOL COVERS ORIGIN AND CONCLUSIONS TWO SC MTGS JUNE 9:
P 1. WHEN MELLBIN (DENMARK) CONSULTED WITH PEDERSEN AT 7 A.M.
NSC RE SYRIAN REQUEST FOR URGENT MEETING OF SC JUNE 9, MELLBIN
INR GAVE FOL INFO: RAFAEL (ISRAEL) HAD PHONED DANES FIRST AT 5
ACDA A.M. AND GAVE THEM ESSENTIALLY SAME INFO CONTAINED TEL AVIV 4026.
AID SOMETIME AFTER 6 A.M. TOMEH (SYRIA) PHONED DANES TO REQUEST
PC URGENT SC MEETING SINCE SYRIA UNDER ATTACK FROM ISRAEL ON GROUND
SR AND IN AIR. DANES CONSULTED SC MEMBERS AND MEETING ARRANGED
ORM FOR 10 A.M.
OPR
TRSY 2. GIVEN NECESSITY PROMPT SC ACTION REAFFIRM CEASE-FIRE
AND DEMAND COMPLIANCE OF ALL PARTIES, WE CONSIDERED VARIOUS TACTICAL
RSR POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING HAVING PRES TABLE SHORT NEW DRAFT RES,
UPDATING LONGER SUBSTANTIVE US DRAFT ALREADY ON TABLE (USUN
5660, 5664), OR OFFERING AMENDMENT TO CANADIAN DRAFT (USUN 5655),
WHICH ALSO BEFORE SC BUT WITH PRIORITY STATUS. DENMARK DECIDED IT
WILLING PUT FORWARD TEXT ON BEHALF SC PRES (USUN 5672).
WHEN MEETING TIME CAME SYRIANS TOLD US THEY HAD A TEXT CALLING
FOR CEASEFIRE. WE AGREED TO IT WITH CHANGE IN OP PARA TO REFER
BOTH TO SYRIA AND ISRAEL INSTEAD OF JUST ISRAEL. USSR THEN TRIED
TO GET PREAMBULAR PARA REFERRING TO FIGHTING GOING ON IN SYRIA
IN VICINITY ADL. WE REJECTED THIS IN MEETING OF USSR, DENMARK,
SYRIA AND OURSELVES. (COMMENT: SOV INTENT APPARENTLY WAS TO
EMBARRASS US FOR NOT BEING PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO EMBRACE
EXPLICIT MENTION OF ARMISTICE LINES). FINALLY, AFTER THIS DRAFTING
HAD COST TWO HOURS, SOVS AGREED TO TEXT AS PROPOSED BY SYRIANS,

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WHICH UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AFTER STATEMENTS BY SYRIA AND ISRAEL. (SEE UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY FOR SC MEETING AND USUN 5672 FOR TEXT OF RES.)

3. SC RECONVENED AFTER SEVEN P.M. IN ORDER HEAR LATEST SYG INFO ON COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE. AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION, IN WHICH SYRIANS CITED NEWS REPORTS OF ISRAELI ADVANCES AND SOVS REPEATEDLY STRESSED ISRAELI "AGGRESSION," SYG SUGGESTED THAT PARTIES COOPERATE TO PERMIT UNTSO ESTABLISH FACTS. SUGGESTION BY GOLDBERG AND MOTIONS BY FEDORENKO (USSR), CARADON (UK), AND TINE (FRANCE), LED TO FORMULATION BY SC PRES OF PROPOSAL REQUESTING ISRAEL TO MAKE GOVT HOUSE AVAILABLE TO GEN BULL AND UNTSO, CALLING UPON BOTH PARTIES TO PERMIT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO GEN BULL AND UNTSO OBSERVERS, AND REQUESTING SYG TO REPORT INFO HE RECEIVES FROM OBSERVERS TO SC, WHICH ADJOURNED UNTIL 10:30 AM TOMORROW MORNING, JUNE 10.

4. SOVS SUBMITTED LTR AFTER MTG REQUESTING INSCRIPTION NEW ITEM ENTITLED (APPROXIMATELY) "ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY ISRAEL

AND ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM ARAB STATES". AFTER CONVERSATION WITH AMB PEDERSEN, AMB TABOR TOOK UP WITH UNSEC QUESTION OF WHETHER TO INSCRIBE ITEM "LTR FROM PERMREP OF THE SOV UNION," WHICH WOULD BE PREFERABLE, OR "LTR FROM PERMREP OF SOV UNION ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY ISRAEL AND ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM ARAB STATES," WHICH SOVS LIKELY TO PRESS FOR. IN ANTICIPATION THIS ITEM, SOV CONTINUED EXPLORING WITH OTHER DELS, INCLUDING JAPANESE AND FRENCH, POSSIBILITY OF SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL RES. SHEVCHENKO, TO WHOM SOV PERMREP REFERS AS HIS COMMISSAR, ADMITTED TO PLIHON (FRANCE), HOWEVER, THAT PROBLEM MORE COMPLEX THAN COULD BE COMPREHENDED BY SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL RES.

5. SOV LINE APPEARED TO HARDEN DURING DAY WITH CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS PLACED BY SOVS ON COMMUNIQUE OF MOSCOW MTG KEY SENTENCE OF WHICH READ AS FOL: "IF GOI DOES NOT STOP AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS BEHIND TRUCE LINE, SOCIALIST STATES WHICH SIGNED THIS STATEMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO HELP THE PEOPLES OF ARAB COUNTRIES TO ADMINISTER RESOLUTE REBUFF TO AGGRESSOR, TO PROTECT THEIR LAWFUL RIGHTS, AND TO EXTINGUISH HOTBED OF WAR IN ME AND RESTORE PEACE IN THAT AREA." RAFAEL (ISRAEL) REMARKED TO PEDERSEN SOVS HAD TAKEN DISTURBING LINE AND SEEMED TO WANT TO PUT STATEMENTS ON RECORD PRIOR TO SOME UNSPECIFIED ACTION.

COMMENT:

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ISSUE OF SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL AS OPPOSED TO WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT WILL BE MAIN AND SOMEWHAT TRICKY PROBLEM AS SOON AS CEASE-FIRE FIRMS UP.

GP-4.

GOLDBERG
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:13 A.M. JUNE 10.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC
FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE AT 2:13 A.M. JUNE 10.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5679

SC 009101

1967 JUN 10 AM 1 35

SC: SOV ATTITUDE ON MIDEAST SETTLEMENT

USUN 5660 AND 5666

1. MERON (ISRAEL) TOLD MISOFF JUNE 9 THAT TEKOAH, FORMER ISRAELI AMB TO MOSCOW, NOW IN ISRAEL. FONMIN HAD HAD LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH SOV AMB TONE OF WHICH CONSIDERABLY MORE FRIENDLY THAN USUAL.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 5679 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. POLREICH (CZECH) VOLUNTEERED TO MISOFF THAT US PROPOSAL IN SC JUNE 7 REQUIRED SOV COOPERATION FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION. ASKED WHAT HE FELT SOV POSITION WOULD BE ON STRAIT OF TIRAN AND FREE PASSAGE OF SUEZ, HE DISMISSED THESE AS NOT BEING MAJOR PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING KEY PROBLEMS AS ACHIEVEMENT JOINT PUBLIC US-USSR COMMITMENT TO EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND JOINT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL MODIFY ITS DEMANDS AND PROVIDE FACE-SAVING RESULTS FOR ARABS.

POLREICH URGED CLOSER US-USSR COLLABORATION ON THIS PROBLEM. MISOFF SAID HE HAD NOT HAD MUCH RESPONSE FROM WORKING LEVEL SOV DEL BUT ALWAYS READY IF POLREICH WANTED PROMOTE ANY CONTACT. POLREICH SAID HE THOUGHT MAYBE SOVS NOT READY YET.

3. FOCHINE (SOV UNSEC OFFICIAL) TOOK MORE OMINOUS LINE WITH MISOFF AND DANISH MISOFF INDICATING SYRIA COUNTRY TO WHICH SOVS MOST COMMITTED IN NEAR EAST AND ISRAELI ADVANCES COULD CREATE MORE SERIOUS SITUATION. (COMMENT: INTENTION MAY HAVE BEEN TO LEND WEIGHT TO FEDORENKO PRONOUNCEMENT IN EVENING SC MTG OF COMMUNIQUE OF MTG OF SOCIALIST STATES IN MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL

WHICH DESIGNED PORTEND UNSPECIFIED DIRE RESULTS IF ISRAEL DID NOT STOP ITS MOVE. BULGARIAN PERMREP INDICATED TO SWISS OBSERVER THAT LONG SOV STALLING IN MORNING DUE TO MOSCOW MTG DELAYING SOV INSTRUCTIONS. BULGARIAN ALSO TOLD SWISS HE EXPECTS SOME TOP LEADERSHIP SHAKEUP.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:15 A.M., JUNE 10.
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FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE 2:15 A.M., JUNE 10.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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P 101650Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
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S E C R E T TEHRAN 4900

1967 JUN 10 PM 1 30

EXDIS

SUBJ: SHAH'S DESIRE ASSIST WITH MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

REF: STATE 209548

1. ZAHEDI CALLED ME TO FOREIGN MINISTRY TODAY TO DISCUSS SHAH'S INTEREST IN PLAYING HELPFUL ROLE IN RESOLUTION PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. SHAH HAD TAKEN NOTE OF 3RD PARAGRAPH PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY WONDERING HOW, IN LIGHT POSTPONEMENT HIS OWN VISIT TO US, WE CAN BEST ARRANGE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. SHAH HAS NOW DECIDED INSTRUCT ANSARY PROPOSE TO DEPARTMENT THAT EITHER US SEND SPECIAL EMMISSARY TO IRAN OR GOI WOULD BE PREPARED SEND SOMEONE

PAGE 2 RUQTAN 4900 S E C R E T
TO WASHINGTON.

2. ACCORDINGLY, DEPARTMENT WILL NO DOUBT BE RECEIVING URGENT REQUEST FOR ANSARY MEET WITH APPROPRIATE LEVEL DEPARTMENT OFFICERS DISCUSS THIS IDEA.

3. COMMENT. ZAHEDI DID NOT GIVE ME ANY IDEA WHAT MOVES OR SUGGESTIONS SHAH MAY BE CONSIDERING BUT PERHAPS ANSARY MAY BE PREPARED SPELL THINGS OUT IN SOMEWHAT MORE DETAIL. IT WOULD SEEM IRANIANS COULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN CONTACTS WITH FEISAL AND HUSSEIN. IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE TEHRAN 4899. CONCEIVABLY THEY COULD ALSO PLAY SOME KIND OF INTERMEDIARY ROLE WITH IRAQ.

THACHER
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 1:32 p.m., June 10.
Passed White House at 2:01 p.m., June 10.

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1967 JUN 10 PM 12 43

000432

GEN. BULL HAS INFORMED ISRAELIS OF RECEIPT REPLY FROM SYRIANS PROPOSING 1630 GMT, THAT IS 1830 LOCAL, FOR CEASEFIRE. THIS AGREEABLE TO ISRAELIS WHO HAD TOLD HIM ANY TIME HE PROPOSED ACCEPTABLE. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: PASSED SSO 12:44 p.m. 6/10/67
PASSED WH, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC CINCSTRIKE, USUN 12:45 p.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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1967 JUN 10 AM 12 03 009085

S E C R E T AMMAN 4190

1. KING HUSSEIN TOLD EMBOFF THIS EVENING, AFTER PRESIDENT NASSER'S INITIAL STATEMENT OF RESIGNATION, IN WHICH HE REITERATED THERE WAS POSITIVE PROOF OF ACTIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL, THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE CLEARED UP FOR ONCE AND FOR ALL IN ARAB MINDS IF NOT IN WORLD OPINION. HE SUGGESTED THAT U.S. INVITE THE UNITED NATIONS TO INVESTIGATE ALL THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO THIS ISSUE AND RENDER AN IMPARTIAL

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4190 S E C R E T

PUBLIC VERDICT REGARDING ANY WESTERN INVOLVEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS TEMPTED TO TAKE THIS INITIATIVE HIMSELF IN ORDER TO CLEAR THE AIR AND ABSOLVE THE U.S. BUT ON SECOND THOUGHT BELIEVED IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE U.S. TOOK THE INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, IF THE U.S. FOR SOME REASON FELT THAT THE INITIATIVE SHOULD COME FROM JORDAN, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE IT.

2. THE KING CITED THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BASED ON INFORMATION FROM JORDAN, UAR, AND SYRIA WHICH SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION:

A. JORDANIAN RADAR READINGS INDICATED THAT FOR THE THREE TO FOUR DAYS PRECEDING THE HOSTILITIES, AIRCRAFT APPEARED TO BE FLYING FROM STATIONARY OBJECTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO ISRAEL. THE KING SUSPECTS THAT THESE COULD HAVE BEEN FRENCH PLANES FLOWN IN IN A HURRY AT ISRAEL'S REQUEST IN ANTICIPATION OF HOSTILITIES. WHETHER THEY CAME FROM FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OR EUROPEAN AIR FIELDS OR WHETHER THERE IS SOME OTHER EXPLANATION IS OPEN TO QUESTION, BUT IT SHOULD BE RESOLVED.

B. NUMEROUS REPORTS FROM JORDANIAN OFFICERS THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE ON THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN, BRITISH HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT WERE USED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN ATTACKS ON JORDANIAN FORCES. THE KING IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THESE REPORTS

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PAGE THREE RUQMKG 4190 S E C R E T
BECAUSE THE ONE AIRCRAFT WITH WHICH JORDANIANS ARE FAMILIAR IS THE HAWKER HUNTER WHICH HAS LONG BEEN THE ONLY TYPE USED BY THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES. BECAUSE OF THIS, WHEN FIRST OBSERVED THE JORDANIAN TROOPS ASSUMED THAT THEY WERE FRIENDLY, BUT WHEN THEY FIRED ON THE TROOPS AND REAPPEARED SEVERAL TIMES TO ATTACK THEM, THEY REALIZED THEY WERE ISRAELI. AS FAR AS THE ARABS KNEW THE ISRAELIS HAD NO HAWKER HUNTERS. THE QUESTION THUS ARISES WERE THESE BRITISH AIRCRAFT FLOWN BY BRITISHERS, OR MERCENARIES, OR WERE THEY RECENT OR UNKNOWN PURCHASES BY THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

C. BRITISH CANBERRAS WERE ALSO REPORTED SEEN IN THE ISRAELI ATTACK BY THE JORDANIAN, UAR AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE KING SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN REPORTS ARE FLIMSY BUT THAT THE UAR AND SYRIA HAVE BOTH AFFIRMED THAT CANBERRAS WERE EMPLOYED. AS FAR AS THE ARABS KNOW THE ISRAELIS DO NOT HAVE CANBERRAS. HENCE, WHO WAS FLYING THEM AND FROM WHERE DID THEY COME?

D. UAR LT. GENERAL ABDUL MUNIM RIYADH, IN VIEWING THE MASSIVE ISRAELI AIR ACTION ON RADAR, WAS CONVINCED THAT SOMETHING MORE THAN THE ISRALEI AIR FORCE WAS INVOLVED AND HE SO INFORMED NASSER.

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 4190 S E C R E T
3. THE KING SIMPLY FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO TRY TO CLEAR THE DOUBT SURROUNDING ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS THROUGH INVESTIGATION BY AN IMPARTIAL BODY.

4. REQUEST EARLY REPLY INDICATING WHETHER DEPARTMENT WOULD PREFER SUCH INVESTIGATION BE PROPOSED BY USG OR GOJ.

5. MY INSTINCT IS THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS MADE USG SHOULD MAKE IT.
GP-3 BURNS
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:50 A.M. JUNE 10.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC
FOR POLAD AT 12:50 A.M. JUNE 10.

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 4899

REF: STATE 2108801, TEHRAN 4868

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S REQUEST THAT SHAH INTERVENE WITH FEISAL AND HUSSEIN

1. FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME TODAY THAT SHAH HAD RECEIVED FAVORABLE REPLIES FROM BOTH FEISAL AND HUSSEIN IN RESPONSE TO HIS PLEA THAT THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BREAK RELATIONS WITH US.

2. HUSSEIN AFFIRMED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND SEVER TIES "BARRING ANY FURTHER MAJOR CHANGE IN SITUATION."

3. FEISAL MESSAGE WHICH WAS "QUITE A LONG ONE" MENTIONED FEISAL'S DEEP CONCERN WITH DIFFICULT SITUATION NOW FACING HUSSEIN. I SAID I KNEW HOW DEEPLY THIS VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ENDEAVOR ON PART OF HIM WAS APPRECIATED IN WASHINGTON.

THACHER
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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T O P S E C R E T RABAT 5464

NODIS

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

1. AT HIS FURTHER URGENT REQUEST I SAW FONMIN LARAKI AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. HE ASKED ME CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING TO PRESIDENT:

2. KING WOULD LIKE TO SEND IMMEDIATELY A PERSONAL EMISSARY, FONMIN LARAKI, TO TALK TO PRESIDENT ABOUT CURRENT GRAVE SITUATION AND TO EXPRESS PERSONALLY THE URGENCY OF QUICK ACTION. TO CREATE OSTENSIBLE IMPRESSION OF BALANCE, KING WILL ALSO SEND BALAFREJ TO MOSCOW ALTHOUGH NO SIGNIFICANCE ATTACHED TO THAT MISSION.

3. LARAKI HOPED HE WOULD HAVE AN ANSWER BY END OF TODAY AS HATIS READY DEPART IMMEDIATELY.

4. COMMENT: I SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE AGREE

PAGE 2 RUDKBT 5464 T O P S E C R E T
TO THIS MISSION. KING, AS CONVINCED ARAB MODERATE FEELS IMPORTANCE OF TAKING POSITIVE ACTION TO DEFUSE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION AND MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE HIS USEFULNESS IN WORKING TOWARD MORE LASTING SOLUTION. THIS INITIATIVE WILL ALSO BE WELCOMED BY ARAB NATIONALISTS HERE AS REFLECTING KING'S DEEP CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS. GP-1 TASCA
BT

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1967 JUN 10 PM 12 48

EXDIS

REF: KUWAIT 1286, PARA 3; KUWAIT 1299, PARA 3.

AMIR CONFIDED ME TACTICAL PLAN RE OIL CONTROLS WHICH HE HAS REVEALED ONLY TO PM, MINISTER OF FINANCE AND OIL, UK AMBASSADOR AND TO ME. IT CONCERNS MOSTLY UK, AND AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HAS REPORTED IT FULLY. I SUGGEST DEPT DESIGNATE SOMEONE IN LONDON AND/OR DEPT TO EXPLORE ON NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

GP-1 COTTAM
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 12:48 p.m., June 10.
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PARIS FOR NATUS

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON MIDDLE EAST

1. FONMIN FANFANI JUNE 9 REPEATED TO CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SUBSTANCE OF STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMITTEE JUNE 7 (AIRGRAM POUCHED JUNE 9). ELEMENT OF SELF-JUSTIFICATION WAS STRONGER, HOWEVER, SHOWING HOW MUCH HAD RANKLED FORCEFULLY PRO-ISRAELI POSITION OF MANY CONSERVATIVES AND OF SOCIALIST AND REPUBLICAN COALITION PARTNERS AND RESULTING CRITICISM OF HIS POSITION AS HAVING BEEN SO "EQUIDISTANT" AS TO GAIN EVENTUAL APPROVAL OF COMMUNISTS. FANFANI THUS SAID THAT TAKING SIDES (AS HE HINTED HE WOULD HAVE DONE HAD HE NOT BEEN BOUND BY DIPLOMATIC PRUDENCE) WOULD HAVE NULLIFIED VALUE OF WHAT ITALY COULD DO TOWARD RESOLVING CRISIS. POINTED OUT IN THIS CONNECTION HE HAD FOLLOWED SAME PRINCIPLE IN RECENT MONTHS IN REFUSING TO TAKE SIDES ON VIETNAM CONFLICT. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT BASIC GOVERNMENT LINE OF SUPPORTING UN ACTION HAD BEEN APPROVED BY CABINET UNANIMOUSLY AND BY SENIOR LEADERS OF COALITION PARTIES.

2. FANFANI HOPED CEASE FIRE WOULD BE PRELUDE TO "CAREFUL AND REALISTIC" REEXAMINATION OF ME PROBLEMS: ARABS AND ISRAELIS LIVING TOGETHER, USE OF MARITIME ROUTES BY ALL, SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGION. REPEATED GOI'S WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT AND SAID THAT AS IMMEDIATE STEP HAD AUTHORIZED 200 MILLION LIRE ($320,000) FOR ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN ISRAEL AND INVOLVED ARAB COUNTRIES. IN ABSENCE OR TARDINESS OF MULTILATERAL DECISIONS LATER, GOI WOULD PROPOSE TO PARLIAMENT PLAN FOR FURTHER DIRECT HELP.

REINHARDT
BT

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ZEN/AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
STATE GPNC
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S E C R E T LONDON 10292

1967 JUN 10 AM 11 52

SUBJ: LIBYA

REF: STATE 209828

1. EMBOFF AGAIN REVIEWED LIBYAN SITUATION JUNE 10 WITH FONOFF·S SPEARES AND MALLET. THEY AGREED IT SERIOUS, BUT THOUGHT LAW AND ORDER GENERALLY MAINTAINED EXCEPT IN BENGHAZI. MALLET SHOWED EMBOFF CABLE RECEIVED OVERNIGHT.

PAGE 2 RUDTCP 10292 S E C R E T
A. FROM WAKEFIELD IN BENGHAZI-
SITUATION TOUCHY. SOME GANGS OF YOUTHS STILL ROAMING CITY. SECURITY AUTHORITIES DOING ALL THEY CAN, AND ARE ALERT TO POSSIBILITY ALGERIAN TROOPS MIGHT SEEK TO LINK UP WITH LIBYANDISSIDENTS.

B. FROM AMB. SARELL IN TRIPOLI-
FONMIN BISHTI CONFIDED NASSER IN MOST UNPLEASANT JUNE 3 SESSION SAID HE VERY ANGRY WITH LIBYANS. BISHTI IN AMMAN WHEN ISRAELI PLANES HIT; KNOWS CAIRO CHARGES ABOUT US/UK AIR ROLE ARE FALSE. TAXED BY SARELL ABOUT ANARCHY IN BENGHAZI, BISHTI ACKNOWLEDGED (1.) EXTENSIVE UAR PENETRATION ALL GOL DEPARTMENTS, (2.) MANY WEAKNESS CYRENAICAN DEFENSE FORCE. BISHTI COMPLAINED PRIMIN MORE INTERESTED IN CONSTRUCTION (ESP. OF BAIDA) AND OWN POSITION IN CYRENAICA THAN IN SECURITY AND ADEQUATE CONTROL OF INFO MEDIA.

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUDTCH 10292
SAPELL NOTED TO FONOFF THAT BISHTI NOT
POWERFUL FIGURE.

4. RESPONSE FURTHER LEADS RE POSSIBLE
UK/US ACTION TO HELP GOL STABILIZE
SITUATION, FONOFF OFFICIALS RESIGNEDLY
STRESSED MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON CAIRO RADIO
LINE. MALLET (PROTECT) SAID LIBYANS HAD NO
SPINES TO STIFFEN. ENDING EXCHANGE, HE
STATED FONOFF CONFIDENT AMBS ON SPOT
DOING ALL THAT CAN BE DONE, AND ON OWN
INITIATIVES.

5. COMMENT: BRITS MAY BE LESS WORRIED
THAN WE. APPEARS EVIDENT ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTION
FOR COORDINATED US/UK ACTION TO STIFFEN GOL SPINE
MUST COME FROM US.

GP-1 KAISER
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 1:43 p.m., June 10.
Passed White House, USIA at 2:30 p.m., June 10.

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1967 JUN 10 AM 10:38

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 4776

1., TUNISIANS, ORDINARILY PRAGMATIC AND LEVEL-HEADED, BECOMING MORE EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED IN NEAR EAST STRUGGLE THAN AT ANY TIME IN PAST. LADGHAM AND SLIM RECEIVED ME LAST NIGHT IN STATE OF HIGH AGITATION AND CONCERN OVER ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE AGAINST EGYPT AND SYRIA (TUNIS 4774 NOTAL). LADGHAM SPOKE WITH GREAT EMOTION OF

THE KILLING OF 15,000 JORDANIANS. GAVE ME LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON CALLING UPON USG TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO STOP ISRAELI VIOLATIONS. SAID ONLY US HAS INFLUENCE TO INDUCE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW TO ITS OWN TERRITORY.

2. GROWING PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL FEELING OVER PRESENT SITUATION FURTHER EVIDENCED BY:

(A) REBROADCASTING OF LARGE PORTION NASSER'S SPEECH ON RADIO TUNIS THIS MORNING INCLUDING EXCERPTS RELATING TO US AND UK AERIAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

(B) FORMATION SPECIAL NATIONAL COMMITTEE HEADED BY MINISTER OF HEALTH TO AID VICTIMS OF ISRAELI AGRESSION. COMMITTEE HAS DECIDED TO SEND MEDICAL SUPPLIES, CLOTHING AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4776 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(C) FOREIGN EDITOR OF INDEPENDENT AS-SABAH TELEPHONED USIS TO SAY HE NO LONGER WISHED TO RECEIVE ANY USIS MATERIAL AS A RESULT OF "WHAT YOU HAVE DONE IN NEAR EAST."

(D) FOR FIRST TIME OF WHICH EMBASSY HAS KNOWLEDGE SERVANTS OF SEVERAL EMBASSY FAMILIES BEING DENOUNCED BY NEIGHBORS FOR WORKING FOR AMERICANS.

(E) EDITORIAL IN OFFICIAL PARTY PAPER L'ACTION JUNE 10 ATTACKS ISRAEL FOR FAILURE TO RESPECT CEASE-FIRE. EDITORIAL SEES THIS AS CONTINUANCE ISRAELI DEFIANCE OF ENTIRE WORLD DURING PAST 20 YEARS. EDITORIAL SAYS "PRESENT WORLD LEADERS SHOULD HAVE ALL THE MORE REMORSE AND SHAME FOR HAVING TOLERATED, ENCOURAGED AND ASSISTED THE AGGRESSOR."

3. THERE IS GROWING POPULAR CONVICTION THAT US INVOLVED IN ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND THAT IT UNLIKELY TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO COMPEL ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ARAB TERRITORY. FRONT PAGE L'ACTION CITES DECISION COMMUNIST SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW TO DEMAND RETREAT OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORY. CONVICTION INCREASINGLY EXPRESSED THAT US

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4776 C O N F I D E N T I A L
COMMITMENT TO GUARANTEE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN ME IN FACT LIMITED TO ISRAEL.

4. BOURGUIBA HAS BEEN BUSY DURING PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT. HE RECEIVED AMBASSADORS OF ALGERIA, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, IRAN AND INDONESIA TO GIVE THEM GOT POSITION ON MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND URGED THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO USE INFLUENCE TO BRING END TO ISRAELI'S VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE. IN ADDITION LETTERS TO CHIEFS OF STATE US, USSR, UK AND FRANCE, BOURGUIBA HAS SENT MESSAGES TO U THANT AND PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLING ATTENTION TO ISRAELI VIOLATIONS AND TO TUNISIA'S CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO CHARTER OF UN AND URGING THEM TO USE ALL MEANS TO SEE THAT ISRAEL RESPECTS CEASE-FIRE. PRESIDENT ALSO SENDING MONGI SLIM TO AMMAN JUNE 11 ALONG WITH MEDICAL DELEGATION.

GP-2 RUSSELL
BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 12:20 PM 6/10/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, USUN AT 1:18 PM 6/10/67

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action
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Info

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RR RUEHC
DE RUDTCR 10291 1711325
ZNY SSSSS
R 101320Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T LONDON 10291

1967 JUN 10 AM 9 39

EXDIS-NOFORN

REF: LONDON.S 10260

SUBJECT: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. ASKED ABOUT PRIME MINISTER WILSON.S STRESS TODAY ON FOUR-POWER APPROACH TO ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT (LONDON.S 10282), ASS'T. UNSEC. BRENCHLEY CONFIDED TO EMBOFF. THAT FONOFF.S IMPRESSION THIS STANCE STRUCK LARGELY FOR EFFECT VIS-A-VIS DEGAULLE AND U.K.'S COMMON MARKET APPLICATION. IN SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE, BRENCHLEY ALLOWED HMG MUCH DESIRES FOUR-POWER OR TWO-POWER DEAL ON MIDDLE EAST, BUT FONOFF:

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 10291 S E C R E T
(A) NOTES FRENCH VERY QUIET ABOUT FOUR-POWER IDEA IN RECENT DAYS: (B) NOT SANGUINE SOVS. WOULD AGREE EXCLUDE VIET-NAM HAZARD FROM GAME.

GP-1 KAISER
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

210153

SECRET

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
Amconsul JERUSALEM PRIORITY
Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USUN

Jun 10 9 39 PM '67

STATE 210153

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Iran, Israel and West-Bank Arabs

1. Iranian Ambassador Ansary has informed Dept that in response suggestion made to him by Under Secretary Rostow, Shah is sending message and Iranian emissary to Israel to attempt persuade Israelis to provide for Arab population on west bank and not rpt not to drive them across Jordan river. Dept officer expressed gratitude for this constructive Iranian step.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by	Tel Ext	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/IRN: TLEliot 6/10/67	5840	classification approved by: NEA/IRN: T. L. Eliot

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210030

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

8-1-S

Origin E

Info: SS GPM SP SC H AF ARA EA EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD AID AGR CEA COM DOT FMC INT TRSY

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY
INFO: Amembassy PARIS ~~CEDTO~~

Jun 10 10 45 AM '67

STATE 210030
CEDTO
REF: London's 10238

1. State and Interior believe it would be error to have an officially sanctioned US-UK oil company committee working on oil crisis problems in London separately from the OECD emergency organization. Existence such committee virtually certain to become known in international oil industry and through industry by governments. Knowledge on part of OECD members existence Anglo-American company organization might generate suspicion US and UK not forthcoming re capability those companies to provide petroleum Western Europe and Japan with potential danger that individual OECD members might be encouraged to take separate actions to procure greater POL supplies. We would be willing reassess possible usefullness of a London organization as coordination channel between US and UK companies at some later date in the event OECD organization found not to function satisfactorily in the oil crisis.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
6/9/67 E:OR:FSE:JEAkins:dwb	2673	E - Mr. Solomon

Clearances:

INT/MR - Asst Secy Moore

EUR/RPE - Mr. Hinton

INT/MOG - Mr. Goodman

SECRET

FORM DS-322
8-63

SECRET

2. Department officers discussed oil crisis with Angus Beckett, Undersecretary, Min. of Power and chairman of the OECD oil committee) and other British officials, June 6-7. General coincidence of views on shortfall and make-up.

In case loss all Arab oil (except Algeria for France and Neutral Zone off-shore for Japan), plus closure Suez Canal, loss will be 9 million b/d. In first 90 days approximately 1.3 million b/d can be made up by increasing US, Venezuelan, Iranian, Indonesian and West African production leaving a net shortage of 52 percent or a stock draw-down of 46 days.

In case canal and pipelines remain closed and Arabs boycott oil only to US and UK, supplies for US can be made up in Western Hemisphere and for UK in Iran but tanker situation becomes critical. Transport around cape would require additional 1200 T-2's. A maximum of 850 T-2 equivalents can be made up through more efficient use of existing tankers, withdrawing ships from the grain trade and reactivating laid-up ships.

In the present situation of full Iranian production, Kuwait denying oil only to the US and UK, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran out altogether, the problem is finding crude, not tankers. This would change, of course, if Saudi Arabia and Libya would resume production.

SECRET

Beckett concluded that action already taken by Arabs and potential further losses, required him to call OECD meeting. We have given Interior our formal assessment of situation and requested that Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee (FPSC) be convened.

RUSK

GP3.

END.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

210152

SECRET

39

Jun 10 9 38 PM '67

81 Origin
55 Infor

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY

STATE 210152

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Iran and Middle East

REF TEHRAN 4900

1. We have told Ansary, who has received Shah's message per reftel, that in view fact we are still studying all aspects Middle East situation and formulating our plans it would seem premature for us to send special rep to Tehran for discussions with GOI. On other hand, we have said that if GOI wishes send special rep to Washington we would be pleased hold discussions with him provided no publicity would attend his mission and that he would realize top-level of USG extremely busy at moment.

2. Ansary has replied that in light his discussions with Battle (STATE 210119) and his decision not rpt not to go to Tehran himself until he has clearer picture of US plans, he will be sending message to Zahedi suggesting that decision on whether to send GOI rep to Washington be postponed for few days.

3. Ansary expressed hope you would hold off discussing this subject again with Zahedi until after his message received, presumably Sunday morning.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/IRN:TLEliot,Jr. 6/10/67	5810	NEA/IRN - T. L. Eliot Jr.

Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle (substance para 1)
S/S - AMGiese

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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81
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: **Embassy PARIS**

RPT INFO: **Amembassies London, Moscow**
USUN

JUN 10 7 55 PM

~~NATO~~ ATC 210147
~~STATE~~ EXDIS
NATUS

~~Ambassador~~ Lucet was requested to call on Undersecretary Rostow this afternoon. Rostow said he had been instructed to put two questions to K GO~~F~~.

1. The first was ~~whether~~ the French Government might wish to consider taking an initiative in Cairo with regard to the opening of the Suez Canal. The Canal was a matter of international ~~importance~~. With the cease-fire in effect, the UAR could claim no possible justification for the closing under the Convention of 1888. We thought GOF might be in a good posit~~ion~~ to raise the issue in Cairo, as we are not. Before consider~~ing~~ other possibilities, we should appreciate having the French Government's views on the question.

2. Proposals have come to us from various sources about the possibility of reaching agreements regarding the level

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
M:EVRostow:emb 6/10/67	5284	M - Mr. Rostow

Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle G - Mr. Kohler W/S

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FORM DS-322

SECRET

of armaments in the area of the Middle East affected by recent hostilities. In the long run, we should study the possibility of agreements among the nations supplying arms, regional disarmament agreements, agreements on the subject linked to international security arrangements for the region, or perhaps initiatives of various kinds within U.N.

3. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and a few other countries ~~now~~ face pressing requests for arms from ~~the~~ Israel and the ~~a~~ Arab nations which have been involved in hostilities. Unless we soon reach agreements on arms levels and arms limitations in the area we may soon again face the situation we faced last month--another round of mobilization, another menacing encirclement of Israel, the risk of a renewal of hostilities.

4. Before deciding on substance and procedure for approaches to be undertaken at this time, we should appreciate having views of British and French Governments, by Monday ~~in~~ if possible, on a problem we regard as urgent.

5. Lucet asked if USG wanted to prevent resupply~~XXXX~~ Rostow ~~XXXX~~ replied we could not yet make firm decision on this. For one thing, if cease-fire does not lead to satisfactory long-term settlement there could be another round of fighting. For another,

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Soviets might send in new supplies. They were already shipping on a large scale. Lucet said he was not certain of current French embargo policy. French MOD had put out ambiguous communique which he thought implied shipment spare parts could go ahead. [redacted]

END

GP-1

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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JUN 10 7 31 PM '67

81
Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ~~MX~~ AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LONDON
INFO: USUN NEW YORK

STATE 210141
EXDIS
REF: Amman's 4190

Please convey to King Hussein at earliest opportunity the following:

1) We fully appreciate need to clear up once and for all charges US and UK actively involved ~~x~~ in support Israel in hostilities. We have already issued categoric denial, including specific statements by Secretary, Ambassador Goldberg and Defense Dept. British also denied charges.

2) In SC on June 6 Ambassador Goldberg said (unnecessary words omitted): QTE US prepared, first, to cooperate in immediate impartial investigation by UN of these charges, to offer all facilities to UN in that investigation; second, as part of or in addition such investigation, US prepared invite UN personnel aboard our aircraft carriers in Mediterranean today, tomorrow, or at convenience of UN, to serve as impartial observers of

Drafted by: IO:JSisco:by 6/10/67 | Tel. Ext. | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - John P. Walsh

Clearances:
M - Mr. Rostow
NEA - Mr. Battle

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FORM DS-322

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activities of our planes in area and verify past activities our plans from our official records and from log each ship carries. These observers will, in addition, be free interview air crews these carriers without inhibition, to determine their activities during days in question. Their presence as observers on these carriers will be welcomed throughout period this crisis and so long these ships in eastern waters of Mediterranean. UNQTE

We have now transmitted to UN same offer in official communication for circulation to all Members. ~~It~~ This places us in position to take formal initiative at any time. In light this fact any Jordanian/~~xxxxxxxx~~ initiative would be superfluous. Moreover, it seems to us Jordanians upon reflection would realize not in their own interest take any such initiative which bound antagonize other Middle Eastern states.

3) We are continuing watch problem carefully with view to seeing how play of UAR charges evolves worldwide. UN so far has shown virtually no interest in formal follow-up. We know USSR considers charges have no foundation and has said so to Middle Eastern ambassadors privately, but it obviously will not say so publicly. In this connection Goldberg on June 10 noted that Soviets have been shadowing our fleet in Mediterranean and are in position ~~xx~~ to disprove charges of involvement by US aircraft. He also remarked that Soviet Ambassador

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to UN has made no comment on these charges.

4) We will keep in continuous review whether to take further steps including submission specific proposal in light developments.

BEGIN FYI

/ 5) We will forward comments on Hawker Hunters and Canberras in septel. END FYI.

6) FOR LONDON: Embassy should urgently review contents of Amman's 4190 with appropriate UK officials and seek their comment on Jordanian impression that Canberras and Hawker Hunters were active in area. You should specifically try confirm our impression these aircraft obsolete and no longer in use by any British forces in Middle East.

GP-3

END.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY
INFO: USUN

Jun 10 7 22 PM '67

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STATE 210137

Following is text note received today from Israeli Embassy:

QUOTE: The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that he has been requested by the Government of Israel to renew its sincere expression of deep regret for the tragic accident in which, at the height of hostilities in the area, the USS Liberty was hit by Israeli fire. The Government of Israel deeply regrets this tragic accident.

The Ambassador of Israel has been instructed to inform the Honorable the Secretary of State that the Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage.

The Ambassador of Israel expresses once again in the name of the Government of Israel its deep condolences to the Government of the United States and its sympathy to all the

NEA:IAI:ALAtherton,Jr:fah: 2942
6/10/67

NEA:IAI - Alfred L. Atherton,Jr.

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bereaved families.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the expression of his highest consideration. UNQUOTE

Exempted [redacted]

End

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: **AmEmbassy LONDON**

INFO: **AmEmbassy PARIS**

JUN 10 6 26 PM '67

STATE 210131

EXDIS

MEMCON Between Sir Michael Stewart and Under Secretary Rostow

1. Under Secretary Rostow called in Sir Michael Stewart this afternoon and asked him to ascertain what HMG's views were on the question of arms supplies to the Middle East both during the immediate period and in the long run. USG would be glad to exchange information on all aspects of the subject as requested by HMG.

2. The problem goes beyond the immediate tense situation. The idea has come up from various sources that we might all begin to move with the Soviets toward a policy of agreed arms limitations to those parts of the area involved in hostilities. This was obviously a matter of utmost importance as the arms race has added to the basic instability of the area. We could consider a number of approaches to this problem; regional arms limitation agreements,

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and
M:RTGrey:idp 6/10/67	2157	classification approved by: M - E.V.Rostow

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Bruce

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FORM 8 65 DS-322

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public registration of arms shipments with the UN, bilateral arrangements, etc. All these ideas were worth exploring.

3. The acute problem for the moment is that the Soviets appear to be resupplying the UAR, perhaps Algeria as well. This risks setting off another round of hostilities and puts corresponding pressure on the US, France and the UK to resupply Israel.

4. Rostow indicated that he had mentioned arms limitation proposal to Ambassador Lucet in the same vein.

5. USG would like to have views of HMG and GOF before proceeding with any arms limitation approaches.

6. Rostow also said he had suggested to Lucet that GOF might wish to consider appraoching UAR re opening of Suez Canal.

END RUSK

GP-3

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210130

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin NEA

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

Jun 10 6 20 PM '67

STATE 210130

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USIA
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CIA
NSA
DOD

1. Congressional and public opinion incensed over Israeli attack on USS LIBERTY and resultant loss of life.

2. Ambassador Harman handed us note this morning confirming in writing GOI willingness compensate and apologize for accident for which they expressed great regret. We plan give firm note protest and expressing view incident grew out of gross negligence and indicating our expectation disciplinary action will be taken by GOI as well as preventive action taken assure no repetition such incident.

3. In conversation with Under Secretary this morning, Ambassador Harman was informed great U.S. concern over incident for which we can find no satisfactory explanation and our intention submit firm note as indicated above.

4. In conversations in Tel Aviv, suggest you take consistent line informing them in your discretion that note will be forthcoming through GOI Embassy Washington.

5. Text both notes will be sent separately.

GP-3

END RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA:LDBattle:lab 6/10/67	4263	The Under Secretary

Clearances:

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Bromley Smith S/S - Mr. Walsh

SECRET

FORM 8-65 DS-322

210017

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

10

Origin IO
Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR NEA P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD ACDA AID PC SR ORM SCA SCS O SY PER OPR OC TRSY

ACTION: AMEmbassy Tel Aviv FLASH
AMCONGEN Jerusalem FLASH
RPT INFO USUN New York PRIORITY

JUN 10 6 06 AM '67

STATE 210017

Situation in SC deteriorating rapidly. Your 4849 states that Israeli action limited to attempting silence guns bombarding settlements and that no foundation to Syrian charges that Israel intends advance to Damascus.

This conflicts with message (Jerusalem 1093) just received which reports following information: "Quneitra has fallen. Damascus under air attack and city may fall."

Tel Aviv and Jerusalem please comment further by FLASH, repeating USUN.

END

GP-3

RUSK

Drafted by: IO: JJSisco:eb	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO- Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances:
NEA Task Force

FORM 8-65 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

210122

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

39

SECRET/~~EXDIS~~

81
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

INFO : Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

Jun 10 5 31 PM '67

STATE 210122
EXDIS

REF.: Kuwait's 1303

LONDON FOR McGRATH

Appreciate your concerns re sensitivity but please report details immediately to permit prompt consideration by interested senior officials here.

GP-1

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/ARP - William D. Brewer:oh June 10, 1967	5655	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:
E/FSE - Mr. Oliver
S/S - Mr. Bruce

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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SECRET

38

81 Origin SS Info:

JUN 10 5 02 PM '67

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY

INFO : Amembassy AMMAN
" TEL AVIV
USUN

STATE 210119

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Iran and Middle East

1. Iranian Ambassador Ansary received separate briefings June 9 and 10 from Under Secretary Rostow, Assistant Secretary Battle and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rockwell. Ansary's expressed primary interest in US plans for future of area after hostilities cease.

2. Ansary questioned Rostow on ~~h~~inth about Soviet and US arms shipments to area. Rostow indicated Soviet intentions can in part be gauged by whether they resupply Arabs with arms. As for US shipments, he said we being most careful, watching what Soviets do and trying not give wrong impressions especially to Saudis and Moroccans. Rostow also stressed ~~XXX~~ three major US long term relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and other M.E. states concerns are/rebutting ~~Arab~~ UAR charges that US planes involved in war and keeping oil situation from worsening. Ansary said Shah feels Israelis should show restraint in their postwar expectations, although recognition of Israel as a state and problem of Arab refugees must be ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ faced. Rostow indicated Israelis saying they prepared tackle all ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/IRN:TLElliot,Jr.:csl 6/10/67	5840	classification approved by: NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:
S/S - Mr. Bruce
M - Mr. [illegible]

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

questions in context of a return to condition of peace. Ansary said fact that Arabs humiliated poses particular problem, and Rostow said we doing our best mitigate that situation.

3. Rostow stated it would be mistake for Israelis to drive Arab population out of west-bank area across Jordan river and that this would be useful point for Shah to make to Israelis. Ansary has indicated he has passed this message to Shah.

4. Battle on tenth stressed to Ansary that we are trying to take broadest and most imaginative possible look at future and that working groups are studying various subjects including economic situation, refugees, demarcation line, Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal. Battle said we have reached no conclusions and impossible state what we think because we do not yet know ourselves. One aspect of situation for example is who should take lead in working for solutions of various parts of problem. In this context perhaps Iran can play useful role. We want Iran's views. Ansary indicated he has been considering making brief trip to Tehran to discuss Iran's role in situation and suggestions Iran might make. After discussion he concluded he would remain Washington until he would be able obtain somewhat clearer picture of US plans.

5. In describing situation Battle mentioned number of uncertainties exist. These include fate of Nasser, with attitude of UAR army unknown, with economic problems tremendous and with attitude of Soviets toward assisting Egypt unclear. Soviet position also still to be clarified. They have refrained from direct confrontation with US and have suffered vis-a-vis Arabs. While it doubtful they will resume military aid to Arabs at least on previous scale, they will

undoubtedly attempt rebuild their influence in area. They are likely continue their recent policy of attempting broaden their base and lessening their reliance on UAR alone, but Egypt's economic problems will have to be faced. Another unknown is fate of Hussein and Jordan. Ansary said major problem is credence being given in Arab world to charges US assisted Israel military. Perhaps a new Egyptian regime could deny them. Battle agreed rebutting these charges will be most difficult.

6. Ansary asked Battle to inform him if at any time US decides to take conciliatory attitude toward Nasser. Battle pointed out that given break in relations, Nasser's charges of US involvement on Israel's side, and Congressional attitude conciliation at this time most unlikely. He said that chances of a change depend on UAR.

GP-3

END

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210104

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

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Origin AF

Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD IGA AID PC CU E SR ORM CPR O OPR AGR COM FRB TRSY

ACTION: Amembassy KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE

Jun 10 4 34 PM '67

STATE 210104

1. Policy decision has been taken that no military or economic aid materials that we can still control should be delivered to countries that have broken diplomatic relations with US. PL 480 Title II and III goods donated to US voluntary agencies or international agencies are not affected by this decision and such shipments may proceed.

2. Foregoing policy will affect approximately $1 million worth of sewer pipe for Sudan under North Khartoum project.

3. Under circumstances, you may wish consider approaching GOS along following lines:

a. You have been thinking about GOS statement to us that it only wished break political relations but wished continue economic, cultural and consular ties.

b. You have noted that in case of Lebanon, diplomatic ties were not broken and that its action confined to request that Ambassador and Service Attaches depart.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
AF:JPalmer:gm	5374	M - Under Secretary Rostow

Clearances:
U - Under Secretary Katzenbach (in substance)
AID - Mr. Straus
AFNE - Mr. Looram

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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c. As purely personal suggestion and without being able anticipate reaction your govt, you would be prepared recommend continuance current economic aid shipments if GOS would find it possible publicly redefine its action against USG to conform with Lebanese formula.

4. Department leaves entirely your discretion whether make approach along foregoing lines. In making your decision, you will wish bear in mind following factors:

a. No overall USG policy yet reached re future aid programs for countries involved in Arab-Israeli conflict and no assurance could be given that aid to Sudan will continue even if Lebanese formula adopted. This decision can only be made in due course in light developing situation in area.

b. We would not wish be in position seeming make threats or offering rewards. Hence our emphasis on you personally assuming responsibility foregoing suggestion.

c. We recognize Mahjoub may have little or no leeway to reverse action already taken given pressures pro-UAR elements Cabinet.

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d. GOS would have move quickly on this matter - within day or two - since USG cannot long delay action to divert ship carrying pipe.

5. If you decide against approach outlined paras 3 and 4 above, we leave your discretion whether or not you inform GOS of USG policy and effect on Sudan as outlined para 1 and 2 above, bearing in mind action will probably become public knowledge. If so, you should emphasize that action taken is simply a suspension [redacted] pending clarification situation in area.

END

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

CONTROL: 9114
RECEIVED: JUNE 10, 1967, 2:50 A.M.

CORRECTION ISSUED:
JUNE 10, 1967, 7:00 A.M.
RNL

Info

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4045

NODIS

REF STATE'S 209964

FOR THE SECRETARY

I HAVE JUST SEEN EBAN (0445 SAT) AND HAVE GIVEN HIM YOUR MESSAGE ORALLY. HE ASKS THAT I TELL YOU THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER ARE AWARE OF IMPORTANCE THAT ISRAEL MAKE ITS ACCEPTANCE OF CEASE FIRECLEAR BY ACTIONS ON THE GROUND. THEY HOPE TO ACHIEVE ACTUAL CEASE FIRE IN NEXT FEW HOURS. IF SYRIANS MAKE THIS IMPOSSIBLE, GOI WILL TAKE STEPS BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS TODAY TO DEMONSTRATE PUBLICLY ISRAEL'S PREPAREDNESS TO STOP WHERE THEY NOW ARE AND THAT IT IS THE SYRIANS WHO ARE DEFYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

EBAN NOTED TWO PROBLEMS:

1.) THERE IS NO MACHINERY ON THE GROUND TO VERIFY ACTIONS OF PARTIES. HE THINKING OF ACTIVATING GEN BULL AS MEANS SOLVING THIS ONE. 2) SO FAR, EACH TIME ISRAELI'S HAVE STOPPED FIRING, SYRIANS HAVE REOPENED BOMBARDMENT OF SETTLEMENTS. HE THINKS SYRIAN OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVE THAT OF ALL THE ARABS, SYRIA IS THE ONLY STATE WHICH HAS INFLICTED SERIOUS DAMAGE ON ISRAEL.

EBAN EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION OF GOING ON TO DAMASCUS. IT IS TRYING PHYSICALLY TO SILENCE THE SYRIAN GUN POSITIONS BUT THEY ARE WELL EMPLACED, ALMOST IMPERVIOUS TO AIR ATTACKS, AND HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY GROUND ASSAULT. ISRAEL'S FORCES ON THE SYRIAN FRONT ARE VERY SMALL. SHE IS MANY TIMES OUTNUMBERED AND HER WHOLE POSITION AND PURPOSE ON THAT

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FRONT IS NECESSAIRLY DEFENSIVE.

EBAN AGREED MY STRONG REPRESENTATION THAT CRUX SITUATION IS SOME HOW TO GET FIGHTING STOPPED OR ISRAEL RISKS PREJUDICING WHOLE POSITION IT HAS SO FAR ACHIEVED ON OTHER FRONTS. I AM CONVINCED HE, AT LEAST, HAS NO ILLUSIONS THIS SCORE AND THAT HE AND ESHKOL PROPOSED FOR ISRAELI FORCES TO CEASE ALL OPERATIONS AT EXISTING POSITIONS, PROVIDED SYRIA CEASES FIRE. THIS IS ALSO DESPITE FACT THAT APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND SMALL ISRAELI FORCES AVAILABLE (IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE REDEPLOY APPRECIABLE FORCES FROM SOUTH) ISRAELIS HAVE NOT RPT NOT SUCCEEDED IN WIPING OUT SYRIAN GUN POSITIONS AS WAS INTENDED.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1. EARLY THIS MORNING SAQQAF SENT KING FAISAL'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER CITED REFTEL. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION PREPARED BY EMBOFF:

QUOTE: IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL THE COMPASSIONATE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE RECEIVED WITH GREAT APPRECIATION YOUR EXCELLENCY'S MESSAGE DATED JUNE 8, 1967. IN EXPRESSING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY GRATITUDE FOR THE HIGH SENTIMENTS CONTAINED IN YOUR MESSAGE, I APPRECIATE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S CONSIDERATION IN TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNEMENT TOWARD THE SUDDEN EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS TO WHICH OUR ARAB REGION HAS BEEN EXPOSED. I FURTHER APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE TO LEARN OUR VIEWS ON THESE EVENTS, AND YOUR ASSURANCE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL END THEM CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

PAGE 2 RUQVRA 5272 S E C R E T

STARTING FROM THE COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY SPIRIT ON WHICH THE CORDIAL RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND OURSELVES PERSONALLY ARE BASED, AND WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HELD WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY IN WASHINGTON LAST YEAR, PERMIT ME, MR. PRESIDENT, TO COMMENT ON FOUR POINTS MENTIONED IN YOUR LETTER:

1. YOUR EXCELLENCY MENTIONS THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO LEARN WHO BEGAN THE AGGRESSION. IN MY OPINION, THE SWIFT SURPRISE ATTACK WHICH ISRAEL CARRIED OUT, WHICH PARALYZED THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARAB AIR FORCES AND DESTROYED THEIR AIRPORTS FROM THE FIRST MOMENT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE BATTLE, IS ABSOLUTE PROOF THAT SHE BEGAN THE AGGRESSION.

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2. YOUR EXCELLENCY MENTIONS THAT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITHOUT ITSELF BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE, AND THAT YOU WILL MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO PURSUE AN EVEN-HANDED AND JUST COURSE. IN MAY OPINION THIS POINT IS WORTHY OF CAREFUL ATTENTION -- RESERVING MY POSITION CONCERNING THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE AREA -- FOR ITS JUST AND FAIR THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE BOUND BY THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED

PAGE 3 RUQVRA 5272 S E C R E T
NATIONS BY WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED AND WHICH DELINEATED IT BORDERS, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING FROM TIME TO TIME TO STIR UP ARMED ACTIONS THROUGH WHICH IT MAY MAKE NEW GAINS, AS IT DID IN 1948 WHEN IT PENETRATED TO THE GULF OF AQABA BY FORCE OF ARMS AND IN 1956 WHEN IT IMPOSED FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THAT GULF.

3. YOUR EXCELLENCY ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OPPOSES AND WILL WORK AGAINST ANY EFFORT AIMED AT ALTERING FRONTIERS IN THE AREA OR IN SETTLING PROBLEMS BY FORCE OF ARMS. THIS STEP IS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IN VIEW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND THE PREVAILING TENSION, AND AFTER THE ARAB STATES HAVE SUFFERED ENORMOUS LOSSES IN LIFE, TREASURY AND MATERIAL.

4. YOUR EXCELLENCY EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE SEVERENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF CERTAIN ARAB STATES WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND AT CERTAIN INCIDENTS IN THE DHAHRAN AREA. YOUR EXCELLENCY NO DOUBT REALIZES, BY YOUR KEEN INSIGHT AND EXPERIENCE OF AFFAIRS, THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHAT MAY STILL HAPPEN IS ONLY ONE MANIFESTATION OF THE DEEP FEELING WHICH HAS GROWN OVER THE YEARS IN THE HEARTS OF THE

PAGE 4 RUQVRA 5272 S E C R E T
ARAB PEOPLES TOWARD THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

I APPRECIATE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S RECOGNITION OF THE GRAVITY OF OUR SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE VIOLENT WAVE OF INFLAMMATORY EMOTION WHICH IS SWEEPING OVER THE ARAB WORLD, AND BEYOND IT OVER THE ENTIRE ISLAMIC WORLD. I SEE IT A NECESSARY DUTY, AS WELL AS IN THE GENERAL INTEREST, TO WORK FOR CALMING THIS DOWN AND FOR LIMITING ITS SPREAD SO AS TO

PERMIT -- AS YOUR EXCELLENCY SAYS IN YOUR LETTER -- THE HANDLING OF THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF THE REGIONS MORE REALISTICALLY, IN COOPERATION WITH YOU AND WITH THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH DESIRE STABILITY IN THE AREA, TO INSURE PEACE THEREIN, AND TO PRESERVE THE RESOURCES WHICH ARE THE BASIS OF ITS PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY. TO THIS END, THEREFORE, IN MAY OPINION THE UNITED STATES SHOULD, AT THE VERY LEAST, ESTABLISH TWO PRINCIPLES AND ENDEAVOR TO SECURE THEIR ADOPTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR THE AGGRESSION.

2. ENSURE THAT SHE IS UNABLE TO REALIZE ANY GAIN AS A RESULT OF THIS AGGRESSION.
IN THIS WAY YOU WILL ASSIST YOUR FRIENDS IN LIMITING THE

VIOLENCE OF THE PRESENT DISPUTE AND IN DAMPENING IT DOWN, AND HALT THE VIOLENT DESTRUCTION TO WHICH THE ENTIRE AREA IS NOW EXPOSED TO THE DETRIMENT OF ITS SECURITY AND STABILITY. IN ASSURING YOU OF MAY APPRECIATION OF YOUR HIGH SENTIMENTS, I EXPRESS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY SINCERE HOPE THAT ALL FACTORS AND MOTIVES OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO COMPLICATE SINCERE EFFORTS TO DIRECT ALL OF OUR ABILITIES TOWARD THE REALIZATION OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, TOWARD PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY FOR ITS PEOPLES, AND TOWARD POSITIVE PARTICIPATION IN STRENGTHENING WORLD PEACE, WILL BE REMOVED. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IN THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND CONTRACTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND OUR GOVERNMENTS LIES THE INTEREST OF ALL, AND THAT THIS WILL ASSIST IN CREATING THE APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE LONG PROCESS OF RETURN TO TRANQUILITY AND STABILITY IN THE AREA.
SINCERELY YOURS, YOUR FRIEND FAISAL. UNQUOTE.

2. SAUDI STATES SAUDIS ALSO WISH KEEP EXCHANGE CONFIDENTIAL. WILL SEND SIGNED ARABIC ORIGINAL OF FAISAL'S LETTER SOON AS COURIER SERVICE RESUMED. GP-3. EILTS

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PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8:20 A.M., 6/12/67.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1. EMBOFF MET SALAH NASIR AT 0330 LOCAL 9 JUNE AT LATTERS' REQUEST. SALAH NASIR SAID THAT HE WISHED CONVEY HIS PERSONAL THINKING TO USG AT CRITICAL TIME FOR EGYPT. HE STATED THIS ACTION UNDERTAKEN ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND EMPHASIZED THAT IF IT BECAME KNOWN TO THOSE ELMENTS IN EGYPT WHICH OPPOSE HIM BECAUSE OF HIS BASICALLY PRO-WESTERN ATTITUDE, THE RESULT COULD BE HIS OUSTER AS HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE.

2. IN ESSENCE, HE ASSESSES BALANCE OF "INFLUENCE ON NASIR" AS BETWEEN WESTERN ORIENTED AND SOVIET ORIENTED ELEMENTS IN UAR GOVERNMENT TO BE DANGEROUSLY EVEN AND JUDGES HIS OWN POSITION TO BE PRECARIOUS. THE PRO-SOVIET EXTREME LEFTIST ELEMENTS ARE GATHERING STRENGTH FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH EGYPT'S PLIGHT, AS IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY EVIDENT, WILL HAVE BEEN SO SUCCESSFULLY PORTRAYED--BY EGYPT ITSELF--AS THE

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8711B S E C R E T

RESULT OF U.S. CONNIVANCE WITH AND DIRECT SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HE FEELS IT IMPERATIVE THEREFORE THAT THE U.S. TAKE AN INITIATIVE IN UN AND ELSEWHERE WHICH IS, IN HIS WORDS, "PRO-ARAB". HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE EXTENT OF U.S. PRO-ARABISM OR PRO-UARISM, BUT FEELS THAT IT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE SOVIETS BE PREVENTED FROM ASSUMING THE ROLE OF DEFENDER OF THE ARAB POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS OR PROCEEDINGS IN UN FORUM WHICH WILL FOLLOW PRESENT CEASE FIRE. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN SO DOING, IT MAY WELL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM AND LIKEMINDED OTHERS TO ARREST AND MODIFY THE FORCES IN EGYPT WORKING TOWARD SOVIETIZATION.

3. COMMENT: IT IS, OF COURSE, EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHAT PROPORTION OF THIS PRESENTATION IS CORRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CONCERN EXPRESSED AND WHAT TO THE OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING SUPPORT OF ARAB POSITION VERSUS ISRAEL. TO WHAT EXTENT IS

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THE SPECTRE OF SOVIETIZATION A PLOY? TO WHAT EXTENT IS SALAH NASIR CONCERNED TO PROTECT HIMSELF AND TO WHAT EXTENT IS HE CONCERNED FOR EGYPT? EMBOFF JUDGES THAT WHILE ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE PRESENT IN SOME DEGREE, THERE IS IN FACT--IN SALAH NASIRS'S VIEW--A VERY PRECARIOUS BALANCE OF FORCES

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 8711B S E C R E T
WITHIN EGYPT, WHICH, IF NOT TIPPED TOWARD THE WEST BY U.S. ACTION, WILL PROBABLY FALL IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WITHIN A FAIRLY SHORT TIME.

4. FOOTNOTE: OUR LEASED LINE WHICH HAS BEEN OUT FOR PAST TWO DAYS WITH TOTAL LACK OF COOPERATION FROM UAR CONTROL, IS NOW WORKING PERFECTLY ON THE SEND SIDE RESULT EMBOFF STATEMENT HE HAD NO COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON.

NOLTE

NOTE: Handled EXDIS per INR and S/S.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 1124

REF ISTANBUL 1095 AND 1120

ISTANBUL OPINION VS GOT POLICY

1. WE FIND LITTLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOT'S LIP SERVICE TO ARAB CAUSE AND OPINION INFORMED TURKS IN ISTANBUL. BUSINESSMEN ESPECIALLY PRO-ISRAELI. FOR EXAMPLE, AT RECEPTION BY CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES JUNE 8 ISRAELI CONGEN OVERWHELMED BY CONGRATUALTIONS AND PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST ECZACIBASI COMMENTED ISRAELI FEAT OF ARMS BEST THING IN LAST TEN YEAR. POSITIONS OTHER IMPORTANT SECTORS OF OPINION:

PAGE 2 RUQMPL 1124 C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. PRESS: SMALL FAR-RIGHT PAPERS (YENI ISTANBUL, BUGUN, SABAH) ALONE IN SUPPORTING ARABS, WHILE SMALL NON-RELIGIOUS RIGHTIST HABER LONE SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL. REMAINDER, INCLUDING ALL LARGE CIRCULATION PAPERS, TREATING NEWS STRAIGHT AND MAKING FAIRLY NEUTRAL COMMENTS, EXCEPT THAT USUAL PRO-SOVIET ANTI-AMERICAN COLUMNISTS WEAVING ANOTHER STRAND INTO THEIR TAPESTRIES OF U.S. WICKEDNESS.

B. STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS: GROUP OF LEFTIST STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS JUNE 7 ISSUED SOVIET-LINE STATEMENT SUPPORTING ARABS IN "STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISTS." RIGHTIST AND RELIGIOUSLY-ORIENTED NATIONAL TURKISH STUDENT UNION (MTTB) JUNE 8 ISSUED SOMEWHAT CONTRASTING STATEMENT SUPPORTING MOSLM BROTHERS BUT DENOUNCING NASSER AS TOOL OF SOVIETS, THEN CONDEMNING U.S. AND U.K. FOR FOSTERING CREATION OF ISRAEL.

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C. INTELLECTUALS: KEEPING QUIET. APPARENTLY NEUTRAL EXCEPT FOR EXTREMISTS OF RIGHT AND LEFT, WHOSE POSITIONS PROBABLY WELL REPRESENTED BY STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS STATEMENTS ABOVE.

D. MINORITIES: BOTH TURKISH JEWS AND ARAB STUDENTS KEEPING HEADS DOWN DESPITE PREDICTABLE EMOTIONS. OTHER MINORITIES APPEAR QUIETLY PRO-ISRAEL.

PAGE 3 RUQMPL 1124 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. INFORMED TURKS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED AWARE WHAT GOT SEEKING BY ITS FAINTLY PRO-ARAB STANCE. HOWEVER, NOT BEING IN GOVERNMENT, THEY CAN GIVE VENT TO BASIC AND TYPICALLY TURKISH PREJUDICE AGAINST ARABS, FEELING WHICH IN VARYING DEGREES SUPPORTED BY HOSTILITY TO SOVIETS AND OCCASSIONALLY BY ADMIRATION FOR ISRAEL'S RAPID DEVELOPMENT.

3. SUBORDINATE ISSUES: LITTLE CREDENCE GIVEN ARAB CHARGES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH PRESS HAS NEGLECTED PUBLICIZE U.S. AND BRITISH REBUTTALS. MORE DIFFICULT ESTIMATE INFLUENCE OF MADE-IN-ANKARA STATEMENTS OPPOSING U.S. USE OF TURKISH BASIES AGAINST ARABS. BASELESSNESS THIS ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR. WE RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL EFFORTS POUND HOME U.S. POSITION BOTH THESE ISSUES BEFORE OPPOSITE VIEW FIRMLY ROOTED.

GP-4. COLLINS
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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REF: USDAO 4174 AND EMBTEL 4162

1. O'CONNEL AND I HAD MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH HUSSEIN, JUMA AND TELL. I HAVE NOT GOT TIME NOW TO GIVE A FULL REPORT OF THIS MEETING BUT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS A FRANK REVIEW OF THE CRITICAL INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN JORDAN, HUSSEIN'S RELATIONS WITH NASSER, AND HUSSEIN'S RELATIONS WITH THE US.

2. PURPOSE OF MY CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER HUSSEIN WANTED TO TRY TO KEEP HIS LINKS WITH US OR WHETHER HE WAS SO

DEEPLY ENTRAPPED WITH NASSER THAT HE IS GOING TO HAVE TO GO ALONG WITH IN IF LATTER CONTINUES TO TRY TO BLAME ARAB LOSS ON THE US AND GREAT BRITAIN.

3. I GAVE HUSSEIN MANY REASONS WHY IT WOULD BE IN HIS AND JORDAN'S SELF-INTERST TO KEEP THE TIE WITH US AND NOT LET NASSER DRAG HIM ALONG ANY FURTHER IF NASSER CONTINES TO TRY TO BLAME UC AND IP FOR ARAB SLS.

4. I CONCLUDE FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HUSSEIN THAT HE KNOWS PERFECTLY WELL THE REASON THE ARABS LOST. I THINK HE WILL TRY TO CONVINCE NASSER THAT IT WILL BE SAFER NOT TO TRY TO CONTINUE TO BLAME THE LOSS ON THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH.

5. IF NASSER REFUSES TO ACCEPT HUSSEIN'S ADVICE, IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT HUSSEIN WOULD DO IN THIS CASE.

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6. HUSSEIN TOLD ME ONE INTERESTING THING--I.E. THAT NASSER HAD SENT HIM A TELEGRAM URGING HIM NOT RPT NOT TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH THE US AND UK.

7. AS REGARDS THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION NO ONE, NOT EVEN HUSSEIN, KNOWS PRECISELY WHAT IT IS. HUSSEIN MADE ONE

PAGE 3HRUQMKG 4181A S E C R E T EXDIS
POINT CLEAR. IF THE ISRAELIS VIOLATE THE PRESENT CEASE FIRE, INTERNAL SECURITY WOULD QUICKLY COLLAPSE IN AMMAN. AS REGARDS THE REGIME'S PRESENT ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE LOYALTY OF ITS OWN POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES I DO NOT THINK THIS IS YET SERIOUSLY IN QUESTION. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO EARLY TO BE, IN ANY CASE.

8. AS REGARD THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS, THIS OF COURSE AT THE PRESENT TIME IS MUCH MORE IN QUESTION. THE POPULACE HAS BEEN FED THE CANRAD THAT THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH ASSISTED THE ISRAELIS IN THE WAR. JUMA ADMITTED THAT AT THE MOMENT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL COMPLETELY ITS OWN PRESS IN THIS REGARD. THE EXPERIENCE OF COL. IRWIN AT AMMAN AIRPORT THIS MORNING WAS DISTURBING. ON THE OTHER HAND, TWO JAA OFFICERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED AND WHO FOUGHT IN THE BATTLE ON THE WEST BANK DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY PARTICULAR ANIMOSITY TOWARD AMERICANS. THEY SAY THAT THE MAJORITY IN THE ARMY DO NOT BELIEVE THE CANARD RE US AND UK MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL IN HOSTILITIES.

9. I ASKED HUSSEIN IF HE COULD GUARANTEE SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT FOR AMERICAN PLANES UNDER UN AUSPICES TO EVACUATE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4181A S E C R E T EXDIS
AMERICANS AND MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY TOMORROW MORNING. HE PROMISED TO GIVE AN ANSER IN TWO HOURS.

10. I FEEL I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ABIDE BY HUSSEIN'S ADVICE IN THIS MATTER. IF HUSSEIN SAYS IT WOULD NOT BE SAFE FOR THE PLANES TO COME IN TOMORROW MORNING, WE WILL HAVE TO SIT

TIGHT. IF HUSSEIN SAYS IT WILL BE SAFE I SHALL REQUEST THAT THEY COME IN. WE WILL BE TAKING A CHANCE BUT I FEEL THAT THE SITUATION IS IN SUCH A STATE OF FLUX THAT EACH DAY WE DELAY COULD AS EASILY SEE THE SITUATION MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE REVERSE.

1. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAVE DECIDED TO KEEP A MINIMUM STAFF IN AMMAN--I.E. 25. IF THE DEPT WANTS A LARGER STAFF, THE BALANCE CAN BE RETURNED TO AMMAN WHEN THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IS BETTER CLARIFIED.

GP-1. BURNS
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT 12:17 P.M. 6/9/67

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 4026

1. IT IS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON HOW FIGHTING ALONG SYRIAN BORDER IS GOING. BEST WE CAN GET IS STATEMENT BY ARGOV AS OF 1630 LOCAL TIME THAT IT WAS QUOTE NECESSARY TO WEED OUT THE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN SHELLING OUR SETTLEMENTS FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS. THIS EFFORT IS NOW UNDER WAY AND IS PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY. HOWEVER, HAON IS STILL BEING CONSTANTLY HAMMERED BY SYRIAN ARTILLERY FIRE UNQUOTE.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4039 S E C R E T
2. THE OPERATION MAY INDEED BE PROGRESSING QUOTE SATISFACTORILY UNQUOTE BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY TAKING LONGER THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED AND SYRIANS ARE STILL ABLE TO FIGHT. DATT ESTIMATES IDF AF MAKING MAXIMUM AIR SUPPORT EFFORT.

GP-2. BARBOUR
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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:48 A.M., 6/9/67.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 12:10 P.M., 6/9/67.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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S E C R E T CAIRO 8727

REF: CAIRO 8711

1. SOME SUGGESTIONS TOWARD ESTABLISHING US "PRO-ARAB" POSITION TO HELP TIP BALANCE IN UARG REFTEL. BELIEVE ALL STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS IN THIS CONNECTION SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH LONG-RANGE US POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS IN ME AREA.

2. OUR STANCE VERSUS ISRAEL SHOULD BE AS VIGOROUS AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IF UAR-ISRAEL POSITIONS REVERSED.

A. PORTEST STRONGLY AND DEMAND RESTITUTION ATTACK ON US SHIP, DEATH AND INJURY US CITIZENS.

B. INSIST WITH AS MUCH FORCE AS SOVIETS ON IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MILITARY FORCES TO PRE-JUNE 5 LINES.

C. TAKE FIRM LINE WITH ISRAEL AS AGGRESSOR (WE BELIEVE IT

NOW VERY CLEAR ISRAEL LAUNCHED PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK) EVEN THOUGH PROVOCATION EXISTED.

D. PUSH FOR SUBMISSION STRAITS ISSUE TO ICJ, WITH UNDERTAKING ALL PARTIES TO RESPECT DECISION.

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STANCE VERSUS UAR AND ARABS GENERALLY MORE SYMPATHY THAN ANGER.

A. DOWNPLAY BREAK IN RELATIONS AND PROPERTY DESTRUCTION ALTHOUGH PRESSING FOR APOLOGIES AND FULL RESTITUTION.

B. OFFER PROMPT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CASUALTIES IN THE FIGHTING.

C. PROMISE THOROUGH REVIEW WHOLE PALESTINE ISSUE WITH EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR REFUGEES AS WELL AS ON PEACE AS OVERRIDING US OBJECTIVE.

D. AVOID FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST RETALIATORY COUNTER-PRESSURES, INCLUDING FINANCIAL PRESSURES.

E. CONTINUE TO PROJECT EVEN-HANDED POLICY ON SUPPLY ARMS TO ME.

F. PROJECT EVEN-HANDED US TAX POLICY VIS-A-VIS ME STATES, E.G. EXEMPT US DONATIONS TO A UNITED ARAB APPEAL (OR CANCEL EXEMPTIONS ON DONATIONS TO UJA).

[redacted]

NOTE: Handled as EXDIS per INRD and S/S.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JUN 9 AM 10 57

1. THE FONMIN HAS APPEALED TO THE AMBASSADORS IN AMMAN OF THE FOUR BIG POWERS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS QUOTE TO LET THE WEST BANK POPULATION STAY WHERE IT IS AND NOT REPEAT NOT SEND THEM OUT OF THE WEST BANK TO BE REFUGEES. UNQUOTE.

2. BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WHOM I HAVE JUST SEEN, ADVISES THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM ISRAELIS WERE "UP TO THEIR OLD TRICKS" OF GOING AROUND PALESTINIAN VILLAGES WITH LOUD SPEAKER TRUCKS WHICH BROADCAST IN EFFECT "IF YOU REMAIN QUIET YOU CAN STAY HERE BUT IF YOU WANT TO GO WE WILL ARRANGE SAFE CONDUCT THROUGH THE LINES."

3. OBVIOUSLY GOJ HAS TWO FEARS. THE LONG-TERM FEAR IS THAT ISRAELIS MAY BE AIMING TO KEEP WEST BANK; SHORT-TERM IS THAT REFUGEES WILL ONLY AGGRAVATE AN ALREADY PRECARIOUS INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION ON THE EAST BANK.
GP-3 BURNS
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE 6/9/67, 11:01AM.

SECRET

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

53

CONFIDENTIAL

Action NNNNVZCZCFHA935
PP RUEHC/RUEHCR RUALOT
EUR DE RUFHOL 14666 1601415
ZNY CCCCC
Info P 091350Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
GPM INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
SP RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
SC RUDKTH/AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTOWA
SAH RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
L RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA
H RUDKSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO
AF RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
ARA RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
EA ZEN/AMCONGEN HAMBURG
NEA STATE GRNC
IO BT
P C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 14666
USIA BUSEC, TOCED
NSC SUBJECT: OECD OIL COMMITTEE MEETING JUNE 12
INR
CIA REF: STATE 209284
NSA
DOD 1. ALTHOUGH THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE BY THE ARAB STATES
AID HAS PRODUCED AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SITUATION, THE MAIN CONCERN
E OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN THAT IT MIGHT BE
CEA
COM PAGE 2 RUFHOL 14666 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DOT PROVEN WRONG IN ITS PREDICTIONS THAT THERE WERE ADEQUATE ALTERNATE
FRB SOURCES FROM WHICH PETROLEUM SUPPLIES COULD BE OBTAINED IN THE
INT EVENT OF A PROLONGED MIDDLE EASTERN OIL SHUTDOWN. THE ECONOMICS
TRSY MINISTRY HAD ISSUED A NUMBER OF SOOTHING STATEMENTS SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, POINTING OUT THAT A) THERE WAS AT
LEAST 45 DAYS SUPPLY IN GERMANY; B) ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS WERE IN
RSR TRANSIT; C) THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS LIBYAN OIL MIGHT REMAIN
AVAILABLE; AND D) THE FRG COULD DRAW ON VENEZUELAN AND U.S.
SOURCES. THESE STATEMENTS HAVE SO FAR BEEN ACCEPTED WITHOUT
ARGUMENT BY THE PRESS AND PUBLIC.

2. HERR KLING AT THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY, WHO WILL BE ATTENDING
THE OIL COMMITTEE MEETING ON JUNE 12, CALLED AN EMBASSY OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

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1967 JUN 9 AM 10 47

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LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS PRIVATELY WORRIED ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF POINT D ABOVE, AND HOPED THAT THE U.S. COULD GIVE FIRM ASSURANCES AT THE MEETING THAT THE SUPPLY GAP WILL BE CLOSED BY SHIPMENTS FROM OTHER SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICAN PRODUCING COMPANIES. KLING MADE THE POINT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN ABSOLUTE CLARITY ON THIS POINT. THE COAL INTERESTS HAVE BEEN ARGUING FOR YEARS THAT GERMAN COAL

WAS THE ONLY RELIABLE ENERGY SOURCE AND THE INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL SOURCES WAS A THREAT TO GERMAN NATIONAL SECURITY. IN ADDITION, IT HAS BEEN ARGUED HERE THAT THE DEGREE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF THE GERMAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (NEARLY 70 PERCENT OF REFINING CAPACITY) PUT GERMANY AT THE MERCY OF FOREIGN COMPANIES WHOSE DECISIONS IN JUST THIS KIND OF CRISIS SITUATION MIGHT NOT TAKE GERMAN NATIONAL INTERESTS SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT. KLING EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ONLY A CLEAR STATEMENT BY THE U.S. AND OTHER SUPPLIERS THAT THEY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUPPLY THE GERMAN MARKET CAN ALLAY THESE FEARS AND COUNTER THE ACCUSATIONS.

3. WE BELIEVE THE POINTS MADE BY KLING DESERVE FULLEST CONSIDERATION AND THAT OUR INTERESTS HERE, WITH RESPECT TO U.S. INVESTMENT IN GENERAL, THE POSITION OF U.S. COMPANIES IN THE GERMAN PETROLEUM MARKET, AND OUR PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED SALES OF U.S. COAL RPT COAL IN GERMANY WILL BE BEST SERVED BY FIRM ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL, IN THE EVENT OF A MIDDLE EAST SHUTDOWN, CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN MARKET TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND THAT THE U.S. WILL SHARE IN ANY SHORTAGES WHICH MIGHT DEVELOP.
MCGHEE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46

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Action NEA Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR IO P NSC INR CIA NSA DOD AID PC SCA SCS CPR O SY PER FBO OPR OC TRSY

RSR

NNNNXVZCZCDKA494 MDA303
OO RUEHC
DE RUDKMD 3456 1601315
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FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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000533
1967 JUN 9 AM 9 29

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DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SPANISH MFA INFORMED US 1330 LOCAL THAT WORD RECEIVED OF GIRM PERMISSION FOR SPAIN TAKE OVER PROTECTION US INTERESTS MAURITANIA. SPANISH AMBASSADOR NOUAKCHOTT KEENLY REGRETS COMPLETE FAILURE IN HIS EFFORTS WITH PRESIDENT GIRM HAVE TIME LIMIT FOR DEPARTURE AMB. LEWIS AND STAFF EXTENDED. WALKER

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 9:32 AM 6/9/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 10:15 AM 6/9/67

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40
Action
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PP RUEHC SECRET
DE RUDTCR 10260 1601300
ZNY SSSSS
P 091243Z 8 5 2 5
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON 1967 JUN 9 AM 9 13
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T LONDON 10260

EXDIS

1. AT DINNER MY HOME LAST NIGHT, MICHAEL PALLISER, PRIME MINISTERS PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (PROTECT SOURCE), TALKED ABOUT PM'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND PM'S CURRENT VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

2. ON VISIT, PALLISER SAID PM WAS PLEASED WITH RESULTS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY SATISFIED WITH FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON VIET-NAM, WHICH, SAID PALLISER "CLEARED THE AIR." PM CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT HAS IMPRESSIVE COMMAND OF VIET-NAM SITUATION AND THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT PRESIDENT WANTED SETTLEMENT ON REASONABLE TERMS. PALLISER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN PM HAD EXPRESSED THIS FEELING VIGOROUSLY TO CABINET COLLEAGUES.

3. ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, PM WAS THINKING ALONG LINES ONE WOULD EXPECT. WE NOW HAD A CHANCE, PERHAPS THE LAST, FOR ACHIEVING "A BASIC SETTLEMENT." PM HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HOW DIFFICULT NEXT PHASE WOULD BE, BUT THE STAKES WERE SO GREAT THAT NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED IN ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT A LONG-LASTING SOLUTION. IT IS PMS FEELING THAT BIG FOUR SUMMIT MEETING WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO BRING THIS OFF. ONLY FOUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING TOGETHER COULD TAKE SOME OF THE TOUGH DECISIONS REQUIRED. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE DANGERS OF A SUMMIT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD TRY TO USE IT AS AN OCCASION FOR LINKING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WITH VIET-NAM, PALLISER SAID THAT PM FULLY APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENTS CONCERN ON THIS SCORE. ONLY AGENDA ITEM FOR SUMMIT PM HAS IN MIND WOULD BE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, IF SUCH A MEETING WERE REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL, IT COULD HELP IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON VIET-NAM.
GP-3
KAISER
BT
NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/9/67, 9:27 AM.

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DE RUQMVL 4026 1601015
ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN FLASH
STATE GR NC
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4026

0008334
1967 JUN 9 AM 6 21

EXDIS

1. FONOFF ADVISES THAT SYRIANS LAST NIGHT SHELLED 16 SETTLEMENTS FROM NORTHERN MOST AREA SOUTH TO TEL KATZIR. SHELLING THEN CEASED.

2. HOWEVER, AT 1130 HOURS LOCAL THIS MORNING SYRIANS AGAIN OPENED FIRE ON SETTLEMENTS OF GADOT, KFAR HANNASI, AND BNEI SFAT. ISRAELI FORCES ARE TAKING ACTION TO SILENCE THESE GUNS AND ANTICIPATE ITS OPERATION, NATURE OF WHICH NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE, WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN NEXT HOUR OR SO. THEY ADD THIS ACTION SHOULD MAKE CEASE FIRE WITH SYRIA EFFECTIVE NOT ONLY DE JURE BUT DE FACTO.

GP-3. BARBOUR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6:25 AM, JUN 9.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6:30 AM, JUN 9.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T AMMAN 4162

008331
1967 JUN 9 AM 6 15

EXDIS

REF: STATE 209549

FOR BATTLE FROM AMBASSADOR (BRING TO ATTENTION AT OPENING OF BUSINESS)

1. I HAVE ALWAYS PLANNED TO KEEP STAFF IN AMMAN WHATEVER THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WAS TO BE WITH JORDAN AFTER THE SHOOTING STOPPED. ON JUNE 6 THE GOJ WAS VERY NEAR TO CUTTING ITS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH US. THE LEADERSHIP DECIDED TO POSTPONE THIS DECISION FOR A DAY AND BY JUNE 7 VOICES AGAINST CUTTING PREVAILED.

2. MY TOTAL AMERICAN STAFF HAS BEEN APPROXIMATELY 130. MY CURRENT THINKING IS TO EVACUATE FROM JORDAN ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF 50 AND A MINIMUM OF 25 AMERICAN STAFF. (BOTH TOTALS INCLUDE 5 MARINE GUARDS.) THE MAXIMUM NUMBER WOULD MAINTAIN THE SEMBLANCE OF FULL OPERATIONS HERE. THE MINIMUM IS NEEDED TO OPERATE AT ALL AND WOULD CONSTITUTE ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL MISSION.

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4162 S E C R E T
3. I AM UNABLE TO PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THE SECURITY SITUATION IN JORDAN BOTH IN THE IMMEDIATE AND MEDIUM-TERM FUTURE. THE SITUATION IS IN TOO MUCH OF A STATE OF FLUX NOW, AND ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN. OBVIOUSLY, SHOULD WE HAVE TO BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AGAIN AS WE DID BETWEEN JUNE 5-9, WHEN EVEN THE MOST RESPONSIBLE JORDANIANS WERE IN PANIC, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE ONLY 25 STAFF TO COPE WITH AND PROTECT THAN TO HAVE 50.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION AND ONE THAT ONLY WASHINGTON CAN DECIDE IS WHAT KIND OF IMAGE WASHINGTON WISHES TO PRESERVE IN JORDAN AT THIS MOMENT. HOW VALUABLE IS IT TO KEEP THE IMAGE HERE THAT WE HAVE CHANGED NONE OF OUR POLICIES TOWARDS JORDAN? IF THIS IS THE IMAGE WHICH WE WISH TO PROJECT

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THEN I BELIEVE WE SHOULD RETAIN ABOUT 50 AMERICAN STAFF.

5. SINCE I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT AMMAN AIRPORT WOULD BE OPEN TO COMMERCIAL SERVICE IN PERHAPS A WEEK, THE DEPARTMENT HAS THE OPTION IN THE CASE OF A STAFF OF 50 OF REDUCING THE STAFF EITHER TO 25 NOW AND BRINGING BACK 25 IN A WEEK OR TWO, OR ALTERNATELY, KEEPING 50 NOW AND GETTING RID OF 25 IN A WEEK OR TWO.

6. SINCE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF EVACUATION JUNE 10, DEPENDING ON THE ESTIMATE OF THE READINESS OF AMMAN AIRFIELD TO RECEIVE THE USAF C-130'S, I REQUEST A FLASH REPLY GIVING ME THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THE QUESTION POSED IN PARA 4.

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 4162 S E C R E T
7. I WOULD LIKE TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION AT THE EARLIEST FEASIBLE MOMENT--I.E. WHEN I CAN HAVE NAILED DOWN MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION SUFFICIENTLY FIRMLY, AND MY ABSENCE FOR A WEEK WOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED HERE. PLEASE, THEREFORE, SEND ORDERS SO THAT I CAN USE THEM WHEN I DEEM THEM TO BE APPROPRIATE. BURNS
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-9-67, 6:17 A.M.
PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE 6-9-67, 6:40 A.M.

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VZCZCQVA308
OO RUEHC
DE RUQVRA 5180 1600948
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O 090934Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T JIDDA 5180

1967 JUN 9 AM 6 08 008328

E X D I S

SECSTATE 209305

SAW SAQQAF THIS MORNING TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING FAISAL. REQUESTED AUDIENCE BE ARRANGED FOR ME IN RIYADH TO DO SO. HE PROPOSED THAT INSTEAD OF PERSONAL DELIVERY IN RIYADH AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME, HE ARRANGE SEND LETTER TODAY TO KING BY SPECIAL MESSENGER. HE THOUGHT THAT IN PRESENT STILL SOMEWHAT CONFUSED SITUATION, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF AMERICAN AMB DID NOT ASK FOR AUDIENCE WITH KING NOW. IN VIEW CEASE FIRE DEVELOPMENTS, HE THOUGHT KING NOW LIKELY COME TO JIDDA BEFORE LONG AND WILL WANT TO SEE ME HERE. TOLD HIM I DEFERRED TO HIS JUDGMENT, BUT ALSO ASKED THAT KING BE INFORMED I READY COME TO SEE HIM IN RIYADH OR ANYWHERE ELSE ANY TIME. GP-3. EILTS
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6:08 AM, JUN 9.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6:20 AM, JUN 9.

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
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008296

1967 JUN 9 AM 5 14

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 4024

1. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL ASKS THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT:

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I WAS DEEPLY GRIEVED BY THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE ON THE U.S. NAVAL SHIP LIBERTY. PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEP CONDOLENCES AND CONVEY MY SYMPATHY TO ALL THE BEREAVED FAMILIES.

3. MAY ALL BLOODSHED COME TO AN END AND MAY OUR GOD GRANT US PEACE EVERMORE. SINCERLY, LEVI ESHKOK. UNQUOTE
EXEMPT. BARBOUR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5:22 AM, JUN 9.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, USUN 5:35 AM, JUN 9.

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DE RUQMKG 4155A 1600759
ZNY CCCCC
O 090740Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFPBW/USAFE
RUDLGW/322 AIR DIVISION
RUQVRA/USDAO JIDDA
RUEPJS/JCS
RUQTAN/USDAO TEHRAN
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 JUN 9 AM 5 13

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4155

1. ARRANGEMENTS MADE THROUGH PM TO ALLOW LTC IRWIN TO INSPECT CONDITION OF AMMAN AIRPORT TODAY. WILL REPORT CONDITION AS SOON AS THIS IS DONE.

2. OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATES MENTIONED USAFE IDC/OCP 00052 JUNE, BRITISH ARE EXPLORING CONDITION KAWH AIRFIELD (ZERKA AREA).

3. IF EVACUATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY DELAYED BECAUSE OF UNAVAILABILITY SUITABLE LANDING AREA, NUMBER OF EVACUEES WILL PRESUMABLY DEPEND ON SECURITY SITUATION AT TIME.

4. ALL YESTERDAY AND AS OF 0800 ZULU TODAY SECURITY SITUATION AMMAN HAS BEEN QUIET. WE CONTINUE APPREHENSIVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE COULD BE SERIOUS UPSURGE OF CIVIL DISORDER AS FULL AWARENESS GROWS OF JORDAN'S MILITARY DEFEAT. IN CASE OF SAMU' INCIDENT LAST NOVEMBER POPULAR REACTION WAS THREE DAYS DELAYED IN COMING. FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH STORY BEING SOMEWHAT DISCREDITED, THERE ARE STILL WIDESPREAD ALLEGATIONS OF DIRECT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION WITH ISRAELIS IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

RSR AT SAME TIME, WHILE UNABLE AT MOMENT TO GAUGE UNDERLYING POPULAR TEMPER OR TO ESTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF RIOTS, WOULD NOTE THAT SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS APPEAR CONFIDENT THEY CAN MAINTAIN ORDER. GP-3.
BURNS

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-9-67, 5:15 A.M.
PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA,
COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, USUN 5:22 A.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ZNY SSSSS
R 091957Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
RUDKPN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
RUDKTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUDKLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUDKSO/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
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1967 JUN 9 PM 5 47

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 20055/1 S E C R E T
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 20055

NATUS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

1. AT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETION ON TUESDAY, THE MID-EAST CRISIS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE PREDOMINANT CONCERN IN MINDS OF YOUR COLLEAGUES. SEPTEL REPORTS OUTCOME JUNE 9 OF SPECIAL NAC ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE HANDLED TACTICALLY.

2. BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT QUESTION IS HOW THIS WEEK'S EVENTS IN MID-EAST RELATE TO CURRENT BUSINESS OF THE ALLIANCE AS IT STOOD BEFORE MID-EAST ERUPTED - THAT IS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, FUTURE TASKS OF ALLIANCE, AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES ESPECIALLY RE CRISES OUTSIDE NATO DEFENSE AREA. AND I BELIEVE THE OTHER MINISTERS WILL BE LOOKING TO YOU TO MAKE THE CONNECTIONS AND PUT THINGS IN CONTEXT.

SECRET

3. THE DRAMATIC AND (TO MOST EUROPEANS) NOT UNWELCOME EVENTS IN MID-EAST COINCIDE WITH A GROWING SENSE OF REALITY AMONG SOME OF OUR ALLIES AS THEIR EAGERNESS FOR INSTANT EAST-WEST DETENTE HAS BEEN BLUNTED BY EXPERIENCE -- E.G. THE HARSH SOVIET-EE REACTION TO RESUMED RELATIONS BETWEEN BONN AND BUCHAREST INCLUDING THE

GENERALLY HARD LINE OF THE KARLOVY-VARY COMMUNIQUE; THE FIZZLING OF SUCH VENTURES AS THE BRITISH CODE OF CONDUCT DCR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE GROUP OF NINE, THE PROPOSED ALL-EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS MEETINGS, SUGGESTED EAST-WEST INITIATIVES AT ECE; THE SOVIET STALLING ON TABLING A DRAFT NPT; AND THE LACK OF SOVIET RESPONSE SO FAR TO A FRIENDSHIP PACT WITH THE UK OR ABM TALKS WITH THE US.

4. MEANWHILE THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A RISING CONCERN HERE AMONG PERMREPS AND BROSIO ABOUT INDICATIONS IN BREZHNEV'S KARLOVY-VARY SPEECH OF SOVIET INTENT TO MOUNT A MAJOR CAMPAIGN FOR DISSOLUTION OF "BOTH BLOCS" IN 1969, WHEN, AS THE COMMUNISTS HAVE IT, NATO COMES TO AN AUTOMATIC END. (WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WORRY IS OVERDRAWN, SINCE SOVIET AND EE MEDIA DO NOT SEEM TO BE FOLLOWING UP VERY HARD ON THIS THEME.)

5. COMBINED EFFECT OF THIS RE-THINKING PLUS ERUPTION OF A MID-EAST WAR WHICH SOVIETS ARE QUITE GENERALLY BELIEVED TO HAVE HELPED PROVOKE, SEEMS TO HAVE PRODUCED A SEA CHANGE IN THE CLIMATE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION. WHILE WAR IN VIET-NAM AND PROSPECTIVE PEACE IN EUROPE WERE THE TWO MAIN SUBJECTS IN FOCUS HERE, IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE FOR ALLIES TO BELIEVE IN A SOVIET UNION THAT RELAXES

TENSIONS IN EUROPE WHILE HELPING MAINTAIN THEM IN THE FAR EAST. BUT WITH TWO NON-NATO CRISES IN WHICH SOVIETS ARE INVOLVED, PLUS ALL THE ABOVE INDICATIORS OF A HARDENING LINE ON EUOPE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES, THERE IS INCREASING REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DETENTE MAY BE GEOGRAPHICALLY INDIVISIBLE AFTER ALL. AT LEAST THAT IS OUR IMPRESSION FROM DELEGATIONS TO NAC, AND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GATHER FROM EMBASSIES' REPORTING AND EUROPEAN PRESS.

6. THESE TIDES IN POLITICAL THINKING COINCIDE WITH DEVELOPMENTS THAT FAVORABLY AFFECT THE NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM AS SUCH. THE EARLIER NOTION, PROPAGATED BY THE FRENCH, THAT DETENTE IS SO OBVIOUS THAT AN INTEGRATED MILITARY DEFENSE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY, HAS GIVEN WAY TO A QUITE GENERAL SENTIMENT THAT MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM IS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT OF GETTING AND MAINTAINING ANY DETENTE WITH THE SOVIETS IN EUROPE. (THIS ASSUMPTION IS BUILT DEEP INTO THE HARMEL STUDY NOW, WITHOUT VISIBLE DISSENT EVEN FROM THE FRENCH.) IN NATO ITSELF, THE SHOCK OF THE FRENCH PULL OUT IS NOW COMPLETELY ABSORBED AND FRENCH ABSENCE HAS MADE POSSIBLE A SERIES OF QUITE REMARKABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN DEFENSE PLANNING, AGREED STRATEGY, AND NUCLEAR CONSULTATION. EVEN THE US AND UK REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS, WHICH IF MORE DRASTIC WOULD HAVE HAD AN

UNRAVELLING EFFECT, HAVE BEEN MODEST ENOUGH AND EXPLAINED CAREFULLY ENOUGH TO SERVE AS A BACK-HANDED REASSURANCE TO CONTINENTALS ABOUT CONTINUING US AND UK MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

7. IN THIS NEW CLIMATE I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND YOUR COLLEAGUES WITH:

A. NO RPT NO LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF BOTH NATO DEFENSE PROGRAM AND THE ALLIANCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE;

B. A RENEWED SENSE OF THE ONGOING VIRTUE OF WESTERN UNITY;

C. DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS (THOUGH CONTINUING WISH-THOUGHTS) OF IMMINENT EAST-WEST DETENTE;

D. SOMEWHAT HEIGHTENED RECEPTIVITY TO YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD ORDER; AND EVEN

E. A DWINDLING INCLINATION TO GRUMBLE ABOUT OUR CONTINUING TO APPLY THE PRESSURE IN VIETNAM.

GP-3. CLEVELAND

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action SS

Info

P 092256Z JUN 67
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5804
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T USUN 5675

1967 JUN 9 PM 7 49

EXDIS

GOLDBERG TALK WITH EBAN

IN CONVERSATION WITH EBAN JUNE 8, GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT AT PRESENT MOMENT, WHEN ISRAEL ENJOYING MIL VICTORIES, IT VERY IMPORTANT TO WORK FOR GENUINE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. EBAN SAID ISRAEL NOT SEEKING TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT AND HAD NO "COLONIAL" ASPIRATIONS.

EBAN MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AND WAS SELDOM SPECIFIC ON DETAILS. IMPLIED ISRAEL REALLY SEEKING PEACE TREATY WITH JORDAN. WHILE NOT MENTIONING STATUS OF JERUSALEM (BEGIN UNDERLINE) PER SE (END UNDERLINE), EBAN STRESSED ISRAEL WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSURE ALL RELIGIOUS GROUPS CONCERNING HOLY PLACES. SIMILARLY, ISRAEL HAD NO DESIGNS ON UAR TERR; MERELY SEEKING ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO PROTECT ISRAELI TERR. RE SHARM EL SHEIKH, HOWEVER, EBAN SUGGESTED ISRAEL MIGHT WANT SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON STRAIT. AT NO POINT DID EBAN REFER TO SYRIA OR SYRIAN FRONTIER.

GOLDBERG STRONGLY EMPHASIZED IT NECESSARY FOR AMERICAN AS WELL AS WORLD PUBLIC OPINION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT EMERGE FROM CURRENT SITUATION AS POWER WITH DESIGNS TO INFRINGE ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

EBAN SAID ISRAELIS HAD HOPED TO AVOID ANY MIL ACTIVITY IN AREAS WHERE REFUGEES CONGREAGATED (PRESUMABLY GAZA), BUT FORCED BY MIL ACTION OF OTHER SIDE TO CHANGE BATTLE PLAN TO INCLUDE THESE AREAS.

GOLDBERG URGED EBAN TO CONTACT BUNDY ON HOW PEACE MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT ABOUT AND RANCOR AND HUMILIATION FELT BY ARABS OVERCOME. EBAN WELCOMED SUGGESTION. RAFAEL LATER TOLD GOLDBERG EBAN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BUNDY JUNE 8 AND WOULD MEET WITH HIM ON HIS NEXT TRIP TO US.

GP-2
GOLDBERG
BT

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S E C R E T PARIS 20056 SECTION ONE OF TWO

NATUS

EUCOM FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AND THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 209519 CIRCULAR

1. ON RECEIPT VERY HELPFUL AND TIMELY REFTEL, CLEVELAND REVIEWED US THINKING WITH BROSIO. BROSIO FOUND HIMSELF IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH US LINE, AND THEREFORE READILY AGREED TAKE LEAD IN INFORMAL PERMREP MEETING MORNING JUNE 9. (WE ALSO HAD TIME TO CONFIRM UK DELEGATION THE SIMILARITY OF US AND UK THINKING.

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2. BROSIO LED OFF BY POINTING OUT MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE PROBLEM MOST ON MINISTERS MINDS AS THEY DISCUSSED EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN LUXEMBOURG.

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THIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE THAN USUAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. WE MUST THINK NOW ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE NATO'S ROLE AS SITUATION MOVES FROM PHASE OF IMMINENT AND THEN ACTUAL HOSTILITIES TO THAT OF POSITIVE PEACEMAKING. NATO AND ITS MEMBERS ARE INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT A STABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT BECAUSE NATO MEMBERS HAVE DIRECT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SUCH MATTERS AS THE OPERATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL, MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES, AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION - AND ALSO BECAUSE NATO MEMBER INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO SEEKING AND SUPPORTING PEACE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD AS WELL AS THE NATO AREA.
3. BROSIO CONTINUED THAT OF COURSE NATO WOULD NOT HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, SOME NATO MEMBERS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS, AND THE ROLE OF NATO WOULD BE ONE OF CONSULTATION WITH AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATORS. BROSIO CALLED ATTENTION TO ANALOGY OF NATO'S ROLE WITH REGARD TO DISARMAMENT AND ALSO BERLIN, WHERE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT RPT NOT CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF NATO.

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BUT REFLECT INTENSIVE CONSULTATION AND HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE NEGOTIATORS' NATO ALLIES.
4. THUS RESULTS HE ENVISAGED FROM LUXEMBOURG MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE (A) STATEMENT BY MINISTERS CALLING FOR A STABLE AND JUST MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, AND (B) AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE ACTIVE CONSULTATION THROUGH NAC, THEREBY SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT.
5. BROSIO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE "CLANDESTINE" IN UNDERTAKING ACTIVE CONSULTATION REGARDING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. NATO IS CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY PROBLEMS AND WITH THE RESOLUTION OF CRISES AFFECTING WORLD PEACE. THUS TO FAIL TO BAKE - AND TO BE SEEN TO TAKE - AN ACTIVE INTEREST WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH CURRENT ALLIANCE EXAMINATION OF NATO'S FUTURE ROLE, AND WOULD REDUCE NATO TO BEING A PURELY MILITARY CENTRAL EUROPEAN ALLIANCE.
6. CLEVELAND THEN SPOKE ALONG LINES REFTEL, INDICATING HIS REMARKS REFLECTED UP-TO-DATE HIGHEST LEVEL DEPARTMENT

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THINKING AND COVERING FULLY PARAS ONE THROUGH FOUR OF REFTEL.
7. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, IN WHICH ALL EXCEPT ICELAND, LUXEMBOURG AND PORTUGAL SPOKE, A BROAD CONSENSUS EMERGED ALONG LINES ESPOUSED BY BROSIO AND EXPANDED BY CLEVELAND. EVERY SPEAKER FAVORED NATO MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION AT LUXEMBOURG AND ALSO IN COUNCIL THEREAFTER ON THE MIDDLE EAST. SCHRICKE (ACTING FRENCH PERMREP) DID NOT RPT NOT DISSENT THOUGH TRANSPARENTLY RATIONALIZING THIS AS A PERFECTLY NORMAL ASPECT OF COUNCIL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND ENDORSING PARTICULARLY THOUGHT THAT ALLIANCE AS SUCH SHOULD NOT HAVE AN ACTION ROLE, WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED WOULD RAISE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING NECESSARY EAST-WEST AGREEMENT. GREWE (FRG) SPOKE WITH PARTICULAR FEELING, AS NON-MEMBER OF UN, ABOUT USEFULNESS OF NATO CONSULTATION IN VIEW OF INTERESTS (AS MARITIME NATION, ARMS SUPPLIER, OIL CONSUMER, DEFENDER OF NATO SE FLANK, ETC.) WHICH FRG HAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE MENTIONED PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT, NOW THAT ARABS HAVE BROKEN OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, FRG MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESUME DEPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS PART OF GENERAL MOVEMENT TO RESTORE THEM. BOON (NETHERLANDS) TOOK STRONGEST LINE OF ALL, EMPHASIZING DUTCH BELIEVE NATO SHOULD HAVE STARTED ACTIVE CONSULTATION SOONER, PARTICULARLY ON MARITIME DECLARATION.
8. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT INTENSIFIED CONSULTATION SHOULD BE IN FRAMEWORK OF NAC AND OTHER ESTABLISHED ORGANS OF NATO, RATHER THAN ANY SPECIAL MACHINERY, AND SEVERAL SPEAKERS MADE POINT THAT NATO CONSULTATION AS PRACTICED ON DESARMAMENT, NPT, AND BERLIN WAS SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF PRESENT SITUATION. (WHILE THIS WAS NOT DISCUSSED, WE SEE NO PROBLEM AT ALL ON ATTENDANCE OF POLITICAL LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS AS DESIRED.) THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT, SUPPORTING BROSIO'S OPENING REMARKS, THAT CONSULTATION ON INTERESTS AND POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES IN MIDDLE EAST SHOULD IN NO WAY CONFLICT WITH ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UN AND AMBASSADORS OF NATO COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK, BUT RATHER COULD PROVIDE INVALUABLE SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATORS IN UN OR WHATEVER FORMAL OR INFORMAL FORUM MIGHT PROVE TO BE THE CENTER OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR VARIOUS PARTS OF THE PROBLEM OF FASHIONING A PERMANENT PEACE STRUCTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

GP-3 CLEVELAND
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S E C R E T PARIS 20056 SECTION TWO OF TWO

NATUS

EUCOM FOR POLAD

9. SOME DIVERGENCE DID APPEAR ON PUBLICITY. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO IN LUXEMBOURG COMMUNIQUE, EVEN FRENCH ENVISAGING "ONE OR POSSIBLE TWO SENTENCES". MAJORITY SEEMED TO FAVOR STATEMENT OF SUPPORT OF NATO MINISTERS FOR EFFORTS OF UN TO ACHIEVE A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. BROSIO'S MORE POSITIVE VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD MAKE KNOWN ITS ACTIVE AND CONCERTED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PEACE WAS SUPPORTED BY DUTCH AND GERMAN PERMREPS,

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BUT MET WITH OPPOSITION FROM ITALIAN, GREEK, UK, CANADIAN, NORWEGIAN AND FRENCH PERMREPS. LATTER GROUP EXPRESSED VARYING DEGREES OF CONCERN THAT NATO LABEL ON PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN UN AND WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES - AND, IN THE FRENCH VIEW WITH SOVIETS.

10. BROSIO SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED BROACHING SUBJECT AT MINISTERIAL MEETING ALONG LINES HIS OPENING REMARKS TODAY, BY WAY OF UP DATING HIS ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL WHICH HAD BEEN COMPLETED IN LATE MAY AND THUS STOPPED SHORT OF CURRENT CRISIS. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CLEVELAND'S COMMENT (PARA 4 REFTEL) THAT CONTINUED

ACTIVE CONSULTATION WOULD MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE NATO'S MACHINERY FOR CRISIS CONSULTATION; HE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO IMPROVING COUNCIL CONSULTATION PROCEDURES AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SITUATION CENTER IN SUPPORT OF NAC, NATO NEEDED MORE ATTENTION TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

COMMENT:

11. THE APPROACH OUTLINED REFTEL SEEMS CLEARLY, ON BASIS TODAY'S MEETING, CALCULATED TO OBTAIN READY ACCEPTANCE AT LUXEMBOURG. INDEED, IT IS SO FORMULATED AS TO MAKE IT (AS FRENCH REP POINTED OUT) THE MOST NATURAL THING IN THE WORLD FOR NATO TO GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS. BROSIO'S READINESS TO TAKE THE LEAD BOTH IN INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN PROPOSING CONTINUING NATO CONSULTATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL, APPEARS TO SETTLE THE MAIN TACTICAL QUESTION. MINISTERS NEED AGREE ONLY TO THIS PRINCIPLE, AND DETAILS CAN BE WORKED OUT BY COUNCIL SUBSEQUENTLY.

12. AS IS OFTEN CASE WHEN CONSENSUS EMERGES QUICKLY, THE AGREEMENT ON NATO CONSULTATION IS MORE SUPERFICIAL

THAN A NUMBER OF PERMREPS RECOGNIZE TODAY. MOST PERMREPS ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWING ON A CEASE-FIRE, OR AT MXT ON THE CHARACTER OF A POSSIBLE ARAB/ISRAELI MODUS VIVENDI. THEY SEE NATO CONSULTATION AS A WAY TO HAVE SOME VOICE IN HOW THIS IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT IS WORKED OUT. THE BROADER AND LONGER RANGE INTERESTS AND

PROBLEMS INDENTIFIED IN PARA 2 REFTEL STRUCK RESPONSIVE CHORDS FROM SOME PERMREPS, BUT DID NOT RPT NOT REALLY REGISTER AS YET WITH COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, REMINDER AT LUXEMBOURG BY SECRETARY THAT CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HAS DEEP-SEATED ROOTS ABOUT WHICH HE SPOKE LAST DECEMBER, AND HIS COMMENTS ON WHAT MUST NOW BE DONE TO DEAL WITH MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, SHOULD BRING MINISTERS AND PERMREPS TO LOOK AT PROBLEM IN ITS DIMENSIONS. CONTINUING PROCESS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS HERE COULD THEN GRADUALLY ENGAGE MEMBERS OF NAC IN THINKING RESPONSIBLY ABOUT THE VARIOUS AREAS (ARMS SUPPLY, PETROLEUM, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE, RENEWAL OF TIES WITH ARAB STATES, ETC.) WHERE GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE TO TAKE HARD DECISIONS IN COURSE OF BUILDING A REALLY

SOLID AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, ONCE MINISTERS ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THAT MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATION MUST CONTINUE AND BE INTENSIFIED, THE REST CAN PROBABLY BE MADE TO FOLLOW.

GP-3 CLEVELAND
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NATUS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

1. AT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETION ON TUESDAY, THE MID-EAST CRISIS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE PREDOMINANT CONCERN IN MINDS OF YOUR COLLEAGUES. SEPTEL REPORTS OUTCOME JUNE 9 OF SPECIAL NAC ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE HANDLED TACTICALLY.

2. BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT QUESTION IS HOW THIS WEEK'S EVENTS IN MID-EAST RELATE TO CURRENT BUSINESS OF THE ALLIANCE AS IT STOOD BEFORE MID-EAST ERUPTED - THAT IS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, FUTURE TASKS OF ALLIANCE, AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES ESPECIALLY RE CRISES OUTSIDE NATO DEFENSE AREA. AND I BELIEVE THE OTHER MINISTERS WILL BE LOOKING TO YOU TO MAKE THE CONNECTIONS AND PUT THINGS IN CONTEXT.

SECRET

3. THE DRAMATIC AND (TO MOST EUROPEANS) NOT UNWELCOME EVENTS IN MID-EAST COINCIDE WITH A GROWING SENSE OF REALITY AMONG SOME OF OUR ALLIES AS THEIR EAGERNESS FOR INSTANT EAST-WEST DETENTE HAS BEEN BLUNTED BY EXPERIENCE -- E.G. THE HARSH SOVIET-EE REACTION TO RESUMED RELATIONS BETWEEN BONN AND BUCHAREST INCLUDING THE

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GENERALLY HARD LINE OF THE KARLOVY-VARY COMMUNIQUE; THE FIZZLING OF SUCH VENTURES AS THE BRITISH CODE OF CONDUCT DCR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE GROUP OF NINE, THE PROPOSED ALL-EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS MEETINGS, SUGGESTED EAST-WEST INITIATIVES AT ECE; THE SOVIET STALLING ON TABLING A DRAFT NPT; AND THE LACK OF SOVIET RESPONSE SO FAR TO A FRIENDSHIP PACT WITH THE UK OR ABM TALKS WITH THE US.

4. MEANWHILE THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A RISING CONCERN HERE AMONG PERMREPS AND BROSIO ABOUT INDICATIONS IN BREZHNEV'S KARLOVY-VARY SPEECH OF SOVIET INTENT TO MOUNT A MAJOR CAMPAIGN FOR DISSOLUTION OF "BOTH BLOCS" IN 1969, WHEN, AS THE COMMUNISTS HAVE IT, NATO COMES TO AN AUTOMATIC END. (WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WORRY IS OVERDRAWN, SINCE SOVIET AND EE MEDIA DO NOT SEEM TO BE FOLLOWING UP VERY HARD ON THIS THEME.)

5. COMBINED EFFECT OF THIS RE-THINKING PLUS ERUPTION OF A MID-EAST WAR WHICH SOVIETS ARE QUITE GENERALLY BELIEVED TO HAVE HELPED PROVOKE, SEEMS TO HAVE PRODUCED A SEA CHANGE IN THE CLIMATE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION. WHILE WAR IN VIET-NAM AND PROSPECTIVE PEACE IN EUROPE WERE THE TWO MAIN SUBJECTS IN FOCUS HERE, IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE FOR ALLIES TO BELIEVE IN A SOVIET UNION THAT RELAXES

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TENSIONS IN EUROPE WHILE HELPING MAINTAIN THEM IN THE FAR EAST. BUT WITH TWO NON-NATO CRISES IN WHICH SOVIETS ARE INVOLVED, PLUS ALL THE ABOVE INDICATIORS OF A HARDENING LINE ON EUOPE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES, THERE IS INCREASING REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DETENTE MAY BE GEOGRAPHICALLY INDIVISIBLE AFTER ALL. AT LEAST THAT IS OUR IMPRESSION FROM DELEGATIONS TO NAC, AND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GATHER FROM EMBASSIES' REPORTING AND EUROPEAN PRESS.

6. THESE TIDES IN POLITICAL THINKING COINCIDE WITH DEVELOPMENTS THAT FAVORABLY AFFECT THE NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM AS SUCH. THE EARLIER NOTION, PROPAGATED BY THE FRENCH, THAT DETENTE IS SO OBVIOUS THAT AN INTEGRATED MILITARY DEFENSE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY, HAS GIVEN WAY TO A QUITE GENERAL SENTIMENT THAT MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM IS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT OF GETTING AND MAINTAINING ANY DETENTE WITH THE SOVIETS IN EUROPE. (THIS ASSUMPTION IS BUILT DEEP INTO THE HARMEL STUDY NOW, WITHOUT VISIBLE DISSENT EVEN FROM THE FRENCH.) IN NATO ITSELF, THE SHOCK OF THE FRENCH PULL OUT IS NOW COMPLETELY ABSORBED AND FRENCH ABSENCE HAS MADE POSSIBLE A SERIES OF QUITE REMARKABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN DEFENSE PLANNING, AGREED STRATEGY, AND NUCLEAR CONSULTATION. EVEN THE US AND UK REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS, WHICH IF MORE DRASTIC WOULD HAVE HAD AN

UNRAVELLING EFFECT, HAVE BEEN MODEST ENOUGH AND EXPLAINED CAREFULLY ENOUGH TO SERVE AS A BACK-HANDED REASSURANCE TO CONTINENTALS ABOUT CONTINUING US AND UK MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

7. IN THIS NEW CLIMATE I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND YOUR COLLEAGUES WITH:

A. NO RPT NO LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF BOTH NATO DEFENSE PROGRAM AND THE ALLIANCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE;

B. A RENEWED SENSE OF THE ONGOING VIRTUE OF WESTERN UNITY;

C. DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS (THOUGH CONTINUING WISH-THOUGHTS) OF IMMINENT EAST-WEST DETENTE;

D. SOMEWHAT HEIGHTENED RECEPTIVITY TO YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD ORDER; AND EVEN

E. A DWINDLING INCLINATION TO GRUMBLE ABOUT OUR CONTINUING TO APPLY THE PRESSURE IN VIETNAM.

GP-3. CLEVELAND

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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NATUS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

8. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST VALUABLE IF YOUR PRESENTATION, WHETHER IN SINGLE OR MULTIPLE INTERVENTIONS, COULD INCLUDE YOUR ASSESSMENTS OF:

A. ORIGINAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN EARLY STAGES OF MID-EAST CRISIS;

B. SOVIET BEHAVIOR AS CRISIS DETERIORATED INTO WAR;

C. PROBABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN IMMEDIATE POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD;

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D. IMPACT ON PEACEKEEPING IN MID-EAST AND OTHER AREAS OF UNEF WITHDRAWAL, U THANT'S PERFORMANCE, AND DIFFICULTY OF GETTING MAJORITY IN UNSC FOR OPERATIONAL UN ROLE;

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF POWER VACUUM IN MID-EAST AFTER ARAB DEFEATS;

F. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR WEST, E.G. OIL, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS;

G. PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION OF FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY/POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AREA IN AFTERMATH OF WAR;

H. RELEVANCE OF FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS TO US-SOVIET RELATIONS,

EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FUTURE OF ALLIANCE, AND ESPECIALLY OF ITS CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY AND PRACTICES.

9. WITH SPECIFIC RESPECT TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN NAC CONTEXT, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE FUTILITY OF TAKING THE TEMPERATURE OF EASTERN INTENTIONS EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR AND ADJUSTING WESTERN MOODS AND ACTIONS ACCORDINGLY. INSTEAD, THE VIRTUE AND NECESSITY OF KEEPING EVERLASTINGLY AT IT - COME ZIG, COME ZAG.

B. THE LONG, HARD AND ERRATIC ROAD TOWARD EAST-WEST CONCILIATION AND A LASTING EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST THAT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ONE'S NEIGHBORS COMES NATURALLY TO THE WEST BUT REQUIRES A RADICAL WRENCH FROM THE PROGRAMMATIC HOSTILITY WHICH HAS BEEN A WAY OF LIFE FOR SO LONG UNDER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS.

C. THE IMPORTANCE, IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, OF MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE AND MODERN NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM - AND OF THINKING ABOUT FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE WEST AS A PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE EAST.

D. THE USEFULNESS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AS A DEVICE FOR ALLIED CONSULTATION ABOUT THE PROCESS OF DETENTE AND ALLIED

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 20055/2 S E C R E T
COORDINATION OF PLURALISTIC CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF RUEOPE AND THE INTEREST OF ALL.

10. I AM AVAILABLE FOR ANY DRAFTING ASSIGNMENT OVER WEEKEND IF INPUTS OF TEXT FROM HERE (OR, AS OF SUNDAY AFTERNOON, FROM LUXEMBOURG) WOULD BE HELPFUL.

GP-3. CLEVELAND

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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REF: ANKARA 6085

SUB: MIG-21S FOR IRAQ

REFERRING TO MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED FROM TURK AMBASSADOR BAGHDAD, FONOFF ASST SECGEN TURKMEN TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 9 PRESIDENT AREF HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH TURK REFUSAL PERMIT RUSSIAN-SUPPLIED M-21S TO OVERFLY TURKEY TO IRAQ. DESPITE IRAQI REACTION, TURKMEN SAID GOT HAD NO CHOICE BECAUSE ITS SECURITY INTERESTS DICTATED REFUSAL OF SUCH OVERFLIGHTS. OTHERWISE PRECEDENT WOULD BE SET WHEREBY SIMILAR REQUESTS COULD BE MADE FOR OVERFLIGHTS FROM USSR INTO MIDDLE EAST. GP-3.
HART
BT

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1967 JUN 9 PM 4 37

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
ZEN/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
ZEN/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
STATE GRNC
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 10282

SUBJ: WILSON ON ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

1. IN SPEECH AT WORKINGTON THIS AFTERNOON, PRIMIN ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO NATURE AND MODALITIES OF ME SETTLEMENT. TO CARRY ANY HOPE ACCEPTANCE, SUCH SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS BOTH SIDES. TICKED OFF FOLLOWING SPECIFICS AS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:

A. UNEQUIVOCAL RECOGNITION ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

B. RIGHT OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN FOR ALL NATIONS.

C. RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ARAB STATES, "WHO ENTITLED SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW NOT LEAST AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME FOR THEM."

D. PROGRESS IN RELATION TO ARAB REFUGEES DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES IN WHAT WAS NOW ISRAEL.

E. GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO ME.

2. FOUR POWERS, HE SAID, NOW HAVE OPPORTUNITY WORK TOGETHER FOR HONORABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SETTLEMENT. INDEED, WITHOUT SUCH FOUR-POWER COOPERATION LITTLE HOPE SUCH SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED. WILSON LATER REFERRED TO "FOUR POWERS IN CONSULTATION WITH UN, AND WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA".

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INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL
RUEHDT/USUN
RUEDSPA/CINCSTRIKE
STATE GRNC
BT

JUN 9 PM 4 26

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 1085

REF: SITUATION ON WEST BANK

FOLLOWING ARE OBSERVATION OF MEMBER MY STAFF WHO VISITED BIR ZEIT, RAMALLAH AND BAYTIN, JUNE 8 AND BETHLEHEM AND HEBRON AREA JUNE 9. HE RETURNED INCIDENTIALLY TO JERUSALEM BY FORMER MAIN JERUSALEM-BETHLEHEM ROAD WHICH NOW OPEN TO TRAFFIC.

1. BIR ZEIT. BIR ZEIT COLLEGE AND SURROUNDING TOWN APPEAR UNTOUCHED. RESIDENTS SAY ISRAELI SOLDIERS DROVE THROUGH TOWN WITHOUT OPPOSITION AFTER TAKING RAMALLAH.

2. RAMALLAH. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE AMERICAN SOURCE (A RESIDENT), TOWN SUFFERED SOME DAMAGE FROM ISRAELI MORTAR FIRE BEFORE ENTRY ISRAELI ARMY. SOME LOOTING OF STORES. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES REPORTEDLY VERY FEW. OCCASIONAL SNIPER FIRE HEARD BY CONSULAR OFFICER VISITING TOWN LAST TWO DAYS. SIMILARLY BIREH. IDF HEADQUARTERS AT GRAND HOTEL.

3. BAYTIN. CONSULAR OFFICER ADVISED BY ISRAELIS JUNE 8 ERROID BAYTIN AS SOME JAA SOLDIERS STILL THAT AREA. ISRAELI SOLDIERS THOUGHT AREA WOULD BE CLEARED IN FEW HOURS. CONSULAR OFFICER HAS IMPRESSION THAT MANY JAA SOLDIERS MAY HAVE FLED INTO WADIS IN VICINITY OF DEIR DEBWAN, BOURQA, AND BAYTIN BUT WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THIS EXCEPT ISRAELIS' INDICATION YESTERDAY THEY NOT YET IN CONTROL THIS REGION.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. JERUSALEM. FROM MAIN ROAD, CHURCH OF AGONY AND CHURCH OF MARY MAGDALENE IN GARDEN OF GETHSEMANE APPEARED UNHARMED.

5. MAR ELIAS. THIS CONVENT, WHICH FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY JAA, APPEARS RELATIVELY INTACT. TOWER IS STANDING AND APPEARS UNDAMAGED.

6. BEIT JALA. TOWN QUIET AND FEW STORES OPEN. RESIDENTS SAY LITTLE FIGHTING OCCURRED THAT AREA AND CHURCHES BELIEVED UNHARMED. PHONES OPERATING ON EMERGENCY BASIS IN BEIT JALA TO BETHLEHEM.

7. BETHLEHEM. CHURCH OF NATIVITY HIT BY AT LEAST FOUR SHELLS-PROBABLY LIGHT MORTAR, EVIDENTLY COMING FROM WEST. THREE HIT OUTER WALLS BUT DID LITTLE DAMAGE. ONE HIT ROOF OVER LEFT TRANSEPT LEAVING GAPING HOLE BUT DOING LITTLE DAMAGE TO INSIDE OF CHURCH. ADJACENT LATIN CHURCH REPORTED UNDAMAGED. NUMBER OF SAMLL ARMS SHELLS HAVE POCKMARKED FACE OF CHURCH BUT DONE NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE. OTHER LARGE CHURCHES APPEAR UNHURT. SOME STORES NOW OPEN.

8. HEBRON. HEBRON TOWN TAKEN WITHOUT A BATTLE. MOSQUE OF ABRAHAM AND RUSSIAN CONVENT AT ABRAHAM'S OAK REPORTED UNDAMAGED. MAYOR JABARI LED SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO PREVENT RESISTANCE BY TOWNSMEN.

9. BATTIR. RESIDENTS OF KHADDER NEAR BATTIR VILLAGE AND ISRAELI SOLDIERS SAME AREA REPORT BATTIR (ALONG JERUSALEM-TEL AVIV RAILWAY) NOT DAMAGED. LITTLE FIGHTING APPARENTLY OCCURRED THAT AREA, WHICH NOW IN ISRAELI HANDS.

WILSON

BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JUN PM 4 00

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T JIDDA 5205

NODIS

FOR THE SECRTARY FROM AMBASSADOR

STATE 209632

I AM QUITE CONFIDENT KING FAISAL HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION BREAK RELATIONS WITH US. HE HAS ALREADY SENT WORD TO US TO THAT EFFECT (JIDDA 5136). LETTERS OF PRESIDENT, SHAH AND PRESIDENTS OF TURKEY AND PAKISTAN SHOULD ALL BUTTRESS HIS RESOLVE. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, KING IS ANXIOUS AVOID BEING TOO PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED WITH US UNTIL CURRENT NEAR EAST CRISIS CALMS A BIT. IN MY VIEW IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO RESPECT HIS WISH AND WILL NOT RPT NOT HURT US TO DO SO. THUS, WHILE I WOULD BE PLEASED SEE MR EUGENE BLACK IN JIDDA AND AM SURE KING WOULD HOSPITABLY RECIEVE HIM, I SEE NO RPT NO PARTICULAR NEED FOR SUCH VISIT AT THIS TIME AND WOULD RECOMMEND THAT HE NOT RPT NOT COME. SHOULD SITUATION CHANGE, WE CAN ALWAYS CONSIDER SUCH VISIT.

EILTS
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20 59

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

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Origin NEA

Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD SCA SCS CPR O SY OPR OC TRSY

Jan 9 2 21 AM '67

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD FLASH
INFO : Amembassy ANKARA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE
Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
USUN IMMEDIATE

STATE 209559

REF: Baghdad's 2146

We are disappointed GOI inflexibility reflected your meeting with Director General Protocol. We believe GOI position leaves us no alternative but accede its request as we see little point requesting extension in present circumstances. As you comment reftel extremists have won out and prospects are disquieting. In view uncertain security situation you should leave within 48-hour period with all members your staff with exception Sanderson, Rubino, Gorman, Sabin and necessary number communicators and guards. They should wind up affairs of Embassy and depart as quickly as possible within seven days. If, however, you feel that leaving them is undue risk their safety they should also depart with you.

GP-3

END RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/ARN:RBHoughton:mo	5617	NEA Task Force - Mr. Houghton

Clearances: Ambassador Strong (in substance)

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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209982

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET / NODIS
Classification

FOR OCT USE ONLY

JUN 9 3 50 PM '67

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy RABAT IMMEDIATE
INFO: USUN - EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
STATE 209982

NODIS

REF: Rabat 5439

FROM THE SECRETARY

You should tell King that President and I have carefully considered info contained reftel. You should add that we deeply appreciate his willingness play constructive role in connection next phase Arab-Israel crisis and we attach great importance to advice and interest he can bring to bear.

At same time, we also share King's apparent concern re timing of such a visit in terms prospects for its success.

While it is sincere desire USG to move as rapidly as possible toward constructive solution Middle East problems, there remain number of unanswered questions. Prominent among these are UARG's present intentions and tactics and whether it sincerely desirous working toward realistic solution of Middle East problems. Related to this is problem of how authentic a spokesman UARG leaders remain for Arabs under present circumstances and extent to which mission undertaken on their behalf would have general support. Choice of Boumediene as emissary Paris and Moscow would cause us question whether

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
AF:JPalmer2nd:jms 6/9/67		S - The Secretary

Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle
IO - Mr. Sisco
M - Mr. Rostow
White House (Cleared in NSC meeting)
S/S Mr. Walsh

TOP SECRET / NODIS
Classification

FORM DS-322, 8-65

Nasser's real motivations were to contribute to realistic Middle East settlement or merely to buy time in hope of reestablishing disastrous type of leadership which he has given to Arab world.

In considering this matter we have also borne prominently in mind possible consequences of these uncertainties for King's own personal position, to which we attach greatest importance. While we can assure him that US is anxious make every effort contribute genuine peace in area, we have not yet been able finally to develop our own ideas. We will of course wish have constructive Arab input into development our thinking and would be grateful if King could communicate his own thoughts through you. However, unless there were reasonably wide consensus among constructively minded Arab states regarding arrangements which would be viable in present Middle East context, we would be doubtful that visit at this time could achieve much of substantive nature. This might be detrimental King's relations with rest of Arab world and to his image in US. [redacted]

You should assure King that these reactions relate primarily to questions of timing and of assuring conditions which would maximize success. We would not wish King be in least discouraged by this response since we wish in every way possible to encourage him play constructive role in Middle East problems. We need his advice and assistance in present circumstances and if he can help to mobilize constructive Arab support for steps that could be taken toward peace in area, including possibility of resolving refugee problem, we most certainly would be glad explore possibilities of visit at early opportunity.

End

RUSK

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INDICATE: ☒ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

209980

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JUN 9 5 42 PM '67

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ACTION: AmEmbassy TUNIS FLASH

STATE 209980

You may convey following oral message to Bourguiba:

1. His message to President Johnson has been received and conveyed. Reply will be forthcoming shortly.

2. In meantime, we have taken action in SC and directly to bring about cease-fire. As yet we have no solid information on alleged bombing Cairo.

3. You should also express appreciation for Bourguiba's message and state we look forward to useful discussions of overall NE problem in near future.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:DCBergus:vf
Tel. Ext
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA:DCBergus
Clearances:

AF - Mr. Campbell
S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

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JUN 9 9 32 PM '67

Origin

Info:

ACTION: AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

RPT INFO USUN
STATE 209964
NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Please see Eban as soon as possible and tell him, as a personal message from me, that the position of Israel at the UN is deteriorating rapidly because of a general impression that Israel is not throwing itself fully behind the effort of the Security Council to obtain a cease fire. As far as the US is concerned, he knows that we are fully in support of the Security Council resolutions. We consider it very important that Israel demonstrate by actions on the ground that its announcement about the orders it has issued means what it says. If the cease fire on the Syrian front is not effective immediately, there is likely to be broad support in the Security Council for condemnation of Israel. Finally, please tell Eban that I have spent the morning with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and that there is very strong feeling here about the incomprehensible attack on the

Drafted by: S:DRusk:JSisco:cjp 6/9/67
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Bruce

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Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

USS Liberty. We shall be in touch with his government by means of a note on this subject later.

RUSK

209955

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin NEA

Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD ACDA

ACTION: Amembassy BONN

Jun 9 8 36 PM '67

STATE 209955

REF: Puhan-Shaw Telcon June 9

SUBJ: Ambassador's Meeting with Kiesinger--Near East

1. Suggest you draw on following assessment as appropriate bearing in mind changes which will inevitably occur before your meeting. We intend to send you SITREP Sunday, June 11.

2. Nasser, faced with economic problems at home and searching for a means of reasserting his political leadership in the Arab world, brought about the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force from the UAR-Israeli border and declared, on May 22, that he would not allow Israeli shipping to pass through the Straits of Tiran.

3. We do not know for certain who started the fighting on June 5, but in the four-day campaign that followed the Israelis achieved a stunning military victory over their Arab adversaries. Israel now controls Sinai and the West Bank of Jordan. The Jordanian army has been destroyed and the UAR has suffered crippling losses in aircraft and armor. Israel is in control of the Straits of Tiran and has announced that the Gulf of Aqaba is open to international shipping.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/IAI:MSterner:EUR/GER:HirschfeldIpb 6/9/67		EUR - WJStoessel

Clearances:
S/S - Mr. Bruce
M - Mr. Grey
EUR/GER-Mr. Puhan

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

4. The Security Council on June 6 and again on June 7 passed unanimously cease-fire resolutions to which the principal combatants have responded.

5. The problems of consolidating the peace are now before us. They will be difficult ones, but on the other hand there may be some opportunities to make the Arab-Israel modus vivendi that emerges from the conflict more secure and stable than in the past.

6. We face some immediate problems. The most pressing is the humanitarian one, particularly in Jordan where the fighting was intense. We will want to do what we can to provide help to casualties and uprooted persons.

7. Closely related is the problem of political stability in Jordan. King Hussein's regime is in jeopardy as a result of the devastating defeat suffered by his army and loss of the West Bank. We believe the survival of the King's regime is in our basic interest. We will be seeing what we can do to shore him up. Much will depend on ultimate Israeli willingness to give up Jordanian territory it has taken.

8. We can expect the Israelis to use the territory it has occupied as a bargaining counter to achieve their political objectives. Their ultimate goal is Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, with a cessation of the political and economic

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warfare conducted under the Arab posture of continuing belligerence. At a minimum, the Israelis will probably insist on achievement of certain specific objectives, such as guaranteed rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, and rectification of border situations in such a manner as to reduce Israeli vulnerability to shooting and especially terrorist incidents.

9. The Arabs on the other hand are likely to retreat further into their attitude of belligerence and to attempt to put pressure on the world community to force Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory without Arab political concessions. Closure of the Suez Canal may be used to put pressure on the West in this sense. The prospect therefore is one of prolonged Israeli occupation of Arab territory, with some very hard political bargaining. In the process Soviet attitudes will be an important factor.

10. As the dust settles we will be looking closely at the opportunities as well as the problems. For example, can UNRWA be reshaped so that it is less of a millstone? Can border arrangements be made that are more stable and secure than in the past? Are there openings for more effective arms control in the Near East?

11. As we work on these questions we hope we can have the benefit of a full and continuing exchange of views with the German Government.

RUSK

END.

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209944

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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ACTION: Amembassy ANKARA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USUN IMMEDIATE

Jun 9 7 45 PM '67

STATE 109744

Turkish Ambassador on urgent instructions GOT advised Dept 1900 hours ninth Syrians had requested GOT assistance in halting Israeli attacks. Syrians alleged they had agreed to cease-fire at 0300 local time.

End

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA:ARN:LLKinsolving:fah:	3236	classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances: 6/9/67		

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

209821

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

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Origin NEA

ACTION: Amembassy KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

Jun 9 6 55 PM '67

Info:
INFO: Amembassy JIDDA
CAmembassy LONDON
Amconsul DHAHRAN

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STATE 209821

Kuwait 1287, 1290.

1. In light favorable evolution Arab-Israel crisis, notably UAR acceptance cease-fire, we assume GOK unlikely for present act against USG, e.g., breaking relations. Under Secretary's statement to you (para 2, Kuwait 1290) reassuring on this point. Accordingly believe no further need for more explicit assurances, though anything volunteered by Amir would of course be welcome.

2. We seeking provide you appropriate message for Amir but timing uncertain.

3. Believe emphasis your approach should be on: (a) military non-involvement USG in recent hostilities, which we strove mightily if unsucoessfully to prevent; and (b) urgent attention which must now be given by all of ~~x~~ us to the many post-hostilities problems which will require major efforts from all interested countries (Kuwait 1281).

4. You may also wish express Dept appreciation for thorough security precautions taken by GOK which much appreciated by all Americans.

TRSY

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:bmk:6/9/67	5655	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Bruce

M - Mr. Rostow

SECRET

FORM DS-322

5. FYI. GOK Ambassador Ghoussein received instructions June 8 inform Dept Kuwait refusing accept cease-fire. However, by time he reached DeptOff on telephone UAR had announced its acceptance. Ghoussein limited his comment to statement he assumed he would be receiving new [redacted] instructions. END FYI. GP-3. END.

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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CONFIDENTIAL

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8 Origin
55 Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

JUN 9 5 32 PM '67

STATE 205746

Amman's 4162

1. We do not wish to change our posture re Jordan any more than forced to by circumstances and GOJ. In present confused situation it is almost impossible to predict what our future posture will be. Overriding consideration at moment, therefore, must be safety of our personnel there.

2. Final decision on number personnel remaining after evacuation must be made by Ambassador in light his evaluation internal security situation in Amman. Your previous reports indicate you would be justified in reducing staff to 25 or less.

GP 3

END

RUSK

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S0

Drafted by: RBHoughton/ NEA/ARN/MWWiley:jh 6/9/67	Tel Ext 3236	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA-Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN-RBHoughton

Mr. Thompson

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

209727

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

JUN 9 5 07 PM '67

INFO : Amembassy ANKARA
LONDON
MOSCOW
TEHRAN

USUN

EXDIS

STATE 209727

1. At meeting June 8 that preceded news of UAR adceptance cease-fire Unsec Rostow told Israeli Ambassador Harman we were likely to face ~~withdrawal~~ withdrawal demand in SC very soon. We are thinking of suggesting new resolution making point that compliance with cease-fire resolution is first step toward peace. ~~It would make no mention of withdrawal~~

2. Rostow said entire situation remains ~~very~~ dangerous politically and militarily. ~~Noted that McGeorge Bundy~~ ~~Soviets as reacting in way that reminds him of Cuban missile crisis~~ Most Department experts believe UAR is trying to draw Soviets in, but we ~~do~~ think Soviets have decided against this. Harman said GOI ~~thinks~~ thinks USSR will not rpt not intervene directly.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/IAI:WDWolle:pas:ek/6-8-67	4422	M:EVROSTOW

Clearances:
NEA-Mr. Davies
M - RTGrey
S/S- Mr. Thomson

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3. Rostow commented that present situation would, we hoped, permit movement toward a real Near Eastern peace. Said he thought we would have support of Iran in this respect. ~~He are thinking of some high-level visits around the area~~ Rostow noted that Iranian Amb here seems keenly interested in being helpful.

4. Harman said GOI watching ~~very~~ carefully for signs that others may reinforce UAR aircraft inventory. They had noted ~~dispatch~~ dispatch of MIG ~~aircraft~~ aircraft from Algeria and were watching for possibility that Soviet ~~satellites~~ satellites, especially Czechoslovakia, might supply ~~MIGs~~ MIGs. Harman said GOI does not think Egyptians could do much harm by ground activity now that Sinai largely in Israeli hands. Air ~~is~~ is ~~different matter~~ different matter, he emphasized. He had this morning placed call to Secretary McNamara with whom he would be discussing this and drawing attention to Israel's need for assistance.

GP-3

END

RUSK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET - NODIS
Classification

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JUN 9 1 38 PM '67
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Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy JIDDA IMMEDIATE

STATE 209632

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

FYI

We are making a major effort through as many channels as possible to convince King Faisal of US hope maintain good relations with him and to prevent possible break in relations between us. Toward this end we have under consideration possibility of Mr. Eugene Black visiting Jidda to see King. He is old friend of the King and of many leading figures in the Middle East. Before we proceed we would like your recommendation with respect to utility such visit. We would not wish to embarrass King by requesting audience for senior American. However, if such visit possible we believe there could be real value in such meeting. Please give us your recommendation as soon as possible. END FYI

RUSK

OK

Drafted by: NEA:LDBattle:eae 6/7/67 | Tel. Ext. x.4263 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy | M-j Mr. Rostow | S/S Mr. Walsh

SECRET - NODIS
Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

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Origin NEA

Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD SCA SCS CPR O SY OPR OC TRSY

Jun 9 2 21 AM '67

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD FLASH
INFO : Amembassy ANKARA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE
Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
USUN IMMEDIATE

STATE 209559

REF: Baghdad's 2146

We are disappointed GOI inflexibility reflected your meeting with Director General Protocol. We believe GOI position leaves us no alternative but accede its request as we see little point requesting extension in present circumstances. As you comment reftel extremists have won out and prospects are disquieting.

In view uncertain security situation you should leave within 48-hour period with all members your staff with exception Sanderson, Rubino, Gorman, Sabin and necessary number communicators and guards. They should wind up affairs of Embassy and depart as quickly as possible within seven days. If, however, you feel that leaving them is undue risk their safety they should also depart with you.

GP-3

END RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/ARN:RBHoughton:mo	5617	NEA Task Force - Mr. Houghton

Clearances: Ambassador Strong (in substance)

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-322
8-65

209960

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF ARA EA EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC CIA NSA DOD NIC ACDA AID PC O SY OPR OC TRSY

ACTION: CIRCULAR TO ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

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STATE 209960 CIRCULAR

Soviet Role in Middle East Crisis

1. In view of widespread speculation concerning Soviet role in Middle Eastern crisis, following is our assessment of Soviet behavior to date and preliminary estimate of likely Soviet course in future.

2. Apart from general posture of support for Arabs, Soviets almost certainly had hand in fanning Arab fears of imminent Israeli attack against Syria in mid-May. At same time, we are persuaded that they did not participate directly in planning Arab moves as crisis unfolded. It seems likely Soviets were not informed in advance of Nasser's intentions re Gulf of Aqaba. It is clear from hedged Soviet statements and press treatment that they did not fully support UAR blockade of Gulf of Aqaba and certainly did not encourage move. In fact, they seemed surprised and concerned by move. However, when it appeared that Nasser had scored substantial political success by removing UNEF and blockading Gulf, general Soviet support for Arabs became stronger. Soviets probably urged Arabs at this point not to jeopardize gains by provoking Israelis and "imperialists" and in that sense may be said to have exerted restraining influence. Their public and diplomatic posture meanwhile sought to deter Israelis from unilateral action and to induce US to maintain restraints on Israel. In UN Soviets were clearly stalling to

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
INR/RSB:HSonnenfeldt: EUR:SOV:MToon:erk 6/9/67	6477	EUR - Mr. Stoessel

Clearances:
G - Amb. Kohler (in draft)
Amb. Thompson
NEA - Mr. Atherton (in draft)
S/S - Mr. Bruce
IO - Mr. Popper (in draft)
EA - Mr. Isham (in draft)

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

enable Arabs to consolidate gains and frustrate any action to the contrary. Soviet military posture throughout this period was normal. They beefed up naval presence in Mediterranean -- a regular seasonal move, although in this instance the Soviets may have had hopes of later citing this move as having cooled imperialist hotheads.

3. Speculation that Soviets somehow schemed with Arabs to stage crisis as means to embarrass or otherwise put pressure on us in connection with Vietnam does not seem to us valid on the basis of evidence at hand. Indeed Soviets themselves sought to portray crisis as result of US effort to divert world attention from US Vietnam aggression. Likewise, speculation while crisis was unfolding that Soviets were seeking package involving US deescalation in Vietnam and Soviet restraint in Middle East not supported by events.

4. Once fighting began on June 5, Soviets predictably placed blame on Israelis, backed by imperialist circles, and sought by various means, including activation of Moscow-Washington hotline, to put pressure on US to restrain Israelis. Uncertain about trend of fighting, Soviets at UN sought resolution that would have provided for Israeli withdrawal without meeting Israeli concerns re Gulf. By late June 6, Soviets apparently concluded that simple cease-fire resolution was imperative. One of reasons probably leading to this was Arab claim that US and UK aircraft had joined Israelis which, among other things, seemed calculated to pressure Soviets into direct assistance to Arabs. Soviets, despite initial propaganda approaching endorsement of Arab claims, never officially supported them. Following cease-fire resolution, Soviets sought to alleviate obvious Arab resentment of their failure to call for withdrawals by massive propaganda attack on Israelis for not heeding UN

call and by threat to break relations with Tel Aviv. It still not clear why Soviets did not put in separate resolution calling for withdrawals after cease fire call. Eventual Soviet resolution on June 8 did call for withdrawals but also for condemnation of Israel and thus was non-started.

5. Soviets apparently also agreed to mount emergency supply operation for Egyptians and we are watching this. Algerians announced return of their pilot trainees from USSR, whether out of bitterness over Soviet behavior or to use them for MIGs they reportedly supplying UAR remains unclear. Israelis have expressed concern over Soviet and Czech resupply operations for UAR. We assume for time being Soviets are furnishing equipment and spare parts of various kinds not because of any confidence they would turn military tide but in order to preserve some posture of support for Arabs.

6. Our characterization of Soviet behavior to this point is that Soviets became increasingly concerned as fighting progressed to get it stopped in recognition of fact that any effort on their part to retrieve Arab military situation would have to be massive and hence would carry unacceptable risk of confrontation with us. US and Soviet endeavors ran parallel to the extent that Soviets felt obliged in the end to participate in unanimous SC cease-fire call.

7. Question of what lessons Soviets may draw from events partly brought on by their own policy and whether they will show more inclination than heretofore to seek viable arrangement for peace in Middle East cannot be fully answered at this stage. Soviets realize that any such arrangement would be bitter pill for Arabs and Moscow's endorsement of it would set back long Soviet endeavor to obtain

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paramount influence in region. Against such considerations must be set almost certain disillusionment in Moscow with policy of support for and massive investment in Arabs. Opening for beginning constructive approach to problems of ME was presented by US resolution introduced in SC June 8, which Bulgarians attacked violently and Soviets have coldshouldered. While we can express hope Soviets will cooperate in measures to prevent future crisis, and take note of numerous current comments to this effect by lower level Soviet diplomats and KGB types, we think it premature and/not useful make optimistic forecasts on this score. Soviet leaders themselves almost certainly only at beginning of any assessment of meaning recent events and of wisdom of their own role in it. Whatever the outcome, we feel they will find it extremely difficult to cast away "anti-imperialist" stance in region and to resist exploiting anti-US sentiments fanned in Arab world by current crisis.

8. You may draw on foregoing as appropriate in conversations with officials and others. END

Grp 1

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1967 JUN 9 PM 9 11

SYRIAN AND ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE SC JUNE 9 CEASE-FIRE RES

FOL IS TEXT OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI RESPONSES TO JUNE 9 SC CEASE-FIRE RES AS READ BY SYG TO SC AT APPROX 3:30 PM:

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 5676 UNCLAS
SYRIA: QUOTE

EXCELLENCY: CONCERNING THE INFO WHICH I TRANSMITTED TO YOUR OFFICE AT 2:15 THIS AFTERNOON, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVT, AFTER A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MY FONMIN, DR. IBRAHIM MAKHOS, WHO INSTRUCTED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU OFFICIALLY THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SYRIAN GOVT TO SC RES S/7960. UNQUOTE

(SIGNED BY AMB TOMEH, SYRIAN PERMREP).

ISRAEL: QUOTE

EXCELLENCY: I HAVE THE HONOUR TO CONFIRM WHAT I SAID IN THE SC ON 9 JUNE, THAT I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY TELEPHONE TO ANNOUNCE THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE CEASE-FIRE RES ADOPTED BY THE SC TODAY, PROVIDED THAT SYRIA ACCEPTS IT AND WILL IMPLEMENT THE CEASE-FIRE. UNQUOTE

(SIGNED BY AMB RAFAEL, ISRAELI PERMREP).

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ACDA
AID IRAQI SITUATION - ASSESSMENT
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OPR 1. THE IRAQI REGIME ENTERED PRESENT CRISIS RELUCTANTLY.
OC MODERATES WERE IN SADDLE. THEY WERE CARRIED DEEPER AND DEEPER
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BY EVENTS. FIRST MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS THEN COMMITMENT TO ACTION. THEN CONCESSIONS TO SOME EXTREMISTS IN NAME NATIONAL UNITY SUCH AS RELEASE NOTORIOUS PLOTTERS. MEASURES ON OIL PROBABLY TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD OWN POSITION BUT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THEY NOW CONSIDER THIS ESSENTIAL WEAPON. ET CETERA.

2. IRAQIS POSITION HARDENING, BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE. REFLECTS DISILLUSION WITH US NOT ONLY ON PART THOSE WHO BELIEVE STORY OUR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT (WHICH VERY CREDIBLE IN IRAQI EYES GIVEN WAY IT DEVELOPED) BUT ALSO ON PART GREAT MAJORITY WHO FEEL OUR CONCERN FOR ISRAEL HAS DOMINATED OUR STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS BOTH INSIDE UNITED NATIONS AND OUT. REFERENCES TO OPPOSING AGGRESSION BY EITHER SIDE WERE EARLY DISMISSED AS BAREST LIP SERVICE TO IMPARTIALITY. THEY NOW CLAIM OUR AVOIDANCE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ISRAEL INITIATED HOSTILITIES AND OUR REFERENCE ISRAELI INTERESTS AQABA GULF WHILE CEASE FIRE IN QUESTION ARE FURTHER PROOF OUR PARTISANSHIP.

3. WHILE OBVIOUSLY OUR INFORMATION RESOURCES HAVE SHARPLY

DECLINED, WE SENSE FROM PRESS AND A FEW OTHER SOURCES THAT AN INTERNAL IRAQI POLITICAL CONFRONTATION MAY BE SHAPING UP BEHIND THE SCENES. SUCH PLOTTERS AS ARIF ABD AL-RAZZAQ AND SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID WERE RELEASED. THE PRESS IS BEGINNING TO CRITICIZE DIFFERENT CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS FOR NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE NATIONAL CAUSE. THE LONG SILENT SHIA DIVINE MUHSIN HAKIM HAS FINALLY SPOKEN OUT TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE (POSSIBLY MOTIVATED BY FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOESN'T). THE CAUTIOUS AND DELIBERATE TECHNIQUES OF MOST OF THE CABINET MEMBERS AND PRESIDENT ARIF PROBABLY CANNOT SATISFY THESE EXTREMISTS AS THE MILITARY SITUATION BECOMES MORE CRITICAL. IF UN EFFORTS FAIL TO CALM SITUATION SOON, A MAJOR BLOW-UP HERE IS A REAL PROSPECT.

4. TODAY IS FIRST IN SOMETIME WITHOUT REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, SOMETIMES FRANTIC, HAVE SO FAR CONTAINED. THIS MAY BE BREATHING SPELL BASED ON TODAY'S NEWSPAPER REPORTS BRITISH AND AMERICAN EMBASSIES CLOSED DOWN AND PERSONNEL DEPARTING WITHIN FIVE DAYS (WE HAVE ONLY NEWSPAPERS WORD ON TIME LIMIT HOWEVER). ALL MEDIA CONTINUE

BLARE REPORTS OF QTE TRIPARTITE AGRESSION END QTE. AMERICAN PROFESSOR CHECKING OUT BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY TODAY TOLD BY GIRL CASHIER HE LUCKY BE LEAVING BECAUSE QTE WE'RE GOING TO KILL ALL OF YOU END QTE. ASKED BY BRITISH AIR ATTACHE ABOUT DISPOSITION OF BRITISH PILOT INSTRUCTORS, IRAQI AIR FORCE CONTACT SAID HE WOULD PREFER SEE THEM HANGING FROM LAMP POSTS. THESE INSTRUCTORS HOPE GO OUT ON BRITISH CONVOY TONIGHT. TWO CAPTURED ISRAELI PILOTS SCHEDULED GO ON IRAQI TELEVISION TONIGHT.

5. FOREGOING HAS SOMEWHAT GRIM RING. I THINK IT ABOUT RIGHT FOR THIS TRADITIONALLY VIOLENT AND DIVIDED COUNTRY WHICH IS ONLY JUST NOW BEGINNING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE TRAUMA OF THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI GAINS. WE THINK MOST IRAQIS CAN STILL ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A COMPROMISE; BUT THE LONGER THE CRISIS CONTINUES, THE WORSE THE IRAQI INTERNAL SITUATION IS LIKELY TO BECOME, BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE FORCES OF MODERATION.

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6. IN THE BROADER AREA CONTEXT AS VIEWED FROM HERE, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO COMPROMISE AREA ISSUES

PAGE 5 RUQTBG 2143 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IN THE BROADER INTEREST OF OURSELVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY HAVE EACH TIME BEEN ACCEPTED TOO LATE OR NOT AT ALL. WE THINK IT IS BECOMING CRITICAL TO CATCH THE NEXT SUCH OPPORTUNITY AND EXPLOIT IT, OR IF NECESSARY TO GENERATE SOME COMPROMISE PROPOSALS. WHILE AS NOTED ABOVE WE THINK IRAQIS CAN STILL THINK IN TERMS OF COMPROMISE, THEY ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER ARABS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO MAKE FATALISTIC SOUNDS OF ACCEPTING THEIR LOSSES AND SETTLING IN FOR A LONG WAR. THEY PRESUMABLY HOPE FOR SOVIET RESUPPLY AND BELIEVE THEY CAN EXPLOIT THE OBVIOUS ARAB STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF GREAT DISTANCES AND DISPERSED POPULATION.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5667

ME: UAR CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTANCE

1. PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF UAR CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTANCE, LARGE NUMBER OF DELS (E.G., NIGERIANS, PAKISTANIS, GYUANA, MALAYSIA, CYPRUS AND INDONESIA) EXPRESSED FIRM CONVICTION THAT UAR COULD NOT ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT SOME FORM OF GUARANTEE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. KAMIL (INDO) SAID ARAB SOURCES CLAIM MOSCOW HAD BEEN PRESSING UAR TO ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE FOR PAST 48 HOURS, BUT CAIRO KEPT INSISTING ON GUARANTEE.

2. AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT OF UAR ACCEPTANCE, THERE WAS COMBINATION OF SPECULATION AND RUMOR (WITH NO APPARENT RELIABLE SOURCE AS BASIS) TO EFFECT UAR ACCEPTANCE NOT GENUINE. SOME CLAIMED EL-KONY (UAR) ACCEPTED WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD BE REPUDIATED BY CAIRO. MORE CLAIMED UAR HAD NO INTENTION OF ABIDING BY CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT OVER LONG RUN; SIMPLY WANTS CHANCE TO CATCH BREATH, REGROUP FORCES AND START FIGHTING AGAIN. THIS WAS LINKED WITH ANOTHER RUMOR CURRENT EARLIER IN DAY TO EFFECT MOSCOW HAS DECIDED TO SEND UAR IMMEDIATELY LARGE NUMBER OF FIGHTER-BOMBERS.

3. SADI (JORDAN), HOWEVER, SAID EL-KONY HAD WHOLE SPEECH READY ON ASSUMPTION UAR NOT ACCEPTING CEASE-FIRE, BUT "FOUND OUT" (PRESUMABLY GOT INSTRUCTIONS) ABOUT CEASE-FIRE MINUTES BEFORE HE SCHEDULED TO DELIVER IT.

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NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 11:36 PM, 6/8/67. PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE 11:50 PM, 6/8/67.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5666

MIDDLE EAST: REACTIONS TO US JUNE 8 DRAFT RES

1. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO US DRAFT RES QUITE MIXED.

2. MBR CYPRUS DEL FELT IT PREMATURE TO ENGAGE SC ATTENTION WITH LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS BEFORE CEASE-FIRE RESES COMPLIED WITH. MBRS OF NIGERIAN AND INDONESIAN DELS EXPRESSED SAME THOUGHT, AND ADDED IT UNWISE TO INCLUDE BOTH CEASE-FIRE AND LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS IN ONE RES; LATTER A MATTER WHICH WILL REQUIRE LENGTHY DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION AND, THUS, SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO AN EARLY VOTE.

3. KAMIL (INDONESIA) ALSO REPORTED THAT COMMENTS FROM SEVERAL ARAB COLLEAGUES (LEBANON, JORDAN AND UAR) INDICATE ARABS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS UNHAPPY WITH US PROPOSAL THAN WAS ISRAEL WITH SOV DRAFT. MAIN REASON FOR THEIR UNHAPPINESS IS THAT US DRAFT RES DOES NOT SUGGEST GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTS AMONG PARTIES RE LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT; PARTICULARLY EXERCISED THAT US DRAFT, AS WELL AS US SPEECH EXPLAINING PROPOSAL, FAIL MAKE ANY REFERENCE TO US POLICY OF WISHING PRESERVE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN AREA. ACCORDING KAMIL, ARAB COLLEAGUES STATED THAT US FIDELITY TO POLICY EXPRESSED IN PRES JOHNSON'S MAY 23 STATEMENT WILL BE REAL TEST OF US CLAIM TO BE NEUTRAL IN ACTION AND ONLY WAY US CAN HOPE TO RECOUP ITS IMAGE AMONG ARAB NATIONS.

4. MBRS OF CYPRUS AND NIGERIAN DELS CLAIMED SEE SIGNIFICANCE IN FACT US DRAFT PUTS SC PRES AND SYG ON PAR, WITH SC PRES GIVEN PRIOR LISTING, IN ROLE OF BRINGING ABOUT COMPLIANCE CEASE-FIRE. CLAIMED TO DETECT IN THIS SLIGHT MOVE AWAY FROM US STRONG SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENT SYG ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING.

5. CARDUCCI (ITALY) QUESTIONED TIMELINESS OF US RES IN VIEW OF UAR ACCEPTANCE OF CEASE-FIRE, AND AGGREY-ORLEANS

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(GHANA) COMMENTED THAT ANY PROPOSAL RE ME INTRODUCED BY US IS AUTOMATICALLY SUSPECT; THUS, SUGGESTED FUTURE PROPOSALS WOULD FARE BETTER IF INTRODUCED BY SOMEONE ELSE.

6. MBRS OF PAK AND INDO DELS PREDICT SOVS WILL COUNTER US DRAFT BY CONTINUING TO FOCUS ON QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL; IN THEIR JUDGMENT, THIS POSITION WOULD FIND SYMPATHETIC REACTION AMONG AFRO-ASIANS IF IT IS DIVORCED FROM SOV EFFORT TO HAVE ISRAELI AGGRESSION CONDEMNED.

7. SADI (JORDAN) SAID ARABS CONCERNED ABOUT US INTENT WITH REGARD TO INTERPRETATION OF "WITHDRAWAL". ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF THIS MEANT BEHIND ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES.

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NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 12:23 AM, 6/9/67.
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE AT 12:23 AM, 6/9/67.

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PAGE 2 RUEHDT 5660 UNCLAS
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US RES ON ME

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US AT 11:00 AM 8 JUNE REQUESTED URGENT MEETING SC. SC MET AT 2:00 PM AND US INTRODUCED FOL DRAFT RES:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 233 AND 234.

RECALLING THAT IN THE LATTER RESOLUTION THE COUNCIL DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED SHOULD AS A FIRST STEP CEASE FIRE AND DISCONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS AT 2000 HOURS GMT ON 7 JUNE 1967,

NOTING THAT ISRAEL AND JORDAN HAVE INDICATED THEIR MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR A CEASE FIRE, AND THAT ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED WITH RESPECT TO ALL PARTIES ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE PROVIDED THE OTHER PARTIES ACCEPT,

NOTING FURTHER WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT OTHER PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE NOT YET AGREED TO A CEASE FIRE,

1. CALLS FOR SCRUPULOUS COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN WITH THE AGREEMENT THEY HAVE REACHED ON A CEASE-FIRE;

2. INSISTS THAT ALL THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY COMPLY WITH THE COUNCIL'S REPEATED DEMANDS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY AS A FIRST URGENT STEP TOWARD

3. CALLS FOR DISCUSSIONS PROMPTLY THEREAFTER AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED, USING SUCH THIRD PARTY OR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE AS THEY MAY WISH, LOOKING TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VIABLE ARRANGEMENTS
ENCOMPASSING THE WITHDRAWAL AND DISENGAGEMENT OF ARMED PERSONNEL, THE RENUCIATION OF FORCE REGARDLESS OF ITS NATURE, THE MAINTENCE OF VITAL INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE AND DURABLE PEADCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

4. REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO SEEK TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASEFIRE AND TO REPORT TO COUNCIL THEREON WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS;

5. ALSO REQUEST THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN FACILITATING THE DISCUSSIONS CALLED FOR IN PARA 3.

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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O 6/8/67, 7:40 PM.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE,DOD,CIA,USIA,NSA,COMAC,
CINCSTRIKE 6/8/67, 8:10 Pm.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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REF: AMMAN'S 4136

ISRAELI COMPETENT AUTHORITIES CATEGORICALLY DENY RPT DENY ANY TRUTH REPORT ISRAEL IS BOMBING MAFRAQ OR ANY WHERE ELSE IN JORDAN. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 5:51 A.M. - 6/8/67

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, 6:05 A.M. - 6/8/67

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LIMDIS - NOFORN EXCEPT UK

REF: RABAT 5440

1. ON RECEIPT REFTEL, EMBOFF PROVIDED GIST TO FONOFF ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY ROSE. FONOFF HAD NO REPORT YET RE LARAKI-UK AMBASSADOR EXCHANGE.

2. BROWN TOLD COMMONS THAT IN VIEW LACK OF POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM SOVIETS ON QUESTION ARMS EMBARGO TO ARABS AND ISRAEL, HMG REMOVING SUSPENSION OF SHIPMENTS IMPOSED JUNE6.

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 10254 S E C R E T

3. COMMENT: WHILE BRITS SHIPPING TANK SPARES AND AMMO TO ISRAEL, THEY NOT PRESENTLY DISPOSED TO APPROVE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR MORE CENTURIONS. CONTINUATION UK SUSPENSION WOULD HAVE AFFECTED PROVISION BRITISH HARDWARE TO SUCH ARAB COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, LIBYA.

GP-2. KAISER

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1967 JUN 8 PM 4 55

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 6102

SUBJ. STOPOVER BY SHAH; TURK REACTION TO ARAB-ISRAEL WAR

REF: ANKARA 6062

1. SHAH OF IRAN STOPPED ANKARA TWO HOURS EN ROUTE TEHRAN FOR TALKS WITH PRES. SUNAY. AT CONCLUSION SHAH SAID HE AND SUNAY HAD IDENTICAL VIEWS ON ME SITAUTION; PRINCIPAL NEED WAS FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. RE IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS, HE SAID GOI DOES NOT SELL OIL TO ISRAEL BUT SELLS TO COMPANIES; DIFFICULT TELL WHAT HAPPENS THEN AND IT EVEN POSSIBLE ARAB OIL FINDS WAY TO ISRAEL. ONE REPORTER NOTED THAT WHEN RUMOR OF OVERTHROW OF NASSER CIRCULATED "THERE WAS BRIEF MOMENT OF POORLY RESTRAINED JUBLIATION AMONG SHAH'S LARGE RETINUE."

2. JUNE 7 AND 8 TURK PRESS CONTINUED HEAVY COVERAGE OF CONFLICT. NEWS GENERALLY IMPARTIAL AND BASED ON WIRE SERVICES. JUNE 8 PAPERS HEADLINED APPARENT ISRAELI VICTORY PLUS UNSC EFFORTS AND LACK OF ADHERENCE TO CEASE FIRE RESOLUTIONS.

3. LEFTIST AKSAM OF JUNE 7 REPORTED IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN "COMMANDOS" AT INCIRLIK AIR BASE, BUT SEVERAL JUNE 8 PAPERS INCLUDING AKSAM CARRIED FONOFF SPOKESMAN'S DENIAL.

4. JUNE 8 PRESS REPORTED POLITICAL OPPOSITION UNITED BEHIND GOT'S STAND OF "NON-INVOLVEMENT" IN WAR. IN THIS CONTEXT CARRIED EXCERPTS OF STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT JUNE 7. GUVEN PARTY LEADER FEYZIOGLU SPOKE IN FAVOR OF NEUTRALITY AND REQUESTED ASSURANCES FROM GOVT THAT US/NATO BASES WOULD NOT

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BE USED, WHILE TLP DEPUTY GETIN ALTAN ASKED GOT FOR SIMILAR ASSURANCES AFTER POINTING OUT DANGERS OF HAVING FOREIGN BASES ON TURKISH SOIL. RPP SPOKESMAN NIHAT ERIM ALSO COUNSELED NON-INVOLVEMENT.

5. EDITORIALIST CONTINUED TO WARN OF DANGERS EMANATING FROM CONFLICT AND SPECULATED AS TO HOW LASTING STABILITY MIGHT BE ACHIEVED AFTER CEASE FIRE IS ACCOMPLISHED. SOME WRITERS STILL ALLUDE TO "TURKEY'S SYMPATHY FOR ARAB CAUSE" WHILE OTHERS, LIKE ALTAN IN PARLIAMENT, WARN AGAINST FOREIGN BASES ON TURKISH SOIL AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS THEREFROM. MOST WRITERS APPROVE OF TURKEY'S CONTINUING NEUTRALITY AND CONCEDE THAT ISRAEL HAS WON MILITARY VICTORY.

6. COMMENT: MAJORITY OF TURKS WITH WHOM EMBOFFS HAVE TALKED SEEMED PLEASED WITH APPARENT ISRAELI VICTORY. THIS INCLUDES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO ENDORSED EARLIER SLIGHTLY PRO-ARAB GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENT BUT WHO NOW PRIVATELY CONCEDE THEY ARE HAPPY ABOUT ISRAELI TRIUMPH WHICH THEY REGARD PRIMARILY AS DEFEAT FOR NASSER. ALSO INCLUDES INTELLECTUALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HOLD INHERENT MISTRUST AND DISLIKE OF ARABS, WHILE ADMIRING ISRAELI CIVIL AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY. THERE IS ALSO LONG MEMORY OF ARAB "TREACHERY" EXTENDING BACK TO WORLD WAR I AND MORE RECENT LACK OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR TURKEY ON CYPRUS QUESTION. WHILE IT IS PROBABLE THAT POLITICALLY CONSCIOUS ELEMENTS AMONG LOWER CLASSES DO NOT VIEW OUTCOME IN SIMILARLY FAVORABLE LIGHT, LIKELY THEY ARE NOT GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT ARAB SETBACK AND WILL BE QUICK TO SHIFT BLAME TO NASSER.

GP-3. HART
BT

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EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF'S BRIEFING OF MCPHERSON OF WHITE HOUSE JUNE 8, 11:30 A. M.

2. GENERAL YARIV SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF THE IDF NOW WAS TO EXPLOIT ITS SUCCESS. THERE STILL REMAINED THE SYRIAN PROBLEM AND PERHAPS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GIVE SYRIA A BLOW TO GET MORE QUOTE ELBOW ROOM UNQUOTE.

3. IN SPITE OF TREMENDOUS LOSSES OF SOVIET MATERIAL IN SINAI IT SEEMED THAT SOVIETS STILL PLANNED TO SHIP MATERIAL TO UAR. IDF KNEW THAT SHIP HAD LEFT RUSSIAN PORT IN LAST FEW DAYS WHICH WAS LOADED WITH 70 TANKS AND ATI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT. ISRAELIS LEARNED ALSO LAST SATURDAY THAT SOVIETS HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO AIRLIFT EQUIPMENT THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA DOWN TO UAR. NONE OF THIS EQUIPMENT HAD ARRIVED YET. ISRAEL ALSO HAD INFORMATION THAT SOME PLANES FOR UAR MAY BE COMING FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POSSIBLY BY SHIP. YARIV INDICATED SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ACCURACY OF THIS LAST REPORT.

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2. THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET-MAKE AIRCRAFT REACHING UAR FROM ALGERIA. IDF UNDERSTOOD ALGERIA WOULD GIVE UAR 50 AIRPLANES. BETWEEN 15 AND 20 ALGERIAN AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN THE UAR BEGINNING JUNE 7.

3. GERERAL YARIV THEN LAUNCHED INTO SUMMARY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF PAST FEW DAYS. HE SAID THERE WERE STILL IMPORTANT AMOUNTS OF EGYPTIAN ARMOR IN SINAI. EGYPTIANS WERE FINDING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO DISENGAGE FROM THE ISRAELIS; QUOTE WE

ARE ON THEIR HEEL UNQUOTE.

4. THERE WAS STILL UAR EFFORT IN THE AIR. IT HAD SENT UP THIS MORNING SU-7'S, MIG-17'S, AND MIG-21'S. THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOW AN ADVANTAGE IN BEING CLOSER TO THEIR OWN AIR BASES. TODAY WAS THE DAY ISRAEL HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DECIMATE EGYPTIAN ARMOR IN SINAI. IT WAS MAKING MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH ALL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT. EGYPTIANS HAD IN ACTION AT PRESENT TIME BETWEEN 300 AND 400 TANKS; THEY HAD BEGUN THE BATTLE WITH ABOUT 1,000 TANKS IN SINAI.

5. YARIV THEN TURNED TO MAP AND DESCRIBED SOME OF THE MAIN THRUSTS OF CAMPAING TO DATE. THERE HAD BEEN A CONCENTRATION OF EGYPTIAN ARMOR IN SOUTH NEAR EILAT AT BEGINNING. IDF CHOSE NOT TO REACT TO THIS CONCENTRATION BUT ONLY FEINTED IN DIRECTION OF THOSE FORCES. AS TIDE OF BATTLE TURNED AGAINST EGYPTIANS THAT FORCE FLED TO WEST. IN THE CENTER IDF STRATEGY WAS TO HOLD INITIALLY; IN NORTH IT WAS TO STRIKE WITH ITS MAXIMUM EFFORT. IN NORTH, THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD FOUND A NEW ROUTE THROUGH SAND BETWEEN THE BORDER AND THE WADI EL-ARISH ROAD. THIS FORCE HAD RATHER TOUGH FIGHT IN THE EL-ARISH AREA. EGYPTIANS HAD TRIV A COUNTER ATTACK WHEN THE ISRAELI FORCES

REACHED EL-ARISH, BUT THIS WAS MISERABLE FAILURE. WHILE ALL THIS WAS GOING ON, THE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE SOUTH WHICH HAD BEEN LARGELY IGNORED SHOULD HAVE STRUCK ISRAELI FORCES IN THE NORTH, BUT THEY COULD NOT BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD AIR SUPERIORITY. WITH THE DEVELOPING BATTLE, ISRAELI FORCES IN NORTH, CENTER AND

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SOUTH HAVE MOVED WESTWARD CATCHING UP TODAY WITH THE EGYPTIAN FORCES TRYING TO MAKE THEIR ESCAPE ACROSS THE CANAL. AT THE VERY MOMENT YARIV WAS SPEAKING, BATTLES WERE UNDERWAY IN GENERAL AREAS ROMANI, EL-TASA ON THE ROAD LEADING EAST FROM ISMAILIA, JEBEL UMN MAKHASSA, AND MITLA PASS. YARIV THOUGHT THAT THE IDF HAD A GOOD CHANCE TODAY TO DESTROY REMAINING ENEMY ARMOR IN SINAI, THOUGH HE DID NOT THINK ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO GET IT ALL. HE SAID THAT TO DATE OUT OF A THOUSAND EGYPTIAN TANKS IN THE SINAI IN BEGINNING, ABOUT 300 HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THERE WERE 300 OR 400 STILL IN SINAI (PRESUMABLY SOME HAVE MADE THEIR GETAWAY).

6. THE GENERAL REFERRED AGAIN TO DIFFICULTIES ISRAELIS WERE HAVING IN OPERATING INCREASINGLY FAR FROM THEIR BASES. THEY HAD TRIED TO PUT THE AIR BASE AT EL-ARISH IN ORDER AND WERE ALSO HOPING TO USE THE ONE AT JEBEL LIBNI. BOTH HAD BEEN DAMAGED IN FIRST MORNING'S RAID. THERE WAS A THIRD GOOD EGYPTIAN AIR BASE TO THE SOUTHWEST OF JEBEL LIBNI. (YARIV DID NOT SAY WHAT SHAPE THAT BASE WAS IN.)

7. SHARM EL SHEIK HAD POSED NO PROBLEM FOR ISRAELI FORCES. THEY HAD TAKEN OVER BY AIRBORNE TROOPS. NOW FORCES IN THAT AREA WERE WORKING THEIR WAY UP THE GULF OF SUEZ ROAD TOWARD CANAL.

8. YARIV SAID THAT THE IDF HAD HAD NO ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE IN THEIR OPERATIONS. WHEN QUESTIONED ON THIS, HE DID ADMIT THEY HAD SURPRISED THE UAR FORCE. IT WAS QUESTION IN ISRAELI MINDS WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO GET EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE ON GROUND. BUT AS IT TURNED OUT, IT HAD DONE JOB IN ABOUT HOUR. ISRAELIS HAD ALSO ACHIEVED A CERTAIN TACTICAL SURPRISE IN THEIR FEINT TOWARD THE EGYPTIAN FORCE IN THE SOUTH NEAR EILAT.

9. QUESTIONED ABOUT CASUALTIES, YARIV SAID THEY HAD BEEN MUCH LESS THAN EXPECTED IN SINAI AND SOMEWHAT MORE THAN EXPECTED IN GAZA. THE PROBLEM IN GAZA HAD BEEN THAT THE ARABS HAD BEEN CUT OFF AND RESISTED STRONGLY IN GUERILLA-TYPE ACTIONS. A POSSIBLE FIGURE OF AS MUCH AS 5,000 CASUALTIES HAD BEEN MENTIONED FOR ISRAEL, WAS THIS CLOSE TO THE MARK? YARIV INDICATED THAT ALL CASUALTIES TO DATE WERE BELOW 1,000. HE

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INDICATED THAT KILLED IN ACTION WERE WELL UNDER 500.

10. YARIV SAID HE STILL DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY PRISONERS THERE HAD BEEN.

11. THE TOUGHEST BATTLES, AS FOR ARMOR, THEY HAD BEEN IN SINAI, BUT REGARDING INFANTRY ACTIONS, SOME OF HARDEST FIGHTING HAD BEEN NEAR JENIN. THERE, YARIV INDICATED, THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT BEEN EXPECTING JORDANIAN ACTION AND HAD BEEN CAUGHT A LITTLE OFF BALANCE.

12. TO DATE ISRAEL HAD LOST ABOUT 20 PLANES, MOST OF IT TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT. ABOUT 60-70 PERCENT OF THE SYRIAN AIRFORCE HAD BEEN DESTROYED. IT HAD HAD NO OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS SINCE THE FIRST DAY OR TWO. YARIV SAID THERE WERE NO GROUND OPERATIONS IN SYRIA YET, QUOTE UNFORTUNATELY UNQUOTE.

13. YARIV CLOSED WITH A REITERATION OF CONCERN EXPRESSED EARLIER ABOUT CONTINUING UAR AIR ACTIVITY BASED ON REPAIR OF DAMAGED AIRCRAFT AND RECEIPT OF NEW AIRCRAFT. YARIV EXPRESSED HOPE THAT POLITICAL CHANGES WOULD COME ABOUT IN EGYPT WHICH WOULD SOON BRING ABOUT AN END OF HOSTILITIES.

GP-3. BARBOUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 20001

SUEZ CANAL

QUAI'S UAR DESKOFF TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 8 THAT FRENCH HAD REACTED TO UAR'S NOTIFICATION CLOSING OF SUEZ CANAL. FRENCH HAD NOT RPT NOT "PROTESTED" BUT HAD LET IT BE KNOWN IN CAIRO THAT PARIS CONSIDERED UAR'S DECISION AS NOT IN LINE "EITHER WITH CONVENTION OF 1888 OR UARG'S DECLARATIN OF APRIL 1957".

UAR JUSTIFYING SUEZ CLOSURE AS MEASURE DESIGNED PROTECT CANAL AGAINST ISRAELI SABOTAGE, GUAIOFF SAID. GP-3 BOHLEN
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S E C R E T LONDON 10249

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: ARAB/ISRAEL

REF: LONDON 10220

1. POL COUNSELOR ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF EXPLORED UK THINKING ABOUT POST-HOSTILITIES ADJUSTMENTS WITH FONOFF DEP UNSEC ALLEN JUNE 8. FOL. EMERGED:

2. AT CABINET MEETING TODAY SEVERAL MINISTERS URGED THAT HMG QUICKLY PREPARE AND FLOAT OVERALL SETTLEMENT PLAN. BUT FONSEC BROWN HELD SITUATION TOO FLUID FOR MEANINGFUL FOCUS ON SPECIFICS.

3. RESPONSE QUESTTIONS, ALLEN ADVANCED THESE PRELIMINARY PERSONAL VIEWS.

A. ARABS AND ISRAELIS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT.

B. NO INDICATION SOVIETS, WHOSE POSITION PIVOTAL, INTERESTED IN RESOLVING BASIC ME PROBLEMS SOON.

3. EARLY ARRANGEMENT FOR INTERPOSITION OF UN PRESENCE

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BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARABS UNLIKELY.

D. UK AND US CAN EXPECT CONTINUED HEAVY SOVIET PRESSURE TO RESTRAIN ISRAELIS AND FORCE THEM BACK TO ADLS.
3. UK WOULD TRY INFLUENCE ISRAELIS IF SOVIETS AGREED HELP WITH BRITAINS'S "FIRST ORDER" PROBLEMS: REOPENING OF CANAL: RESUMPTION OIL FLOW: SOLUTION TO YEMEN/SOUTH ARABIA.

F. COMPLEX OF ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUES DEEMED HERE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. NOT DIFFICULT TO MAKE LISTS OF DESIRABLE OBJECTIVES. BUT HOW TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT?

G. RE MECHANISM OF APPROACH TO ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, UN NOT FEASIBLE (TOO PUBLIC); FOUR-POWER CONTEXT LOOKS UNPROMISING. THUS KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER US AND SOVS CAN QUIETLY MAKE DEAL.

4. MEANWHILE, FONOFF CONCENTRATING ON HOW TO RECOVER CONSIDERABLE GROUND LOST BY BRITS IN ARAB WORLD. GP-3 KAISER
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SOV RES ON MID-EAST

FOL IS SOV DRAFT RES INTRODUCED SC MTG THIS AFTERNOON:

"THE SC

"NOTING THAT ISRAEL HAS DISREGARDED SC DECISIONS CALLING FOR THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (RESES 233 AND 234 JUNE 6 AND 7),

" CONSIDERING THAT ISRAEL NOT ONLY HAS NOT HALTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT HAS MADE USE OF TIME ELAPSED SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNCIL RESES IN ORDER TO SEIZE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY OF THE UAR AND JORDAN,

"NOTING THAT EVEN NOW ISRAEL IS CONTINUING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INSTEAD OF HALTING ITS AGGRESSION, THUS DEFYING THE UN AND ALL PEACE LOVING STATES,

1. VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SC RESES, OF THE UN CHARTER AND OF UN PRINCIPLES;

"2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY HALT ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES AND SHOULD REMOVE ALL ITS TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF THOSE STATES AND WITHDRAW THEM BEHIND THE ARMISTIC LINES."

GOLDBERG
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S E C R E T PARIS 19995

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PETROLEUM: FRENCH SUPPLY PLANS AND MIDEAST CRISIS

1) OFFICIAL OF FRENCH AFFILIATE OF A US OIL COMPANY TODAY PROVIDED EMBOFF FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MEETINGS HELD JUNE 5 AND 7 BETWEEN DIRECTEUR DES CARBURANTS (DICA) GIRAUD AND PRESIDENTS OF ALL EIGHT INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN FRANCE. MEETINGS DISCUSSED FRENCH SUPPLY PLANS IN CURRENT MIDEAST CRISES. JUNE 5 MEETING SCHEDULED BEFORE OUTBREAK HOSTILITIES AND DEVOTED TO GENERAL REVIEW. GIRAUD CALLED JUNE 7 MEETING IN RESPONSE CRISES TO MAKE SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF THE EIGHT COMPANIES.

2) ALL AGREED FRANCE FACING NO IMMEDIATE CRISIS. FRANCE CURRENTLY HAS SECURITY STORAGE OF THREE MONTHS SUPPLY, PLUS ADDITIONAL ONE MONTH SUPPLY IN REFINERIES OR EN ROUTE, FOR

TOTAL FOUR MONTHS SUPPLY (AS OPPOSED TO FIVE MONTHS STATED IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER ARTICLES). FRANCE BETTER SITUATED THAN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WHICH GENERALLY HAVE TWO MONTH SUPPLY (ITALY, 56 DAYS). GIRAUD MADE CLEAR TO COMPANY PRESIDENTS THAT FRANCE HAS PAID FOR ITS ADDITIONAL STORAGE AND HAS NO INTENTION SHARING IT WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

3) DICA VERY CONCERNED THAT FAVORABLE SUPPLY SITUATION MIGHT BE DISTURBED BY HOARDING. GIRAUD REQUESTED COMPANIES RAPIDLY COLLECT INFORMATION FROM SERVICE STATIONS ON CURRENT SALES. INITIAL SAMPLING INDICATED ONLY

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SLIGHTLY INCREASED SALES OF GASOLINE BY BARREL, BUT SIGNIFICANT RISE IN EARLY ORDERS OF FUEL OIL FOR WINTER. LATTER TREND REINFORCED BY PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED LIKELIHOOD OF PRICE INCREASE IN FALL. GIRAUD STATED RATIONING OF GASOLINE UNLIKELY IN MOST EVENTUALITIES, ALTHOUGH IF NECESSARY DICA WOULD SEEK REDUCE CONSUMPTION BY OTHER MEANS (OIL COMPANY OFFICIALS ASSUME BY INCREASED TAXATION). HOWEVER, DICA AND OIL COMPANY OFFICIALS PLAN TO HOLD SERIES OF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE WHAT LEVEL OF INCREASED PURCHASING WOULD REQUIRE RATIONING OF FUEL OIL. (SOURCE OBSERVED THAT RATION COUPONS FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

HELD BY ALL FRENCH PREFECTURES FOR PAST TWO YEARS.)

4. GIRAUD REQUESTED OIL COMPANIES SUBMIT REVISED REFINING PROGRAMS UP TO BEGINNING OF WINTER TAKING CURRENT CRISIS INTO CONSIDERATION. THESE PROGRAMS, REQURED BY DICA AT BEGINNING OF YEAR WITH UP-DATING EVERY THREE MONTHS, DESCRIBE EACH COMPANY'S PLANS FOR REFINING WHICH QUANTITIES OF FINISHED PRODUCTS FROM ESTIMATED CRUDE IMPORTS. COMPANY PRESIDENTS OBJECTED THIS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT ASSUMPTIONS TO MAKE, E.G., HOW LONG CRISIS MIGHT LAST, AND WHAT TARGETS DICA MIGHT SET FOR SPECIFIC PRODUCTS. THUS, DICA AND COMPANY OFFICIALS WILL HOLD SERIES OF MEETINGS ON REFINERY PROGRAMS. (SOURCE NOTED THAT COMPANY OFFICIALS SURPRISED BY THIS REQUEST IN VIEW OF VAST AMOUNT OF DATA ASSUMING VARIOUS HYPOTHETICAL CRISES GIVEN TO DICA IN PAST YEAR FOR ITS SECURITY OF SUPPLY STUDY. (COMPANIES ASSUME DICA IS STARTING NEW ON CURRENT CRISIS).

5) GIRAUD ADVISED COMPANY PRESIDENTS THAT TRANSPORTATION WAS PRINCIPAL ISSUE FOR FRANCE, SINCE NO MAJOR CUT-OFF OF FRENCH CRUDE SUPPLIES SEEMED LIKELY. HE INFORMED PRESIDENTS OF FRENCH AFFILIATES OF INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES THAT

DICA EXPECTED FRENCH FLAG TANKERS OWNED BY THESE AFFILIATES TO BE AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE TO FRANCE ALONE, IF NECESSARY,

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REGARDLESS OF NEEDS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES' TANKER FLEETS AS A WHOLE. HE THEN STATED DICA EXPECTED ALL THE COMPANIES TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO INCREASE THEIR TANKER CHARTERS BY 20 PERCENT. MOST COMPANY PRESIDENTS OBJECTED, ASKING WHO WOULD PAY FOR THESE CHARTERS IF CRISIS ENDED SUDDENLY OR IF MOST CRUDE SOURCES CUT OFF. GIRAUD REVEALED THAT DICA HAD BEEN ALLOCATED SPECIAL FUNDS FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, BUT WOULD PROVIDE NO DETAILS. HE THEN SAID THAT IF THIS 20 PERCENT INCREASED NOT MET, DICA WOULD RAISE SECURITY STORAGE REQUIREMENT FROM THREE TO FOUR MONTHS, WHICH WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR OIL COMPANIES AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO EXPLICITLY REMINDED COMPANIES OF DICA POWER TO REDUCE BY 10 PERCENT CRUDE OIL IMPORT QUOTA OF COMPANY REFUSING FOLLOW DIRECTIVES IN NATIONAL INTEREST.

6) SOURCE CONSIDERED 20 PERCENT TANKER CHARTER INCREASE MOST SERIOUS ISSUE AT DICA MEETINGS. OIL COMPANIES IN FRANCE WILL CERTAINLY INCREASE TANKER CHARTERS BY YET UNDERTERMINED AMOUNT TO MEET OWN NEEDS, BUT ARE RELUCTANT TO INCREASE UP TO 20 PERCENT

BECAUSE OF DICA VAGUENESS RE FINANCING. THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH DICA.

7) MANY ASPECTS OF FRENCH OIL REGIME (E.G., REQUIREMENTS THAT COMPANIES IMPORT ALGERIAN CRUDE) REST NOT ON LEGISLATION BUT ON DICA DIRECTIVES, BACKED BY ITS POWER TO REDUCE COMPANY CRUDE IMPORT QUOTAS. DICA HAS NEVER NEEDED TO USE THIS POWER AGAINST NON-COMPLIANCE BY LOCAL OIL COMPANY.

8) COMPANY OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE RESULT OF CURRENT CRISIS IS THAT THE SECURITY STORAGE REQUIREMENT WILL BE INCREASED FROM THREE TO PROBABLY FOUR MONTHS AFTER CRISIS ENDS. IN DECEMBER MINISTER OF INDUSTRY PUBLICLY FAVORED INCREASE TO SIX MONTHS. REQUIREMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE PASSED ON MOSTLY TO CONSUMER THROUGH PRICE INCREASE. BOHLEN
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RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQVDA/AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN
RUCIEUA/COMAC (POLAD)
RUQPNAA/COMIDEASTFOR

PAGE 2 RUQTDN 1286 S E C R E T
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T KUWAIT 1286

1. UK AMBASSADOR ARTHUR CALLED ON AMIR JUNE 8 WITH VERBAL MESSAGE FROM UK FOREIGN MINISTER BROWN WHICH EXPRESSED "UNDERSTANDING" OF GOK POSITION, BUT SOUGHT EXPLANATIONS OF GOK FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH HMG IN ACCORDANCE ARTICLES (B) AND (C) OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES OF 1961 (EXCHANGE DEFINING SPECIAL UK-GOK RELATIONSHIP). BROWN "UNDERSTOOD" WHY GOK HAD TO FOLLOW ARABS IN THEIR HOLY WAR AGAINST ISRAEL. HE ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION OF CUTTING OIL SHIPMENTS TO UK-US TO AVOID SABOTAGE. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND ARAB BELIEF, AFTER DENIAL, THAT UK PLANES ASSISTES ISRAEL AND COULD NOT ABIDE GOK FAILURE TO CONSULT HMG. NEITHER DOES HMG LIKE THE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA ON KUWAIT MEDIA AND THE ONEROUS STRICTURES SUCH AS CLOSING BANKS (BBME) AND TAKING OVER KOC SHIP-TO-SHORE COMMUNICATIONS. (THE LATTER EXAMPLE WAS NOT PRUSUED DURING THE MEETING WITH THE AMIR, BUT WILL BE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SABAH AL AHMED.)

2. AS FRIENDLY OPENER, AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT WELFARE KUWAIT

SECRET

TROOPS. AMIR DIDNOT SEEM TO KNOW. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FATE OF KING HUSSEIN.

PAGE 3 RUQTDN 1286 S E C R E T

3. AMIR EXPRESSED PRIDE IN GOK "CLEVERNESS" IN DEMONSTRATING ITS ARABISM BY PROMPT AND FULL COOPERATION. BY CUTTING OFF OIL SHIPMENTS TO US-UK, SABOTAGE HAD BEEN AVERTED. HE HOPED OIL CUT-OFF WOULD BE TEMPORARY AND HAVE MINIMUM BAD EFFECT ON KUWAIT. (DEPARTMENT SHOULD CHECK WITH UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON FOR MORE SPECIFICS ON THIS PART OF CONVERSATION.) HE ASKED HMG TO UNDER-STAND AND TO BE GLAD KOC FACILITIES WERE PROTECTED. MAXIMUM SECURITY OF INSTALLATIONS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN.

4. AMIR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RADIO AND TV, ESPECALLY THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS, MAY HAVE BEEN TOO HOSTILE. CP-PM JABIR AL AHMED AL JABIR, WHO WAS CALLED IN, WAS MORE ARGUMENTATIVE AND LESS WILLING TO OFFER MODERATION. AMBASSADOR PROBED BY ASKING WHY GOK PERMITTED ITSELF BECOME "SATELLITE" OF UAR, BUT THIS DID NOT ELICIT PROMISE BY JABIR TO TONE DOWN. ARTHUR BELIEVES, HOWEVER, AMIR WILL LOOK INTO IT.

5. AMIR HAD TO CALL IN PM TO ANSWER AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS RE CLOSING OF BANKS AND RELATED ISSUES. DEBIR WILL SEEK SOLUTION TO SHORTAGE OF CURRENCY TO MEET EXPECTED RUN WHEN BANKS REOPEN SATURDAY.

6. JABIR THEN ASKED ARTHUR WHY THERE HAD BEEN AN UNCOMMON DELAY IN TRANSFERRING KC 25 MILLION STERLING FROM UK. I PRESUME THIS REFERS TO AMOUNT VOTED YESTERDAY BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO"HELP ARAB EFFORT," BUT DID NOT PURSUE SUBJECT.

PAGE 4 RUQTDN 1286 S E C R E T

7. AMIR ACKNOWLEDGED CONFIDENCE IN HMG AND DESIRE TO CONSULT. HE ASSURED PROTECTION BRITISH SUBJECTS. EVACUATION WAS NOT DISCUSSED.

8. ARTHUR WILL SEE FOREIGN MINISTER SOON. CANCELLATION OF ARAB MINISTERS' MEETING HAS REDUCED URGENCY.

9. AMBASSADOR ARTHUR AND I AGREED THAT ISHOULD FOLLOW UP WITH AMIR.

GP-1 COLTAM

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/8/67 2:49PM.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of Sta.*

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1967 JUN 8 PM 2 32

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RR RUEHC
DE RUDTCP 10245 1591900
ZNY SSSSS
R 081735Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
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BT
S E C R E T LONDON 10245

LIMDIS

1. COUNSELOR, FINNISH EMBASSY LONDON (WHO ASKED TO BE IDENTIFIED ONLY AS "REPRESENTATIVE OF SMALL NEUTRAL NATION") ASKED TO SEE EMBOFF AFTER LUNCHING WITH UNIDENTIFIED SOVIET COUNSELOR TODAY. SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY "WHETHER HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH AMERICANS" AND THEN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS SOVIET ATTITUDE TO CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUTATION.

2. SOVIET EMBOFF CONVEYED AN ATTITUDE OF UTTER DISGUST WITH ARABS REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO THEIR "IRRESPONSIBILITY." HE SAID TURNING POINT ON SOVIET ATTITUDE (PRESUMABLY AS

PAGE 2 RUDTCP 10245 S E C R E T
DISPLAYED AT UN) HAD COME IN WAKE OF EGYPTIAN CHARGES RE US AND UK AIRCRAFT INVOLVEMENT WITH ISRAELI ATTACK. SOVIETS KNEW THAT THESE CHARGES WERE NOT TRUE AND SUSPECTED THAT THEY WERE MADE PRINCIPALLY FOR PURPOSE OF PRESSURING SOVIETS TO COME TO ARAB ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN AS A WAY TO SAVE ARAB FACE.

3. SOVIET EMBOFF SAID THAT USSR WOULD BE IN DIFFICULT POSITION SINCE ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESSES PUT THEM IN A POSITION TO MAKE EXTENSIVE POLITICAL DEMANDS. SOVIETS EXPECTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HOLD OUT NOT ONLY FOR FREE PASSAGE IN STRAITS OF TIRAN BUT THROUGH SUEZ CANAL ALSO AND DID NOT SEE HOW THESE COULD BE REJECTED. HE FEARED, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WOULD MAKE OTHER TERRITORIAL DEMANDS WHICH WOULD PUT SOVIETS IN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POSITON.

SECRET

4. SOVIET EMBOFF APPARENTLY STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT NEED NOW WAS TO STRIKE FOR AS EXTENSIVE A SETTLEMENT AS POSSIBLE IN MIDEAST AND INDICATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO

COOPERATE WITH US IN THIS. HE WAS FIRM IN STATING THAT INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN US, USSR AND OTHER MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIERS ON AN ARMS LIMITATION OR EMBARGO TO AREA.

5. COMMENT: EMBASSY AGREED TO PASS ON THESE POINTS TO WASH SINCE THEY COULD BE PUT TOGETHER THERE WITH OTHER INDICATORS OF SOVIET ATTITUDES NOT AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY HERE. FINNISH COUNSELOR (PASTINEN) NOT WELL KNOWN TO EMBOFF, WHO KNEW HIM ONLY SLIGHTLY DURING PERIOD COMMON SERVICE AT UN. PASTINEN WOULD NOT IDENTIFY SOVIET OFFICER WITH WHOM HE SPOKE OTHER THAN AS COUNSELOR LEVEL.

KAISR
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48-82

CONFIDENTIAL

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1967 JUN 8 PM 2 25

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Info
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFNCR
DE RUQTBG 2143 1591615
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P R 081600Z JUN 67
GPM
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
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INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN
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RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AF
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
EUR
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IO
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
P
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
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RUEPJS/DIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 2143
NSA
IRAQI SITUATION - ASSESSMENT
ACDA
AID
O
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1. THE IRAQI REGIME ENTERED PRESENT CRISIS RELUCTANTLY. MODERATES WERE IN SADDLE. THEY WERE CARRIED DEEPER AND DEEPER

BY EVENTS. FIRST MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS THEN COMMITMENT TO ACTION. THEN CONCESSIONS TO SOME EXTREMISTS IN NAME NATIONAL UNITY SUCH AS RELEASE NOTORIOUS PLOTTERS. MEASURES ON OIL PROBABLY TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD OWN POSITION BUT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THEY NOW CONSIDER THIS ESSENTIAL WEAPON. ET CETERA.

2. IRAQIS POSITION HARDENING, BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE. REFLECTS DISILLUSION WITH US NOT ONLY ON PART THOSE WHO BELIEVE STORY OUR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT (WHICH VERY CREDIBLE IN IRAQI EYES GIVEN WAY IT DEVELOPED) BUT ALSO ON PART GREAT MAJORITY WHO FEEL OUR CONCERN FOR ISRAEL HAS DOMINATED OUR STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS BOTH INSIDE UNITED NATIONS AND OUT. REFERENCES TO OPPOSING AGGRESSION BY EITHER SIDE WERE EARLY DISMISSED AS BAREST LIP SERVICE TO IMPARTIALITY. THEY NOW CLAIM OUR AVOIDANCE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ISRAEL INITIATED HOSTILITIES AND OUR REFERENCE ISRAELI INTERESTS AQABA GULF WHILE CEASE FIRE IN QUESTION ARE FURTHER PROOF OUR PARTISANSHIP.

3. WHILE OBVIOUSLY OUR INFORMATION RESOURCES HAVE SHARPLY

PAGE 3 RUQTBG 2143 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DECLINED, WE SENSE FROM PRESS AND A FEW OTHER SOURCES THAT AN INTERNAL IRAQI POLITICAL CONFRONTATION MAY BE SHAPING UP BEHIND THE SCENES. SUCH PLOTTERS AS ARIF ABD AL-RAZZAQ AND SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID WERE RELEASED. THE PRESS IS BEGINNING TO CRITICIZE DIFFERENT CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS FOR NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE NATIONAL CAUSE. THE LONG SILENT SHIA DIVINE MUHSIN HAKIM HAS FINALLY SPOKEN OUT TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE (POSSIBLY MOTIVATED BY FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOESN'T). THE CAUTIOUS AND DELIBERATE TECHNIQUES OF MOST OF THE CABINET MEMBERS AND PRESIDENT ARIF PROBABLY CANNOT SATISFY THESE EXTREMISTS AS THE MILITARY SITUATION BECOMES MORE CRITICAL. IF UN EFFORTS FAIL TO CALM SITUATION SOON, A MAJOR BLOW-UP HERE IS A REAL PROSPECT.

4. TODAY IS FIRST IN SOMETIME WITHOUT REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, SOMETIMES FRANTIC, HAVE SO FAR CONTAINED. THIS MAY BE BREATHING SPELL BASED ON TODAY'S NEWSPAPER REPORTS BRITISH AND AMERICAN EMBASSIES CLOSED DOWN AND PERSONNEL DEPARTING WITHIN FIVE DAYS (WE HAVE ONLY NEWSPAPERS WORD ON TIME LIMIT HOWEVER). ALL MEDIA CONTINUE

PAGE 4 RUQTBG 2143 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BLARE REPORTS OF QTE TRIPARTITE AGRESSION END QTE. AMERICAN PROFESSOR CHECKING OUT BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY TODAY TOLD BY GIRL CASHIER HE LUCKY BE LEAVING BECAUSE QTE WE'RE GOING TO KILL ALL OF YOU END QTE. ASKED BY BRITISH AIR ATTACHE ABOUT DISPOSITION OF BRITISH PILOT INSTRUCTORS, IRAQI AIR FORCE CONTACT SAID HE WOULD PREFER SEE THEM HANGING FROM LAMP POSTS. THESE INSTRUCTORS HOPE GO OUT ON BRITISH CONVOY TONIGHT. TWO CAPTURED ISRAELI PILOTS SCHEDULED GO ON IRAQI TELEVISION TONIGHT.

5. FOREGOING HAS SOMEWHAT GRIM RING. I THINK IT ABOUT RIGHT FOR THIS TRADITIONALLY VIOLENT AND DIVIDED COUNTRY WHICH IS ONLY JUST NOW BEGINNING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE TRAUMA OF THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI GAINS. WE THINK MOST IRAQIS CAN STILL ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A COMPROMISE; BUT THE LONGER THE CRISIS CONTINUES, THE WORSE THE IRAQI INTERNAL SITUATION IS LIKELY TO BECOME, BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE FORCES OF MODERATION.

DECLASSIFIED

6. IN THE BROADER AREA CONTEXT AS VIEWED FROM HERE, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO COMPROMISE AREA ISSUES

PAGE 5 RUQTBG 2143 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IN THE BROADER INTEREST OF OURSELVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY HAVE EACH TIME BEEN ACCEPTED TOO LATE OR NOT AT ALL. WE THINK IT IS BECOMING CRITICAL TO CATCH THE NEXT SUCH OPPORTUNITY AND EXPLOIT IT, OR IF NECESSARY TO GENERATE SOME COMPROMISE PROPOSALS. WHILE AS NOTED ABOVE WE THINK IRAQIS CAN STILL THINK IN TERMS OF COMPROMISE, THEY ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER ARABS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO MAKE FATALISTIC SOUNDS OF ACCEPTING THEIR LOSSES AND SETTLING IN FOR A LONG WAR. THEY PRESUMABLY HOPE FOR SOVIET RESUPPLY AND BELIEVE THEY CAN EXPLOIT THE OBVIOUS ARAB STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF GREAT DISTANCES AND DISPERSED POPULATION.
DUNCAN
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUQMBE 11321 1591700
ZNY SSSSS
R 081630Z JUNE 67
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

1967 JUN 8 PM 2 12

37

STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 11321

EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE MILITARY PLANS
1. IN LIGHT OF PRIMIN KARAME'S STATEMENTS TO ME JUNE 8 THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CEASE FIRE AND THAT THE ARABS WERE PREPARED TO FIGHT TO END, GOL MAY NOW FEEL OBLIGATED TO COMMIT ITS FORCES TO SOME SORT OF DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL IN ORDER SHOW ITS ARAB SOLIDARITY AND AVOID CIVIL STRIFE.
2. AS PRESIDENT HELOU INFORMED ME JUNE 6, GOL IS CONTEMPLATING TWO DISTASTEFUL MILITARY OPTIONS:

PAGE 2 RUQMBE 11321 S E C R E T
(A) A LIMITED UNILATERAL LEBANESE INITIATIVE ACROSS BORDER AND (2) A JOINT LEBANESE-SYRIAN OPERATION. GOL STILL WANTS TO AVOID A JOINT MILITARY VENTURE WITH SYRIA ESPECIALLY SINCE SYRIA MILITARY PRESENCE ON LEBANESE TERRITORY WOULD CONSTITUTE A SECURITY THREAT TO PRESENT GOVERNMENT. GOL HOPES THAT IF FORCED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, SUCH ACTION WOULD BE A LIMITED ONE, AND ONE WHICH WOULD BE RECIPROCATED IN KIND BY ISRAELIS. OBVIOUSLY GOL PAINFULLY AWARE THAT LEBANESE ARMY AND AIR FORCE NO MATCH FOR ISRAEL. HOWEVER INTERNAL PRESSURES AS SPECIFIED BY HELOU IN OUR JUNE 6 CONVERSATION MAY FORCE GOL TAKE THIS COURSE OF ACTION WHICH COULD ENTAIL DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES.

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

3. I HESITATE SUGGEST USG COURSE OF ACTION ON THIS QUESTION. HEL OU FULLY AWARE CONSEQUENCES OF LEB MILITARY ACTION, AND, WITH SUPPORT CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP WILL TRY STALL AND HOLD OFF DECISION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. IF

PAGE 3 RUQMBE 11321 S E C R E T
CEASEFIRE COMES SOON, PROBLEM PRESUMABLY DISAPPEARS.
IF NOT ODDS ARE LEB WILL HAVE TO ACT.
WE MAY NOT HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE.
". ON BALANCE, I'M INCLINED RECOMMEND WE NOT
DISCUSS WITH GOI NOW BUT TRY MODERATE ISRAELI
RETALIATION IF SHOOTING STARTS. LEBANESE DON'T
WANT A WAR, AND ISRAEL HAS AS MUCH OF A STAKE AS
WE DO IN KEEPING INTERNAL BALANCE IN LEBANON
FOR POST -WAR STABILITY.
GP-3. MIDDLETON

CONTROL NUMBER 7778 SECRET CORRECTION ISSUED 6/8/67 8:57 PM BLS

-2-TEL AVIV 4015, 081510Z JUNE 67. CORRECTED COPY

PAGE 3 RUGMVL 4015 S E C R E T
ASKED FINALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE WOULD BE IN CARRYING FIGHT INTO SYRIA.

2. TOEROEK THEN MENTIONED THAT SHEK HAD PASSED ON TO HIM FOLLOWING FIVE POINTS WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTED GOI'S PRESENT LINE OF THINKING AS TO BASIS OF SETTLEMENT ISRAEL WOULD TRY ACHIEVE WITH ARABS AS RESULT ITS MILITARY VICTORY:
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF JORDAN ON WEST BANK WHERE, HOPEFULLY, ALL REFUGEES WOULD BE SETTLED WITH SUPPORT OF FUNDS NOW DEVOTED TO UNWRA.
B. REPLACEMENT OF ALL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND RESULTING ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BY PEACE TREATIES.
C. DEMILITARIZATION OF GAZA STRIP AND SINAI BORDER.
D. GUARANTEED FREE ACCESS TO GULF OF AQABA AND SUEZ CANAL WITH ISRAELI TROOPS TO REMAIN IN SHARO EL SHEIK UNTIL GOI SATISFIED ON THIS POINT.
E. NEW STATUS FOR UNIFIED JERUSALEM WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE PEOPLE OF ALL RELIGIOUS ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES AND ISRAELIS ACCESS TO THEIR CAPITAL. (BY SUCH CONCEPT GOI WOULD HOPE AVOID CONFLICT WITH USG COMMITMENT PROTECT TERRITORIAL

PAGE 4 RUGMVL 4015 S E C R E T
INTEGRITY OF M.E. NATIONS.)

3. COMMENT: GERMAN EMBASSY VIEWS MORE OR LESS JIBE WITH BROAD LINES OF AUTHORITATIVE THINKING WHICH HAS COME TO US FROM OTHER SOURCES, EXCEPT FOR (D) ABOVE. IN CASE OF THE STRAITS I DOUBT WHETHER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD EVACUATE SHARM EL SHEIK EVEN IF IT WERE REASONABLY CERTAIN OF CONTINUED ACCESS.
3A. AS TO GERMAN EMBASSY REQUEST FOR OUR VIEWS OF GOI MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN SYRIA, WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO CALM WHAT I BELIEVE IS EXAGGERATED IMPRESSION OF ISRAELI MILITARY AMBITIONS. (WE HAVE IMPRESSION 25 KILOMETERS WILL BE MAXIMUM PENETRATION SYRIA.)

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT 12:50 P.M. 6/8/67

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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OO RUEHC RUEHDT
DE RUDKKR 4753/A 1591600
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O R 0815452 JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHDT/USUN
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUCIEUA/COMAC (POLAD)
STATE GRNC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 4753

1. I SAW PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA FOR AN HOUR THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE EXPRESSED HIS PREOCCUPATION OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN ME AND REGRET AS WELL AS "PERSONAL HUMILIATION" OVER JUNE 5 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST EMBASSY. HE SAID RECENT

PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4753 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CARDIOGRAM SHOWED HE NOT YET FULLY RECOVERED BUT PRESENT SITUATION MADE IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO GET BACK TO WORK.

2. HE SAID NASSER HAD ENTERED INTO A WAR FOR SECOND TIME WITHOUT POSSESSING MEANS TO WIN. FINDING SOLUTION TO ME PROBLEM NOW HAD BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLEX. TUNISIA'S POSITION BASED ON PRINCIPLES NOT ON PROPAGANDA. HE RECALLED HIS PROPOSAL MADE IN 1965 TO SOLVE PALESTINE PROBLEM THROUGH PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TUNISIA HAD NO DESIRE TO DESTROY JEWS OR ISRAEL. DESPITE THE INJUSTICE OF THE PAST, ONE COULD NOT FIGHT THIS INJUSTICE BY CREATING STILL ANOTHER. WHEN HE HAD SPOKEN TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN 1965 HE HAD TOLD THEM EMOTION OVER PALESTINE ISSUE NOT ENOUGH, WHAT THEY NEEDED WERE LEADERS WHO COULD FIND REALISTIC SOLUTIONS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES BY STAGES USING 1948 UN RESOLUTION AS A START.

3. DESPITE HIS WELL KNOWN POLICIES AND CONTINUED STRONG FEELINGS OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD U.S., TUNISIA HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH ARAB CAUSE. THIS MADE NECESSARY BY CONTINUED PROPAGANDA BLAST FROM RADIO CAIRO AND ALGIERS.

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PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4753 C O N F I D E N T I A L
NOTED RADIO ALGIERS AT VERY MOMENT URGING TUNISIAN POPULATION TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND ATTACKING EXISTING BASES IN LIBYA. DESPITE ATTENTION AND AID U.S. HAD GIVEN ALGERIA IN PAST, U.S. HAD BECOME ITS ENEMY NUMBER ONE. TUNISIA RESISTING THIS PRESSURE. TUNISIA WOULD NOT BREAK RELATIONS WITH U.S..

4.,WHILE TUNISIA HAD FELT IT HAD TO MANIFEST ITS SOLIDARITY WITH ARAB CAUSE AND HAD FORMED SYMBOLIC CONTINGENT IT HAD NOT SENT A SINGLE SOLDIER. HE HAD SENT MOKKADEM TO MAKE RECONNAISSANCE (TUNIS 4737) " TO SEE HOW TROOPS MIGHT BE UTILIZED." IN REALITY " THIS WAS EFFORT TO GAIN SOME TIME." IF CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN AREA ENDS SOON NOT A SINGLE TUNISIAN SOLDIER WILL BE SENT. WHILE TUNISIA WISHED TO AID ITS ARAB BRETHERN, THERE WAS A LIMIT. IT WAS NOT GOING TO COMMIT SUICIDE BY TAKING ADVENTURES WHICH ACHIEVE NO RESULTS.

5, BOURGUIBA HOPED U.S. WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT TUNISIA IS A COUNTRY IT CAN COUNT UPON. HE HAD SEEN HOW HUSSEIN HAD THROWN HIMSELF AT FEET OF NASSER. HE WOULD NEVER DO THIS. TUNISIA

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4753 C O N FI D E N T I A L
COULD NEVER FORGET THE AID OF U.S. IN ITS BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AT TIME WHEN FRANCE CUT OFF ALL ITS ECONOMIC AID. PRESIDENT ADDED HE DID NOT PUT ANY CREDENCE IN REPORTS U.S. HAD HELPED ISRAEL IN PRESENT CONFLICT. BEST PROOF WAS THAT EVEN SOVIETS AND FRENCH DID NOT BELIEVE IT AND SOVIETS HAD SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHO WERE CLOSELY WATCHING MOVEMENTS OF SIXTH FLEET.

6. PRESIDENT HOPED THAT TUNISIA, DESPITE ITS SMALL SIZE, WOULD GAIN A LITTLE MORE ATTENTION IN DECISION-MAKING OF STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON AND WHITE HOUSE. THIS NECESSARY TO GIVE IT GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY. TO HAVE A FRIENDLY AND SERIOUS MINDED COUNTRY IN THE THIRD WORLD SHOULD BE AN ADVANTAGE TO U.S. AND CITED TUNISIAN SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM. TUNISIA WOULD NOT BE SUBMERGED BY THE "HATE AMERICA CAMPAIGN." SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS HATE. THEIR POLICY NOT SO MUCH TO TRY TO MAKE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES COMMUNISTS AS TO TURN THIS HATE AGAINST U.S. TO WEAKEN OUR INFLUENCE IN ARAB WORLD.

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4753 C O N F I D E N T I A L

7., PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES APPARENTLY NOT ACCEPTING UN CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. THIS CONTINUED REFUSAL WOULD BE "ACT OF FOLLY." HOWEVER, IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT ISRAELIS REALIZE ARAB FEELINGS, IF SETTLEMENT IS A HUMILIATING ONE, WILL HAVE A LASTING EFFECT. HE SAID MANY ARABS EMOTIONALLY AFFECTED BY ISRAELI TAKEOVER OF HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM. HE HOPED U.S. WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO OBLIGE ISRAEL TO MAKE VIABLE SETTLEMENT. MODUS VIVENDI HAD TO BE FOUND WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR COEXISTENCE OF THREE RELIGIONS, PARTICULARLY IN JERUSALEM. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NEW FRUSTRATIONS AND REPETITION OF PRESENT CONFLICT WITHIN FEW YEARS. IF THIS OCCURRED, ARAB PEOPLE WOULD DEVELOP SO MUCH EMOTIONAL HATE WEST COULD NEVER EXERCISE ANY INFLUENCE. IF ARABS COULD THEN NOT FIND SATISFACTION WITH RUSSIANS THEY MIGHT TURN TO CHICOMS TOMORROW OR SOME OTHER RABID ELEMENTS. THIS HATE MADE THE ARABS VULNERABLE AND ACCESSIBLE TO ALL KINDS OF PROPAGANDA AND WOULD MAKE TUNISIA'S POSITION OF MODERATION MORE DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS " A FALSE PEACE." ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD LOOK FOR NEW SCAPE-GOATS TO EXPLAIN THEIR DEFEAT.

PAGE 6 RUDKKR 4753 C O N F I D E N T I A L

8. PRESIDENT SAID WHAT HE HAD EXPRESSED NOT NEW TO U.S. BUT HE WANTED ME TO REMIND WASHINGTON OF HIS VIEWS.

9., I TOLD PRESIDENT OF HIGH LEVEL COMMISSION THAT HAD BEEN CREATED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO FIND NEW ME INITIATIVES WHICH MIGHT ACHIEVE LASTING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS IN THAT AREA. I SAID WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO ADVANCE.
GP-3. RUSSELL
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 1:54 PM 6/8/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, CINCSTRIKE
AT 2:35 PM 6/8/67

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL

Action AF Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC INR ACDA AID PC

VZCZCDKA 72
OO RUEHC
DE RUDKBT 5431 1591715
ZNY CCCCC
O R 081649Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFOSVUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
ZEN/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
ZEN/AMCONSUL TANGIER
STATE GRNC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 5431

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1. ON JUNE 7, AFP TICKER CARRIED STORY DATELINED ALGIERS THAT RADIO ALGIERS HAD BROADCAST APPEAL IN ARABIC TO LIBYAN AND MOROCCAN PEOPLE TO DESTROY AMERICAN BASES PLANTED ON THEIR TERRITORY, NOTABLY THOSE OF NOUASSEUR AND KENITRA IN MOROCCO. "SHAME ON YOU," BROADCAST SAID, "WHO STILL HAVE ON YOUR TERRITORY AMERICAN BASES FROM WHICH DEPART THE AIRCRAFT THAT BOMB AND KILL YOUR BROTHERS."

RSR

2. RTM COMMENTATOR REPLIED TO ALGERIAN ATTACK SAME EVENING SAYING "MOROCCO REJECTS THE VENEMOUS INSINUATIONS OF RADIO ALGIERS AND PROTESTS AGAINST ALGERIAN INTERFERENCE IN MOROCCAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS." COMMENTATOR SAID, "FOREIGN BASES NO LONGER EXIST IN MOROCCO. RADIO ALGIERS HAS CHOSEN A BAD TIME TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION, A TIME WHEN ALL RANKS SHOULD BE UNIFIED TO FIGHT THE COMMON ENEMY OF THE ARAB NATION." BY INDIRECTION, RTM REFERRED TO CONTINUED FRENCH BASES ON ALGERIAN SOIL.

., COMMENT:

A) ALGERIAN ATTACK SHOWS THAT WITH ISRAELI VICTORY ON THE BATTLEFIELD NOW NEARLY TOTAL, AND RELUCTANCE OF SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY EVIDENT, "PROGRESSIVE" ARAB STATES NOW MORE LIKELY THAN EVER TO LASH OUT, NOT ONLY AT MODERATE NEIGHBORS AND US/UK, BUT EVEN AT USSR. (IN LATTER REGARD, MAP JUNE 7 CARRIED (1) REPORT FROM "INFORMED SOURCE" IN

ALGIERS THAT BOUMEDIENNE WROTE LETTER TO KOSSYGIN CRITICIZING USSR FOR SUPPORTING UN CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION AND (2) REPORT FROM PARIS THAT ALGERIAN "PARTI DE LA

PAGE RUDKBT 5431 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REVOLUTION SOCIALISTE" CRITICIZED SOME ARAB STATES FOR RELYING ON SOVIET UNION WHICH "ONLY WISHES USE ARABS AS PAWNS IN GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH US IMPERIALISM.") WHILE WE DO NOT RULE OUT UAR/ALGERIAN COLLUSION, ALGERIANS IN OUR VIEW, QUITE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING SUCH ATTACK ON THEIR OWN.

B) GOM OBVIOUSLY ANGERED BY ALGERIAN RADIO ATTACK WHICH CLEARLY AN APPEAL TO PEOPLE OVER KING'S HEAD AND INCITEMENT AGAINST HIM, AND RTM REPLY REPORTEDLY ORDERED AND PERHAPS PREPARED BY KING HIMSELF. ALGERIAN ACCUSATION SHOWS FRAGILITY OF "ARAB UNITY" AND WILL HELP KING TO EXPLAIN BOTH TO POLITICAL LEADERS AND PEOPLE WHY MOROCCO CANNOT COMMIT ITSELF COMPLETELY TO LEADERSHIP BY NASSER AND HIS FRIENDS, EVEN IN CAUSE OF PALESTINE. TASCA

PASSED 6/8/67; 1:55 PM TO S/S-O.
PASSED WHITEHOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, USUN 6/8/67; 2:28 PM.

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JOINT EMBASSY/ USIS MESSAGE.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF USIS NOTES OF THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE MOSHE DAYAN IN A NEWS CONFERENCE ON THE EVENING JUNE 7. THE GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE FAILED TO ISSUE THE USUAL TRANSCRIPT CITING VAGUELY "MISTAKES." DAYAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS FIGHTING FOR A FREE PASSAGE TO EILAT, NOT REPEAT NOT FOR A RIGHT TO USE THE SUEZ CANAL. HE SAID THE IDF HAS PAUSED BEFORE SUEZ, GIVING THE IMPRESSION TO CORRESPONDENTS THAT ITS PRESENT POSITION WAS AS FAR AS IT INTENDED TO GO.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION WHETHER ISRAEL WANTED TO HAVE A FREE ACCESS TO THE OTHER SIDE OF JERUSALEM, DAYAN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD RETURNED TO JERUSALEM "NEVER TO BE PARTED FROM THE HOLY PLACES."

HE SAID THAT THE "POLITICAL OBJECTIVE" OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH WAS "JUST TO SECURE FREE PASSAGE TO EILAT."

HE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD A CONFLICT WITH JORDAN, SYRIA AND IRAQ ONLY BECAUSE THEY ATTACKED. HAD THEY NOT, THE CONFLICT WOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO THAT WITH EGYPT. "WE HAVE ACHIEVED OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES," DAYAN SAID.
THE GOI PRESS OFFICE FINALLY ISSUED ONLY THE VERBATIM TRANSLATION FROM HEBREW OF DAYAN'S OPENING STATEMENT
(TRANSMITTED THIS DATE USINFO CHANNEL. OMITTING ABOVE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERES. BARBOUR
BT

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EXDIS

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NOFORN

1. GERMAN COUNSELOR TOEROEK AT HIS INITIATIVE PASSED ON TO DCM JUNE 8 VIEWS HE AND AMBASSADOR PAULS HAD OBTAINED FROM SOVIET AMBASSADOR TCHOUVAKHINE, CERTAIN UNNAMED ISRAELI STAFF OFFICERS AND ZEEV SHEK, DIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT IN FOMIN, AS TO ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN CURRENT WAR WITH ARABS. FOREMOST IN TOEROEK'S MIND WAS PAULS' CONVERSATION WITH TCHOUVAKHINE ON JUNE 6 IN WHICH LATTER IN UNUSUALLY SERIOUS VEIN STATED SOVIETS HAD FIRST WARNED

PAGE 2 RUQMPC 4015 S E C R E T
ISRAELIS AGAINST AGGRESSION AFTER NASSER'S MOVE INTO SINAI AND STRAITS AND THEN AFTER AGGRESSION HAD OCCURRED IN CONTEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOULTIONS TO CEASE THEIR ATTACK FORTHWITH. IF NOW ISRAELIS BECOME QUOTE DRUNK WIH SUCCESS UNQUOTE AND PURSUE THEIR AGGRESSION FURTHER QUOTE FUTURE OF THIS LITTLE COUNTRY WILL BE A VERY SAD ONE UNQUOTE. ACCRDING TOEROEK, GERMANS INTERPRET THIS THREAT TO MEAN THAT USSR MIGHT TAKE MORE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL IF IDF NOW PROCEEDS COMPLETELY DESTROY SYRIAN ARMED FORCES CAUSING SOVIET SUPPORTED REGIME THERE TO FALL. TOEROEK REPORTED FURTHER THAT IDF CONNECTIONS HAVE NOW TOLD THEM ISRAELIS MAY WELL ADVANCE ALL WAY TO DAMASCUS WITH OBJECT OF DESTROYING SYRIA'S MILITARY FORCES. THEREFORE, PAULS, WHO HAS BEEN IN FREQUENT TOUCH WITH SHEK ALL THROUGH CRISIS, PLANS SEE HIM AGAIN TONIGHT IN ORDER TO WARN GOI AGAINST CARRYING WAR AGAINST SYRIA BEYOND SEIZING HIGH GROUND ADJACENT TO ISRAELI BORDER. TOEROEK STATED THAT SHEK HAD ALREADY INTIMATED GOI PREPARED FOR SOVIET MOVE TO BREAK RELATIONS BUT PAULS WILL TRY IMPRESS UPON HIM THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL EXTEND BEYOND THIS STEP. TOEROEK

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 4015 S E C R E T
ASKED FINALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE WOULD BE IN CARRYING FIGHT INTO SYRIA.

2. TOEROEK THEN MENTIONED THAT SHEK HAD PASSED ON TO HIM FOLLOWING FIVE POINTS WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTED GOI'S PRESENT LINE OF THINKING AS TO BASIS OF SETTLEMENT ISRAEL WOULD TRY ACHIEVE WITH ARABS AS RESULT ITS MILITARY VICTORY:
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTONOMOUS OWKWNCE*OF JORDAN ON WEST BAOMEGCXTRE,*HOPEFULLY, ALL REFUGEES WOULD BE SETTLED WITH SUPPORT OF FUNDS NOW DEVOTED TO UNWRA.
B. REPLACEMENT OF ALL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND RESULTING ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BY PEACE TREATIES.
C. DEMILITARIZATION OF GAZA STRIP AND SINAI BORDER.
D. GUARANTEED FREE ACCESS TO GULF OF AQABA AND SUEZ CANAL WITH ISRAELI TROOPS TO REMAIN IN SHARO EL SHEIK UNTIL GOI SATISFIED ON THIS POINT.
E. NEW STATUS FOR UNIFIED JERUSALEM WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE PEOPLE OF ALL RELIGIOUS ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES AND ISRAEL IS ACCESS TO THEIR CAPITAL. (BY SUCH CONCEPT GOI WOULD HOPE AVOID CONFLICT WITH ULEAN... ITMENT*PROTECT TERRITORIAL

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 4015 S E C R E T
INTEGRITY OF M.E. NATIONS.)

3. COMMENT: GERMAN EMBASSY VIEWS MORE OR LESS JIBE WITH BROAD LINES OF AUTHORITATIVE THINKING WHICH HAS COME TO US FROM OTHER SOURCES, EXCEPT FOR (D) ABOVE. IN CASE OF THE STRAITS I DOUBT WHETHER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD EVACUATE SHARM EL SHEIK EVEN IF IT WERE REASONABLY CERTAIN OF CONTINUED ACCESS.
3A. AS TO GERMAN EMBASSY REQUEST FOR OUR VIEWS OF GOI MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN SYRIA, WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO CALM WHAT I BELIEVE IS EXAGGERATED IMPRESSION OF ISRAELI MILITARY AMBITIONS. (WE HAVE IMPRESSION 25 KILOMETERS WILL BE MAXIMUM PENETRATION SYRIA.)

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

*AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT 12:50 P.M. 6/8/67

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EXDIS

REF: CONF. 0825

ATTACK BY ISRAELI NAVAL AND AIR UNITS ON AN ALLEGED US FLAG VESSEL REPORTED BY REFTEL. ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY SHOCKED BY ERROR AND TENDER SINCERE APOLOGIES. INVESTIGATION NOW UNDER WAY TO OBTAIN MORE INFO ABOUT VESSEL. ISRAELIS DO NOT INTEND GIVE ANY PUBLICITY TO INCIDENT. URGE STRONGLY THAT WE TOO AVOID PUBLICITY. IF IT IS US FLAG VESSEL ITS PROXIMITY TO SCENE CONFLICT COULD FEED ARAB SUSPICIONS OF US-ISRAEL COLLUSION.

GP-3. BARBOUR
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NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/8/67 1:35 PM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6/8/67 1:50 PM

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EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HARRIMAN.

(SAIGON EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER)

AT HIS REQUEST, I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER HARMEL TODAY JUNE 8. MOST OF THE ONE HOUR AND THREE-QUARTER'S TALK WAS SPENT ON MIDDLE EAST, NATO AND SOVIET UNION, AS THEY RELATED TO FUTURE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

HE LOOKS FORWARD TO NATO MINISTERS MEETING NEXT WEEK. HE ASSUMES

PAGE 2 RUFHBS 6578 S E C R E T
DISCUSSION THERE WILL BE DIRECTED LARGELY TO MANNER IN WHICH MAXIMUM LONG-RANGE SECURITY CAN BE ACHIEVED. HE BELIEVES SETTLEMENT SHOULD GIVE ASSURANCE AGAINST POSSIBLE RECURRENCE ARAB HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. NASSER MUST BE SB DISCREDITED THAT HE CANNOT CREATE ANOTHER CRISIS. HE POINTED OUT SOVIETS HAD BEEN AT FIRST VOCALLY BELLIGERENT IN SUPPORT OF ARABS, BUT THEN BY VOTE IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION RAN FOR COVER. HE HOPES THIS INDICATED SOVIET READINESS TO STABILIZE SITUATION. I AGREED, BUT ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO ABANDON THEIR OBJECTIVE TO EXPAND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY STEPPED UP THEIR VERBAL ATTACK ON SIXTH FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN.

HE THOUGHT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING! AND REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER FOR A SETTLEMENT OF UNDERLYING ISSUES, USING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE UNITED NAIONS PRESENCE AND FACILITIES.

HE FURTHERMORE HOPED THAT IF SOVIETS COULD AGREE TO MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD FACILITATE THEIR COOPERATION WITH US IN

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PAGE 3 RUFHBS 6578 S E C R E T
OBTAINING VIETNAM SETTLEMENT. I AGREED BUT POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN HANOI WAS LIMITED, AND THAT PEKING WOULD OPPOSE.

HE EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS TALK WITH PETERS, HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE LATTER HAD INDICATED THAT SOVIET BLOC WANTED A NEUTRALIZED INDOCHINA! BUT PETERS STATED THAT COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RECOGNIZED THAT CONTINUED US PRESENCE IN THAILAND WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSURE STABILITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS WERE AGREED TO BY MAJOR POWERS.

HARMEL OUTLINED HIS LONG TALK WITH SVN FOREIGN MINISTER DO, IC WHICH DO HAD FRANKLY INDICATED EVENTUAL SOLUTION LAY IN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND LIBERATION FRONT FOR COALITION. HOWEVER, DO STATED THAT NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS IN SVN WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY STRONG AND UNITED TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

FURTHER DETAILS OF MY TALK WITH HARMEL, INCLUDING THE CONGO, WILL BE COVERED BY MEMCON WHICH I AM BRINGING HOME WITH ME.

GP-1. MJNFULL

ADVANCED COPY PASSED WHITE HOUSE SS/O 6/8/67

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REF: STATE CIRCULAR 208550

1. EVENING JUNE 7 I CONVEYED TO DEPUTY FONMIN NASZKOWSKI CATEGORIAL DENIAL U.S. AIRCRAFT ASSISTED IN ISRAELI ATTACKS. IN VIEW POLISH PRESS DISTORTIONS AND ECHO OF UAR LINE, I ALSO CALLED ATTENTION POLISH MEDIA MISREPRESENTATIONS ME SITUATION (WARSAW 2954, 2934). NASZKOWSKI REPLIED ALONG WELL-KNOWN PRO-UAR LINE. MEMCON POUCHED TODAY.

2., AFTER NASZKOWSKI MEETING EMB PRESS ATTACHE READ BRIEF STATEMENT (TEL EDITED) TO WESTERN PRESS AGENCIES AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON DEPTY FONMIN NASZKOWSKI JUNE 7 TO MAKE CLEAR TO GOP THAT, CONTRARY TO CHARGES BY UAR AND SOME OF IT ALLIES IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT,

THERE HAS BEEN NO INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. PLANES, CHIPS OR PERSONNEL IN M.E. FIGHTING.

QUOTE HE USED OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS, EXPECIALLY DURING PERIOD OF GRAVE CRISIS, THAT POSITIONS ALL COUNTRIES BE ACCURATELY REPORTED AND UNDERSTOOD. QUOTE HE RESTATED DEEP INTEREST AND IMPARTIAL RECORD OF U.S. EFFORTS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY TO MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE.

EXEMPT. GRONOUSKI
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 8699

REF: STATE'S 209179

1. WE HAVE DECIDED MAKE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS:
A. WE WILL RETAIN SIX PERSONS CAIRO-PARKER, BROMELL, HANSEL, WEITZEL, GRAHAM AND HYDE. THIS WILL GIVE US MINIMUM STAFF WHICH CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH UARG, DO SOME HOUSEKEEPING AND WORK WITH SPANISH EMBASSY.
B. WE WILL EVACUATE ALL OTHER OFFICIAL AMERICANS, INCLUDING NAMRU-3, AND UNOFFICIALS WHO WISH DEPART BY KARENA FROM ALEXANDRIA JUNE 10. FONMIN IS ARRANGING TWO SPECIAL TRAINS TO DEPART CAIRO FOR ALEXANDRIA AT 0810 AND 0910, JUNE 10. WE WILL ATTEMPT HAVE TRAIN GO STRAIGHT TO HARBOR AREA RATHER THAN STOPPING

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8699B C O N F I D E N T I A L
AT MAIN STATION. AMERICAN CITIZENS BEING INFORMED THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

2. WE WILL GO OFF THE AIR AND CLOSE ALL BUILDINGS ON COMPOUND AFTERNOON JUNE 9 AND TELL LOCAL EMPLOYEES STAY HOME FOR ENSUING WEEK. SIX AMERICANS WHO REMAINING WILL BE DISPERSED IN NON-USG APARTMENTS AROUND CAIRO. WE WILL LEAVE USG RESIDENCE PROPERTIES IN CARE OF SERVANTS. SIX AMERICANS WILL WAIT FOR WEEK TO SEE HOW SITUATION DEVELOPS AND WILL NOT ATTEMPT OPERATE EMBASSY COMMUNICATION FACILITIES OR HAVE OFFICE HOURS. AT END OF WEEK WE WILL ATTEMPT RESUME OPERATIONS ON LIMITED SCALE CONDITIONS PERMIT. IN MEANTIME, COMMO

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MUST BE THRU SPANISH OR CANADIAN EMBASSIES OR COMMERCIAL FACILITIES.

3. PARKER AND BROMELL WILL OCCUPY QUINLAN APARTMENT IN SHAMS BUILDING, 1103 CORNICHE AN-NIL, TELEPHONE NO. 35827. THIS APARTMENT SCANT TWO BLOCKS FROM EMBASSY AND WILL PROVIDE CONVENIENT POINT FOR OBSERVING EMBASSY.

4. WE PLAN KEEP ALL LOCAL EMPLOYEES ON PAYROLL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SITUATION CLARIFIES ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

5. SUGGEST DEPT PERMIT UAR EMBASSY KEEP UP TO 14 PERSONNEL AS UAR HAS AUTHORIZED US TO DO, SO THAT ON BASIS RECIPROCITY EMB

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 8699B C O N F I D E N T I A L
WILL NOT BE HELD TO PROPOSED SIX BUT WILL BE ABLE ENLARGE IF CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.

6. FRITZLAN WILL REMAIN ALONE IN ALEXANDRIA.

7. REQUEST DEPT INFORM PARKER'S WIFE WHO DUE ARRIVE NEW YORK ON CONSTITUTION JUNE 10 OF ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS. REQUEST ATHENS INFORM DEPENDENTS BROMELL, WEITZEL, HANSEL, BRAHAN.

8. IF ABOVE PLAN GOES ACCORDING SCHEDULE THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR 6TH FLEET SEA LIFT. NOLTE
ST

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/8/67 10:55 AM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, CINCSTRIKE, USUN 6/8/67 11:10 AM

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1967 JUN 8 AM 9 59

1. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (PRIME MINISTER KARAME) SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING AND INFORMED ME GOL HAD DECIDED ASK RECALL AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN PROTEST OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICIES AND SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. DEPARTURE WITHIN

PAGE 2 RUQMBE 11313 S E C R E T
THREE DAYS. KARAME SAID IMPOSSIBLE LEBANON NOT TAKE SOME ACT OF CONDEMNATION. LEBANON HOWEVER WISHED CONTINUE RELATIONS WITH US AND CURRENT ACTION DESIGNED MAINTAIN SUCH RELATIONS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

2. KARAME WAS PERSONALLY GRACIOUS AND MADE CLEAR LEBANON REGRETTED MY DEPARTURE AS PERSON BUT HAD NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE WAY EXPRESS ITS DISAGREEMENT AND CONDEMNATION US SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HE HOPED I COULD SOME DAY RETURN.

3. I EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT THERE NO RUPTURE IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH I THOUGHT EXTRMELEY IMPORTANT TO BOTH COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT KEEp LEBANON AS WINDOW TO ARAB WORLD THROUGH WHICH I HOPED USG COULD CONTINUE COMMUNICATE TO REST OF ARABS WHERE RELATIONS NOW BROKEN. I OF COURSE EXPRESSED DEEPEST REGRET AND CONCERN THAT CURRENT ANTI-US WAVE BASED ON FALSE CHARGES OF US

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PAGE 3 RUQMBE 11313 S E C R E T
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CURRENT FIGHTING. DESPITE
MY MOST FERVANT DENIALS, HOWEVER, IT APPARENT KARAME
PREPARED BELIEVE WORST. FACTS ARE NOT IM-
PORTANT, HE SAID. ALL ARABS BELIEVE ISRAEL
EXISTS ONLY THROUGH SUPPORT US AND ANY CHARGES OF US
MILITARY ACTION ON BEHALF ISRAEL SIMPLY LOGICAL EXTENSION
OF TOTAL US SUPPORT FOR COUNTRY.

4. I MENTIONED JORDAN'S DENIAL OF US INTERVENTION
AND WENT INTO GREAT DETAIL ON CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING
FAULTY RADAR SIGHTINGS. KARAME SAID ARABS WOULD NOT
ACCEPT JORDANS DENIAL. ASSUMPTION WOULD BE THAT
JORDAN TRYING PRESERVE HER EXISTENCE BY CURRYING US FAVOR.

5. WE HAD CONVERSATION ON PALESTINE PROBLEM ALONG SIMILAR VEIN AS
REPORTED BY ME A WEEK AGO (OUR REFERENCE FILES
DESTROYED). US MUST UNDERSTAND, SAID KARAME, THAT
ISRAEL VICTORY OF MOMENT ONLY BUTTRESSED ARAB
IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY AND DESIRE CARRY ON FIGHT. I

PAGE 4 RUQMBE 11313 S E C R E T
URGED HIM TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SUPPORT CEASE
FIRE EFFORTS BEFORE SITUATION GOT WORSE. THIS WOULD GIVE UN AND
GREAT POWERS CHANCE WORK TOWARD TROOP
WITHDRAWAL TO FORMER BOUNDARIES. KARAME IN MOST EMPHATIC
WAY SAID THERE NO CHANCE OF CEASE FIRE. THIS
FIGHT WILL CONTINUE. WHOLE ARAB WORLD IS INVOLVED AND
ALL ARAB ASSETS WILL BE USED -- ABOVE ALL WEIGHT
OF NUMBERS OF PEOPLE. THIS, I SAID, SEEMED TO HAVE
NOTHING BUT CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES. THERE NO
CHANCE WORK TOWARD PEACEFUL SOLUTION PALESTINE PROBLEM
SO LONG AS FIGHTING CONTINUED. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION
ALREADY SO SERIOUS FROM ARAB POINT OF VIEW THAT
THEY SIMPLY THROWING BACK THEIR CAUSE BY DECADES.
KARAME NONETHELESS CONVINCED CEASE FIRE WOULD NOT OCCUR.
WHETHER IT VISCERAL REACTION OR BASED ON HARD FACTS, I CANNOT SAY.

6. KARAME PLEADED WITH ME TO EXPLAIN CURRENT ARAB
STATE OF MIND IN WASHINGTON. WE SHOULD NOT BE DELUDED
BY ISRAEL VICTORIES. NOTHING IS SETTLED - THE PROBLEM IS ONLY
WORSE. AS HE HAD SAID MANY TIMES BEFORE, ONLY A

PAGE 5 RUQMBE 11313 S E C R E T
PERMANENT SOLUTION TO PALESTINE WILL BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THE MEANTIME US, SO LONG AS ITS POLICY REFLECTS CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, WILL CONTINUE SUFFER GREATLY IN TERMS PRESTIGE, INFLUENCE AND ACCESS TO ARAB OIL. ARABS HAD NO CHOICE AND NORMAL CONSIDERATIONS ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST OR MILITARY DEFEAT WOULD NOT DETER THEM. AT CONVERSATIONS END, KARAME SAID HE HAD HEARD OFFICIAL US COMMENTS THAT USG BEGINNING UNDERSTAND ARAB POINT OF VIEW. HE PRAYED THIS WAS SO AND URGED US TAKE PUBLIC POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHICH COULD BE TRANLATED BY ARABS AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN ALL-OUT SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, E. G. DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL BEHIND BORDERS.

7. BRITISH AMBASSADOR RICHES FOLLOWED ME AND RECEIVED SAME NEWS RE HIS RECALL. I PLAN DEPART VIA ATHENS ON FIRST AVAILABLE AIR TRANSPORT. MIDDLETON WILL BE IN CHARGE.

I THINK IT QUITE CLEAR LEBANON WILL NOT REVISE DECISION IN NEAR FUTURE AND WILL THEREFORE AWAIT DEPT INSTRUCTIONS IN ATHENS AS TO MY NEXT MOVE.
PORTER

PASSED S/S-O 6/8/67; 10:02 AM.
PASSED WHITEHOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, CINCSTRIKE 6/8/67; 10:15 AM.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

50-42

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFPBK/EUCOM
RUDLHA/SHAPE
STATE GRNC
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C O NF I D E N T I A L PARIS 19967

007644

1967 JUN 8 AM 9 38

SHAPE FOR POLAD

ALGERIAN MIGS TO UAR

PARIS 19933

1. AFP REPORTS FROM ALGIERS JUNE 7THAT "NEW CONTINGENT OF ALGERIANS MIGS" BEING SENT TO UAR AIRFIELD TODAY.

2. QUAI'S ALGERIAN AFFAIRS CHIEF TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 7 THAT (A) ALGERIANS WERESTILL RESISTING DECISION SEND FIRST CONTINGENT

MIGS AFTERNOON JUNE 6; (B) FIRST CONTINGENT MAY HAVE LEFT SINCE THEN (COMPAR REFTEL) AS ALGERIANS HAD BEEN UNDER STRONG SOVIET PRESSURE GET PLANES TO EGYPT; (C) 48 MIGS WHICH ALGERIANS THINKING OF SENDING YESTERDAY REPRESENT ABOUT HALF ALGERIAS TOTAL MIG INVENTORY AND OTHER HALF MAY NOT BE TOTALLY OPERATIONAL; (D) UN SECURITY COUNCIL CEASE FIRE DECISION COULD CHANGE ATTITUDE SOVIETS AND ALGERIANS.

3. QUAI'S UAR DESKOFF TOLD EMBOFF ALGERIANS ONLY "CONVOYING" MIGS TO UAR BY ALGERIAN PILOTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT FLY THEM IN COMBAT.

4. PROTECT SOURCE.
GP-3
BOHLEN

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

37

Action SS

Info

RR RUEHC RUEHDT
DE RUDTCR 10232 1591315
ZNY SSSSS
R 081230Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/US MISSION USUN
RUFHGV/US MISSION GENEVA
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T LONDON 10232

007636
1967 JUN 8 AM 9 20

EXDIS

FOR ROSTOW AND DENNEY FROM SIEVERTS

REFS: GENEVA 4069 AND 4091, STATE 204906

SUBJECT: POISON GAS IN YEMEN

1. HAD USEFUL DISCUSSION JUNE 7 WITH UK GAS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS, CONCENGRATING ON ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF MAKING DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 10232 S E C R E T
AVAILABLE TO ICRC. GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT LITTLE OR NOTHING ALONG THIS LINE OUGHT TO BE DONE AT PRESENT, FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: A) TESTS TO VERIFY GAS USE MORE THAN A FEW HOURS AFTER AN ATTACK ARE NOT EASY AND IN SOME CASES REQUIRE SOPHISTICATED LABORATORY PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DUPLICATE UNDER PRIMITIVE DESERT CONDITIONS.

B) ICRC DOES NOT WANT TO USE EQUIPMENT OBVIOUSLY RELATED TO GAS, SUCH AS GAS MASKS, SINCE THIS MIGHT CAUSE MASS PANIC AMONG LOCAL POPULATION. ALSO AGAINST RED CROSS TRADITIONS TO PROTECT SELVES BY MEANS NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHERS. IN ADDITION, ICRC MIDEAST EXPERTS CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT LOCAL POPULATION WOULD ATTACK ICRC TO GET GAS MASKS FOR THEMSELVES.

C) FOR TIME BEING ICRC DELEGATION UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO INVESTIGATE GAS ATTACKS. D) FROM ALL INDICATIONS ICRC DELEGATES REPORT SENT TO FOUR PARTIES BASED ON EXAMINATION OF CORPSE AND SURVIVORS IS COMPELLING DOCUMENT WHICH INESCAPABLY POINTS TO USE OF TOXIC GAS. WHILE WOULD OF COURSE BE DESIRABLE HAVE EXPLICIT EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC TOXIC AGENT, FROM POINT OF

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PAGE 3 RUDTCR 10232 S E C R E T
VIEW OF POLEMICS CASE BASED ON GROSS MEDICAL FINDINGS BY IMPARTIAL BODY LIKE ICRC, SUPPORTED BY RESPECTED SWISS FORENSIC LAB, IS COMPELLING AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, INCONCLUSIVE TESTS WHICH MIGHT FAIL TO PROVIDE SOLID PROOF OF TOXIC GAS WOULD BE WORSE THAN USELESS.

2. ABOVE REASONS MIGHT NOT BE OVERRIDING IF ICRC IN FACT WANTED TO GET INTO BUSINESS OF EXPOSING GAS USE, WHICH FOR PRESENT AT LEAST THEY PLAINLY RELUCTANT TO DO. HAVING VENTURED BRAVELY INTO THE SUBJECT WITH THEIR PUBLIC RELEASE AND REPORT TO FOUR PARTIES, THEY NOW PREFER TO WAIT FOR THE FUMES TO SETTLE. FOR PRESENT, THEY FULLY OCCUPIED WITH MIDEAST CRISIS, AND ARE DEVOTING FULL ENERGIES TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY DO NOT EXPECT REPLIES FROM PARTIES UNTIL NEW STATUS QUO EMERGES, IF THEN. FINALLY, THEY DEEPLY SENSITIVE ABOUT ANYTHING THAT COULD ADVERSLY REFLECT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY, SO WILL BEHOOVE US TO TREAD WITH UTMOST CIRCUMSPECTION IN MAKING SUGGESTIONS OR OFFERING ASSISTANCE, TO AVOID GIVING ANY PLAUSIBILITY TO POTENTIAL ALLEGATION THAT ICRC IN CAHOOTS WITH US/UK.

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 10232 S E C R E T
3. ALSO REVIEWED SUBJECT WITH FONOFF (MCCARTHY), WHO ALSO FELT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND PROBABLY UNWISE TO PROD ICRC FURTHER FOR TIME BEING, ESPECIALLY WHILE SINAI DOMINATING HEADLINES. MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTION IS WHETHER NASSER IN DESPERATION MAY USE GAS AGAINST ISRAEL. OTHER QUESTION IS FUTURE OF UAR - YEMEN CAMPAIGN AND WHETHER GAS ATTACKS WILL BE RESUMED.

4. QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IN COMMONS ASKING THAT USE OF POISON GAS IN YEMEN BE BROUGHT TO UN. MCCARTHY DRAFTING REPLY STATING THAT SUBJECT IS MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN TO HMG, BUT THAT TIME IS NOT RIPE TO BRING TO UN. KAISER
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

53-44

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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67 JUN 8 AM 9 16

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PP RUEHC
DE RUQNAD 30 1591107M
ZNY CCCCC
P 080945MZ JUN 67
FM AMCONSUL ADANA
TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO RUQMPL/ AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
RUQGA/AMCONSUL IZMIR PRIORITY
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ADANA 153

REF ADANA 152
SITUATION REPORT ADANA
1. AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN ALEPPO MENTIONED PARA THREE REFTEL FORCED EVACUATE COUNTRY IN HIRED TAXIS JUNE SEVEN. ESCORTED TO REYHANLI BORDER POINT BY SECURITY POLICE WHERE PROCESSED VIA ISKENDERUN TO INCIRLIK BASE WHERE REMAINING FOR PRESENT. CONGEN BARROW AND FSO WARD REPORT OUR ALEPPO CONSULATE GUTTED BY FIRE AND LOOTED MORNING JUNE SEVEN. ALL MALE MEMBERS GROUP SLID FROM UPPER STORY CONSULATE BUILDING SUSTAINED SEVERE ROPE BURNS WHICH ONLY SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL INJURIES ATTRIBUTABLE INCIDENT. OFFICIAL VEHICLES AND POV'S BURNED BY MOB. BARROW RESIDENCE, ENDRIZZI APARTMENT AND GUEST APARTMENT WHERE COLONEL AND MRS. WRIGHT STAYING SUBJECTED FIRE AND LOOTING. FURTHER (#) AND DAMAGE NOT KNOWN WHICH OF COURSE NOW ACADEMIC. EVACUEES UNABLE SECURE SUITCASES WITH PERSONAL POSSESSIONS. COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT GROUP NOT MISTREATED BY SYRIAN SECURITY POLICE WHEN THEY UNDER GUARD AND ESCORT TO BORDER JUNE SEVEN.
2. DURING BRIEF STOPOVER ISKENDERUN, COLONEL WRIGHT FELL, GASHED HEAD, WHICH REQUIRED FIVE STITCHES. USAF AMBULANCE ON HAND BRING HIM INCIRLIK BASE DISPENSARY. INJURY BELIEVED NOT RPT NOT SERIOUS AND WRIGHT IS OUT-PATIENT.
3. BRITISH CONSULATE ALEPPO ALSO SET AFIRE BY MOB MORNING JUNE SEVEN. U.K. CONSUL AND MRS. FREDERICK COOPER ACCOMPANIED OUR PERSONNEL AS FAR AS ISKENDERUN, WHERE REMAINED STOPOVER WITH U.K. VICE-CONSUL IAN JOYCE. COOPERS EXPECTED INCIRLIK SOMETIME TODAY. IN ADDITION, NINE OTHER U.K. SUBJECTS REPORTEDLY CROSSED EX-SYRIA AT REYHANLI JUNE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SEVEN AND MAY EVENTUALLY PROCEED INCIRLIK BASE.
4. JOYCE INFORMS THAT U.K. AMBASSADOR DAMASCUS TREVOR EVANS AND WIFE, ACCOMPANIED BY APPROXIMATELY TWENTY-TWO OTHERS WITH BRITISH PASSPORTS WILL CROSS AT REYHANLI TODAY, PROCEEDING VIA ISKENDERUN TO BASE WHERE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE THEIR BEHALF AS STATED REFTEL. HOWEVER, BECAUSE MANY U.K. SUBJECTS MEANWHILE BEING MADE EXIT SYRIA AT LEBANESE BORDER, TOTAL NUMBER WILL BE SOMEWHAT LESS THAN TWO HUNDRED ORIGINALLY EXPECTED HERE.
5. BYRON WINGROVE, AMERICAN DIRECTOR ATAS REFINERY, MERSIN, CALLED ME MORNING JUNE EIGHT TO INFORM THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE EN ROUTE ASSIST APPROXIMATELY THIRTY EVACUEES WHO ENTERING TURKEY EX-SYRIA AT KESAB (DUE SOUTH ANTAKYA). STATED THESE ARE OIL PERSONNEL WHO FORMERLY AT BANYAS. NATIONALITIES NOT KNOWN BUT BELIEVED BE U.K. AND AMERICAN. WINGROVE WILL HANDLE ENTIRE SITUATION, HOUSE TEMPORARILY AT REFINERY INSTALLATION MERSIN AND THEN OBTAIN THEIR ONWARD TRANSPORTATION.
6. KEMAL SERHATLI, ADANA PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTOR, CALLED MORNING JUNE EIGHT INFORM THAT MINISTRY INTERIOR TELEPHONED HIM WITH INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDE ALL AVAILABLE ASSISTANCE AMERICAN EVACUEES COMING THROUGH ADANA AREA. STATED READY GIVE WHATEVER HELP WE MAY REQUIRE.
7. CONSULATE PERSONAL WORKING CLOSELY WITH TURKISH AIR FORCE BASE COMMANDER AND COMMANDER USLOG DETACHMENT TEN PROVIDE HELP U.S. AND U.K. EVACUEES AND ASSIST PREPARATIONS FOR THEIR ONWARD TRAVEL. ALL INCIRLIK BASE EFFORTS OUTSTANDING.
8. SITUATION ADANA AREA OTHERWISE REMAINS UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH SOME TURKS APPEAR CONVINCED BY ARAB PROPAGANDA THAT UNITED STATES AND U.K. MILITARY AIRCRAFT PROVIDED COVER FOR ISRAELI FORCES.
SANDALLS
BT

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

GZCZCQMA95 IVV KGA917*****

NEA ZZ RUEHC
Info DE RUQMKG 4134A 1590623 Control: 7399
ZNY SSSSS June 8, 1967, 3:04 A.M.
Z O 080625Z
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
GPM RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SP INFO RUEPBK/CINCEUR IMMEDIATE
SG RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
SAH RUEPJS/DIA
L GRNC
H BT
AF S E C R E T AMMAN 4134
EUR 1. PRIME MINISTER JUMA HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT ISRAELI ARMORED BATTALION
XX COMPRISED OF ABOUT 30 TANKS CROSSED MUNDESSEH BRIDGE (OPPOSITE WADI
EUR SHU'AID) AT 0530 ZULU THIS MORNING. AT THAT JUNCTURE BATTALION COULD
IO EITHER BE HEADING FOR SALT AND AMMAN OR NORTH TO POSSIBLY
P IBID AND SYRIA. HOWEVER, ACCORDING WASFI TELL, ROUTE CHOSEN WOULD
NSC INDICATE JORDANIAN EAST BANK WAS TARGET SINCE THERE BETTER ACCESS TO
LNR SYRIA BY ANOTHER ROUTE.
ACDA 2. ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY DROPPED SIGNIFICANTLY AFTER ANNOUNCE-
AID MENT CEASE FIRE AT 2000 ZULU LAST NIGHT. HOWEVER PICKED UP DURING
PC NIGHT AND ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN SHELLING JORDANIAN POSITIONS AT RAMTHA
SR IN RECENT HOURS.
ORM 3. IF THESE ATTACKS, VIOLATIONS OF CEASE FIRE, CANNOT BE STOPPED
SCA IMMEDIATELY, INTERNAL SECURITY OF JORDAN DANGEROUS.
O 4. PRIME MINISTER SAID QUOTE ASK THEM WHAT IT IS THEY WANT, I
SY MUST KNOW RIGHT AWAY UNQUOTE
PER 5. JUMA ASKS THIS MATTER RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY ATTENTION AND THAT
FBO WE IMMEDIATELY ASCERTAIN WHAT IT IS ISRAELIS DEMAND OF JORDAN
OPR THAT THEY VIOLATE CEASE FIRE.
OC 6. KING HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO PLEAD QUOTE FOR GOD'S SAKE,
GET THEM TO STOP. UNQUOTE.
GP-3 BURNS
BT

RSR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:56 A.M., JUNE 8.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, USUN
COMAC (FOR POLAD) AT 3:30 A.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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••••• ZZ RUEHC RUTPRC
DE RUEIVC 8705B 1591550
ZNY SSSSS
Z 081545Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 8705

7 7 7 2
1967 JUN 8 PM 12:02

WE HAD BETTER GET OUR STORY ON TORPEDOING OF USS LIBERTY OUT FAST AND IT HAD BETTER BE GOOD. NOLTE
BT **NOTE: HANDLE AS EXDIS PER S/S-O.**
NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 12:19 PM 6/8/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 12:50 PM 6/8/67

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 5654

REACTIONS TO ME CRISIS IN UN CIRCLES

FOL IS ROUND-UP OF REACTIONS TO OR INTERPRETATIONS OF LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESENT ME CONFLICT AS EXPRESSED TO MISOFFS IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BY VARIOUS UN DELS OVER PAST TWO DAYS:

1. SADI (JORDAN) EXPRESSED VIEWS AS FOLS:

A) ARABS ARE DISGUSTED WITH THE SOVS FOR SUPPORTING CEASE-FIRE ONLY RES OF JUNE 6, MYSTIFIED AT SOV SPONSORSHIP OF JUNE 7 FOLLOW-UP RES, AND UNABLE DEFINE SOV MOTIVATION. SAID JORDAN NOT CONSULTED BY SOVS IN ADVANCE, AND BELIEVED OTHER ARABS NOT CONSULTED EITHER. EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOV SUPPORT OF ARABS ONE OF WORDS ONLY.

B) RE FUTURE, HIS PRIMARY CONCERN IS FUTURE US POSTURE TOWARD ARAB WORLD, STATING ARABS LESS CONCERNED NOW ABOUT STRAIT OF TIRAN THAN THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ASKED IF US STILL HAS POLICY TO RESPECT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN AREA AND SAID ARABS HAD COMMENTED ON ABSENCE SUCH STATEMENT FROM GOLDBERG SPEECHES SINCE JUNE 5. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT GOLDBERG HAD REITERATED THIS POLICY ON JUNE 6, SADI EXPRESSED HOPE US COULD STATE THIS MORE CLEARLY.

C) JORDAN NOT BEING CRITICIZED BY OTHER ARABS HERE FOR SEEKING CEASE-FIRE. ALL RECOGNIZED THAT JAA HAD DONE MOST AND BEST FIGHTING ON ARAB SIDE, HAD TAKEN BRUNT OF CASUALTIES AND HAD FOUGHT WITH GREATEST DISTINCTION WHEN CHIPS DOWN. BY CONTRAST, UAR HAD PERFORMED MISERABLY; SYRIANS HAD DONE LITTLE; IRAQ WAS FAR AWAY AND COST OF SENDING A FEW PLANES AND MEN MINIMAL.

D) HUSSEIN, HOWEVER, NOW IN GREAT DIFFICULTY INTERNALLY BECAUSE COUNTRY ITSELF ON BRINK OF COLLAPSE.

2. SAUDI DEP PERMREP EXPRESSED FOL VIEWS:

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A) ARABS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED WITH USSR FOR TWO REASONS: SOV REFUSAL TO TAKE POSITION LAST WEEK ON MERITS OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE; FAILURE TO HELP ARABS WITH ANYTHING BUT WORDS. UAR CLAIMS RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WARFARE WERE CONVINCING TO MANY ARABS WHO QUITE NATURALLY WONDERED WHY SOVS HAD NOT TAKEN CONCRETE COUNTER STEPS.

B) HUSSEIN HAD OUTSMARTED NASSER THIS TIME. LATTER COUNTED ON LACK OF COOPERATION FROM HUSSEIN AND FEISAL, WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO UNDERMINE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES, AS WELL AS POINT TO INTRA-ARAB SPLIT AS REASON FOR NOT CARRYING THROUGH AGAINST ISRAEL. BY COMING TO CAIRO AND SIGNING TREATY, HOWEVER, HUSSEIN HAD UNDERCUT NASSER.

C) ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY WOULD LEAVE SURROUNDING ARAB POPULACE MORE EMBITTERED THAN EVER AND DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE PEACE OF AREA.

D) FAILURE OF IRAQI ARMY PLAY GREATER ROLE SOURCE OF GREAT CONCERN AMONG ARABS. WITH BEST ARMY OF ALL ARABS AND GOOD AIR FORCE, ACTIVE IRAQI ROLE COULD MAKE GREAT DIFFERENCE.

3. REACTIONS OF SEVERAL ASIAN DEL MEMBERS (JAPAN, MALAYSIA, CEYLON. THAILAND, INDONESIA, BURMA, PHILIPPINES) REVEALED FOL COMMON ELEMENTS:

A) NASSER AND RADICAL ARAB GOVTS HAVE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS LOSS OF FACE AND PRESTIGE AT HOME AND ABROAD. EVEN THOUGH THIS IN LARGE PART DUE TO NASSER'S OWN MISJUDGMENT RE MOOD AND STRENGTH OF ISRAEL, IT WILL HAVE RESULTS, BOTH SHORT AND LONG-TERM, SATISFACTORY TO VERY FEW, E.G., DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ARAB STATES (ESPECIALLY JORDAN), INTENSIFICATION OF ARAB DESIRE FOR REVENGE AGAINST ISRAEL (ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN CASE OF SYRIA), AND ABRUPT DECLINE IN US INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD.

B) UAR CHARGES RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WAR NEITHER CREDIBLE NOR GENERALLY BELIEVED, EVEN AMONG ARABS AT UN. CHARGES PROBABLY RESULT FROM COMBINATION OF UAR NEED FOR SCAPEGOAT FOR MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE PLUS WILD HOPE THERE WAS STILL CHANCE OF GETTING SOVS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY EQUIPMENT TO HELP IN AIR DEFENSE OF ARABS.

C) US CLAIM TO BE NEUTRAL IN THOUGHT, DEED AND WORD DID NOT RING QUITE TRUE. WHILE US WAS CONSISTENT (ONCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT) IN URGING SIMPLE CEASEFIRE, GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT US WOULD HAVE TAKEN DIFFERENT STAND (I.E., INSIST UPON CEASEFIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL) IF COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAD GONE AGAINST ISRAEL. MOREOVER US POSITION IN THIS CASE NOT CONSISTENT WITH POSITION US TOOK AT TIME OF INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT IN 1965.

D) GENERAL FEELING IS THAT US, WHILE IT DID NOT ENCOURAGE ISRAELIS TO TAKE TO ARMS, IS NOT AVERSE TO TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESS TO SECURE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS RE STRAIT OF TIRAN. MOREOVER, THERE IS UNDERCURRENT OF SUSPICION US AWARE OF AND DID NOTHING TO PREVENT ISRAELI RESORT TO ARMS.

E) ONCE MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF ARABS CLEAR, SOVS WERE FACED WITH VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES; THEY COULD EITHER WORK TOSTOP ISRAELI ADVANCE THROUGH UN, OR TAKE SOME CONCRETE AND DIRECT ACTION TO BOLSTER UAR DEFENSES. LATTER ALTERNATIVE RULED OUT PARTLY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, EVEN MORE BECAUSE OF SOV CONCERN IT WOULD GENERATE COUNTER STEPS BY US AND UK.

F) WHILE THERE IS RELIEF THAT SOVS MADE CHOICE THEY DID, IT IS FELT SOVS HAVE THEREBY DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN PRESTIGE AND RELIABILITY AS "PROTECTOR" IN EYES OF ARABS AND MANY AFRICANS; SOVS HAVE ONLY INTENSIFIED THIS DAMAGE BY THEIR LOUD TALK

ABOUT ME CONFLICT BEING ISRAELI AGGRESSION, ENCOURAGED BY IMPERIALISTS.

4. ACCORDING MCKEOWN (AUSTRALIA), EBAN (ISRAEL) EXPRESSED VIEW TO CORNER (NEW ZEALAND) THAT SOV HASTE IN DEMANDING CEASE-FIRE BASED ON USSR DECISION SCUTTLE NASSER AND PIN HOPES ON SYRIA AS LEADER ARAB WORLD. EBAN REPORTEDLY SAID SYRIA ONLY ARAB STATE AT MOMENT ENJOYING RELATIVELY FAVORABLE MILITARY POSITION AND RAPID CEASEFIRE MIGHT PREVENT SYRIA FROM SUFFERING DEFEAT EQUAL TO UAR'S. MCKEOWN THOUGHT SOVS HAD DECIDED THEY HAD BACKED WRONG HORSE AND WANTED CUT THEIR LOSSES. REISCH (AUSTRIA) SAID HE HAD HEARD THEORIES SIMILAR TO EBAN'S. MOREOVER, HE GATHERED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH ARAB AND EE DELEGATES THAT SOVS HAD DISCUSSED THEIR INTENTION REQUEST RAPID CEASEFIRE ONLY CASUALLY WITH UAR AND OTHER ARABS, BUT QUITE FULLY WITH SYRIA.

5. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION AMONG SCATTERED LAS AND EUROPEANS, AS WELL AS VAKIL OF IRAN, THAT NASSER HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS DEFEAT, AS RESULT OF WHICH ENTIRE ME BALANCE HAS SHIFTED AWAY FROM HIM. CREMIN (IRELAND) THOUGHT SOVS HAVE LOST MAJOR ROUND IN DIPLOMATIC BOUT; JOURNALISTS HEARD TO COMMENT ON WHOPPING SOV ERRORS OVER PAST YEARS (E.G., CUBA, INDONESIA AND NOW UAR) AND TO WONDER WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF US COMMITTED SUCH BLOOPERS.

6. INDICATIVE OF REACTION MORE INTELLIGENT "PROGRESSIVE" ARAB SPOKESMEN HERE WAS FACT THAT AMB BOUATTOURA (ALG) STOPPED USUN OFFICER EVENING JUNE 7 TO SAY HE HOPED RECENT OCCURRENCES

WOULD NOT MEAN END OF CONTACT WITH USUN (OBVIOUSLY ALLUDING TO ALGERIAN BREAK IN RELS WITH US). WHEN ASSURED THAT HE COULD COUNT ON CONTINUING CONTACT BUT THAT US REGRETTED ALG GOVT HAD ACTED ON BASIS WHOLLY ERRONEOUS INFO, BOUATTOURA HEDGED BY SAYING THAT ALG DECISION BASED ON "OBJECTIVE" (IN MARXIST SENSE) ALIGNMENT US ON SIDE OF ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH HAMAD (ARAB LEAGUE) BEWAILED PLUMMETTING US CREDIBILITY AMONG ARABS IN WAKE ISRAELI MOVE AND APPEARED ACCEPT YARN ABOUT US PLANS, BOUATTOURA POINTEDLY REFRAINED FROM ASSOCIATING HIMSELF WITH THIS ARGUMENT.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, 6/8/67 - 2:25 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1.1 UNCLASSIFIED

007354

1967 JUN 8 AM 1 13

Action LO

Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR NEA P NSC INR AID PC SR ORM SCA SCS O SY OPR OC ACDA RSR

00 RUDSC RUEHC RUEIVC RUFJC RUQMDM RUQMJR RUQMKG RUQMVL
DE RUEHDT 5657 1590455
ZNR UUUUU
O R 080437Z JUN 67 ZFF4
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEIVC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS USUN 5657

SC: JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE

FOL LTR RECEIVED BY SC PRES 10 PM JUNE 7 FROM ISRAEL: FONMIN EBAN:

QUOTE

EXCELLENCY: AT 4:45 O'CLOCK PM, NY TIME, I INFORMED THE SYG OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JERUSALEM, INFORMING ME THAT THE ISRAELI GOVT ACCEPTS THE SC'S CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE, PROVIDED THAT THE OTHER PARTIES ACCEPT.

I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED A CABLED CONFIRMATION OF THIS DECISION, WHICH I NOW COMMUNICATE TO YOU OFFICIALLY.

WE HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF THE GOVT OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE AND THE CEASE FIRE WITH THAT COUNTRY HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 2000 HOURS GMT.

WE WOULD WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER GOVTS INVOLVED IN THE HOSTILITIES.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

UNQUOTE

COMMENT: 2000 GMT WAS HOUR BY WHICH JUNE 7 SC RES DEMANDED CEASE-FIRE.

GOLDBERG

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 1:17 A.M., 6/8/67
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE AT 1:17 A.M., 6/8/67

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

007675

1967 JUN 8 AM 10 41

Info

VZCZCEUB787NEA196
••••ZZ RUEHC RUEHDT
DZQRUQMVL 0825 1591405
ZNY CCCCC
Z 081414Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUEPNAA/QCNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT . ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
BT

SS-25
GPM-3
AF-6
EMR-8
NEA-7
SP-2
SC-1
IO-3
P-3
INR-7
ACDA-7
AID-10
O-2
OPR-2
OC-9
SCA-2
SCS-2
PC-4
L-3
H-1
107

PASSED S/S/O 6/8/67 10:45 AM

CONFIDENTIAL

2 0 3 1 0 2

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

7

Origin NEA

Info: SS, GPM, SP, SC, SAH, L, H, AF, EUR, IO, P, USIA, NSC, INR, CIA, NSA, DOD, ACDA, AID, PC

JUN 8 6 31 AM '67

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV — FLASH
INFO; Amembassy AMMAN — PRIORITY
Amembassy ATHENS — PRIORITY
Amembassy BEIRUT — PRIORITY
Amembassy DAMASCUS — PRIORITY
Amconsul JERUSALEM — PRIORITY
Amembassy LONDON — PRIORITY
USUN — PRIORITY
CINCSTRIKE — PRIORITY

STATE 207182

REF: Jerusalem 1053

UNTSO report reftel deeply disturbing. You should urgently approach Fonoff at highest level to express deep concern this new indication military action by GOI. If reported bombardment correct, we would assume it prelude to military action against Syrian positions on Syrian soil. Such a development, following on heels Israeli acceptance SC cease-fire resolution would cast doubts on Israeli intentions and create gravest problems for USG representatives in Arab countries. You should stress we must at all costs have complete cessation Israeli military action except in cases where clearly some replying fire is necessary in self-defense.

GP-2

END

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA Task Force:WDBrewer		NEA Task Force:WDBREWER

Clearances: U - Mr. Katzenbach

SECRET

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

37

JUN 8 11 18 PM '67

Origin SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS
USUN
MOSCOW
TEL AVIV
LONDON

STATE 209550

EXDIS

1.. Lucet called at his request on Under Secretary Rostow yesterday for further discussion on Middle East crisis. Rostow stressed that greatest risk in present situation would be to fail to appreciate political consequences of military events of last two days. We must take full advantage of situation in order to seek progress towards improved security both of Israel and the Arab states. Rostow stated that certain Arab govts are privately not unhappy at what has happened to Nasser.

2. Currently most difficult situation for US is continuing propagation of false story that US planes are participating in the war on side of Israel.

3. Rostow said we must now prepare ourselves for Security Council politics. It is encouraging that Russians have capitulated on

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EUR:FBX:WRomine:rms 6-8-67	5952	M - Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances:
EUR:FBX - Mr. Anderson
EUR - Mr. Stoessel
M - R. T. Grey
NEA - Mr. Wolle
S/S - Mr. Kelly

SECRET

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

SECRET

question of cease-fire and did not insist on withdrawal to positions held by each side before beginning of hostilities. Israeli position is now that they will withdraw only to a QTE condition of peaceUNQTE. or accept claims of quote belligerent rights unquote.
They will not return to armistice situation/ Israelis are willing to negotiate all questions, including that of Palestine refugees, in the context of a peace agreement. US believes Israel will accept its perhaps with some rectifications
present frontiers/if it has a peace treaty. ~~[illegible]~~ GOI will insist on freedom of passage of Straits of Tiran. Rostow noted that peace treaties will be a ~~very~~ bitter pill for Arab countries to take, and USG was considering a multilateral regional economic development projects as part of an overall solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

4. We are also thinking of broaching question of arms limitation in area. ~~[illegible]~~

5. Ambassador Lucet mentioned Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's speech in National Assembly June 7 in which Couve stressed difficulty of bringing opposing powers together by themselves and need for four-power agreement on Near East area. Rostow said Soviets will undoubtedly be pressing for withdrawal of Israeli forces and in this

SECRET

connection he urged that French Govt seriously consider a resolution in Security Council ~~xkxx~~ which includes language pointed towards a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

END

RJS

DISPATCH

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

209549

SECRET

36

81 Origin
SS Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

JUN 8 11 16 PM '67

STATE 209549

[redacted]

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BATTLE

1. While we are aware your difficulties, we consider it vitally important retain minimum U.S. presence in Amman, as one of few Arab states with whom we still have possibility continuing relations.

2. What are your plans to retain minimum presence assuming physically possible after evacuation?

END

GP-3

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA:LDBattle:lab 6/8/67		NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:

M - Mr. Rostow

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

McGREGOR PRINTING CORPORATION 4-67

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

9

207861

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

JUN 3 10 36 AM '67

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

Origin

Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy CAIRO FLASH

INFO: AmEmbassy ~~TEL AVIV~~ TEL AVIV

STATE 207861

NODIS

DUPLICATE

Ref. Cairo 8397

The President would
~~We should~~ welcome a visit from Vice President Zakariya Mohieddin at his earliest convenience. In view of the urgency of the situation, we hope it will be possible for him to come without delay.
~~at once.~~ If asked you may say that an answer to President Nasser's letter will certainly be made, and that a corresponding visit to Cairo by a very senior representative of the President will be sympathetically considered if/~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ both Presidents decide such a step could be useful.
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

For TEL AVIV: Harman informed about possibility of this visit, and ~~answered~~ assured that GOI will be informed of outcome.

END RUSK

GP-1

Drafted by: M:EVRostow:idp 6/3/67 | Tel. Ext. | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ S - The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Read

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

2 0 3

SECRET

1
Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: **Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY**

Jun 8 11 14 PM '67

STATE 209548
EXDIS

1. Please deliver to Shah following message from President dated June 8, 1967:

QUOTE Your Imperial Majesty:

I very much appreciate the kind letter you sent me from Paris, I fully understand why you felt obliged to return home directly from Paris, but wish you to know not only how much Mrs. Johnson and I will miss seeing you and the Empress on this occasion but also how disappointed I am not to have this opportunity to discuss our mutual concerns especially in the Middle East. I hope we will be able to get together soon and that you will let me know when it would be convenient for you to come to Washington.

Meanwhile, Your Majesty, I assure you that in these troubled times I deeply appreciate your counsel and Iran's constructive position in world affairs. Ambassador Harriman has informed me of his conversations with you in

Drafted by: Text received from White House | Tel. Ext. | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Clearances:

XXXXX

Mr. Smith/ S/S-Mr. Kelly

SECRET

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Paris and of your desire to continue a close ~~XXX~~ exchange of views. That is my desire too.

I have just learned that the UAR as ~~XXX~~ well as Israel have accepted a cease-fire. I would greatly welcome your thoughts as to how we might proceed in ~~XXXX~~ trying to bring stable peace, prosperity, and regional cooperation to the Middle East, out of the wreckage of this crisis.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very warmest personal wishes to you and the Empress and also to the Iranian people whose progress under your leadership is greatly admired by Americans everywhere.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

RUSK

Walsh

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

2 0 9 5 2 4

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

Origin AF

Info:

ACTION: **CIRCULAR**

Jun 8 9 50 PM '67

STATE 209524 CIRCULAR 208457

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RSR

REFERENCES: DEPARTMENT CIRCULARS [redacted]/and 208550, June 5 and 6.

1. Under Secretary Rostow briefed twenty-seven African diplomatic representatives June 7 on US actions re Near Eastern developments.

2. He traced impartial and restraining role of US and our active efforts once hostilities broke out obtain UN cease fire resolution as a contribution to achieving return of peace to area.

3. He also reiterated previous US high level categorical denials of public charges by certain Arab states of US military aircraft involvement in hostilities.

4. Meeting prompted by importance we attach informing African governments through their diplomatic representatives in Washington of US attitudes and actions re crisis, and our interest in having mutually beneficial exchange views with them on this problem.

5. Africans present welcomed opportunity offered by briefing to exchange views.

6. You may use above in your discretion to reinforce previous statements by Secretary Rusk that charges of US military aircraft intervention completely false.

End

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
AFI:NFeld:dh 6/8/67	2797	AF - Joseph Palmer

Clearances: AF:JWFredericks
S/S - GLKell
M - R. T. Grey

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

BY TELEGRAM:

BOTSWANA - AMEMB. GABERONES
CAMEROON - AMEMB. YAOUNDE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - AMEMB. BANGUI
CHAD - AMEMB. FORT LAMY
CONGO (K) - AMEMB. KINSHASA
DAHOMEY - AMEMB. COTONOU
ETHIOPIA - AMEMB. ADDIS ABABA
GABON - AMEMB. LIBREVILLE
GHANA - AMEMB. ACCRA
GUINEA - AMEMB. CONAKRY
IVORY COAST - AMEMB. ABIDJAN
KENYA - AMEMB. NAIROBI
LIBERIA - AMEMB. MONROVIA
MALAGASY REPUBLIC - AMEMB. TANNANARIVE
MALAWI - AMEMB. BLANTYRE
MALI - AMEMB. BAMAKO
NIGER - AMEMB. NIAMEY
NIGERIA - AMEMB. LAGOS
RWANDA - AMEMB. KIGALI
SENEGAL - AMEMB. DAKAR
SIERRA LEONE - AMEMB. FREETOWN
SOMALIA - AMEMB. MOGADISCIO
TANZANIA - AMEMB. DARESSALAAM
TOGO - AMEMB. LOME
UGANDA - AMEMB. KAMPALA
UPPER VOLTA - AMEMB. OUAGADOUGOU
ZAMBIA - AMEMB. LUSAKA

RUSK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

2 0 3

SECRET

1
Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: **Amembassy TEHRAN PRIORITY**

Jun 8 11 14 PM '67

STATE 209548
EXDIS

1. Please deliver to Shah following message from President dated June 8, 1967:

QUOTE Your Imperial Majesty:

XX I very much appreciate the kind XXXX letter you sent me from Paris, I fully understand why you felt obliged to return home directly from Paris, but wish you to know not only how much Mrs. Johnson and I will miss seeing you and the Empress on this occasion but also how disappointed I am not to have this opportunity to discuss our mutual concerns especially in the Middle East. I hope we will be able to get together soon and that you will let me know when it would be convenient for you to come to Washington.

Meanwhile, Your Majesty, I assure you that in these troubled times I deeply appreciate your counsel and Iran's constructive position in world affairs. Ambassador Harriman has informed me of his conversations with you in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Drafted by: Text received from White House | Tel. Ext | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Clearances:

XXXXX

Mr Smith/ S/S Mr Kelly

SECRET

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM 8-65 DS-322

SECRET

Paris and of your desire to continue a close ~~XXX~~ exchange of views. That is my desire too.

I have just learned that the UAR as ~~XXX~~ well as Israel have accepted a cease-fire. I would greatly welcome your thoughts as to how we might proceed in ~~XXXX~~ trying to bring stable peace, prosperity, and regional cooperation to the Middle East, out of the wreckage of this crisis.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very warmest personal wishes to you and the Empress and also to the Iranian people whose progress under your leadership is greatly admired by Americans everywhere.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State** 209305

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

81
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy JIDDA PRIORITY XXXXXXXXXX IMMEDIATE 36

INFO: Amconsul DHAHRAN PRIORITY
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

JUN 8 4 37 PM '67

STATE 209305
EXDIS
PRIORITY CHANNEL
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1. Ambassador requested immediately deliver to King Faisal following personal message from President Johnson XX dated June 8:

QUOTE

Your Majesty:

In the light of my own high regard for Your Majesty, as well as the long-standing close and cordial relations between our two governments, I want to assure that you are fully informed regarding the views and policies of my government at this delicate juncture in the history of the Near East.

The United States Government had been engaged for several weeks in strenuous attempts to reduce tensions in the Near East when, despite our best efforts, hostilities broke out on June 5 on a broad front. We had been in close touch with the parties and had received no indication that such fighting was in prospect. It is not clear to us how it started.

In this situation, the policy of the United States must be to seek urgently for concerted action through the United Nations to bring about an end to the current hostilities. We are bending all our efforts to this end. Far from seeking to become involved in this new conflict, we are

Drafted by: NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:bmk:6/5/67	Tel Ext 5655	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:
NEA - Amb. Battle S/S - Mr. Walsh White House - Mr. Smith

SECRET

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DS 322
3-65

doing our best to stop it. In so doing, we will strive to steer an even-handed course. Our sole endeavor will be to seek the earliest feasible return to peaceful conditions so that the underlying problems of the region can be addressed in relative calm.

As the situation evolves, I realize that we may not always see eye to eye on every issue. I recognize the imperatives of your position, just as I hope you will recognize those that govern our own. We continue to support the integrity and independence of all states involved in the current hostilities. We are opposed to efforts to change frontiers or resolve problems by force of arms. But this is not favoritism for any single state in the region, it is simple realism. The purpose of the United States Government must remain the prevention and limitation of hostilities which otherwise might well expand outside the Near East. Such has been our settled policy under four Administrations of both political parties since the end of World War II.

At the same time I want to assure Your Majesty that it will be my firm determination that events in the present crisis not be permitted to affect the long-standing interest of the United States Government in the closest possible relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. I hope that Your Majesty will understand and appreciate the current efforts of the United States for peace within this unchanging context. It would be tragic if misunderstandings between us, or ill-conceived efforts on the part of others, were to weaken the enduring relationship between our two countries from which both have derived such benefit for so long.

SECRET

In this connection, I want to give Your Majesty my own solemn assurances that the charges being circulated in the Near East alleging that the United States has given military support to operations against the Arab countries in this crisis is totally false. I deeply regret that some of our Arab friends have seen fit to break diplomatic relations with us, particularly in view of the groundless nature of the charges and because of the urgent need for us to remain in close communication with all sides in the present difficult situation. You will have seen that my Ambassador to the United Nations has publicly invited the UN to send investigators to the 6th Fleet to establish for themselves the baselessness of these accusations.

I must tell Your Majesty frankly that I have been disturbed at reports on June 7 of mob action against American citizens in Dhahran. My Ambassador, Mr. Eilts, in whom I have the fullest confidence, has reported to me the assurances given by you and your senior officials that adequate protection will be afforded for all citizens. I welcome this consideration and assure you that it is not my desire to take any action which would focus attention on your problems.

In this difficult time, I take comfort from the continued maintenance of cordial relations between us and our two Governments. As a continuation of our friendly talks in Washington a year ago, I would of course consider most carefully any views which you might wish to send me on the current situation. Meanwhile, Ambassador Eilts has been instructed to remain in particularly close contact with your Government throughout the present crisis. If God wills, the fighting will soon stop, now that the Security Council has acted, so that we may address the underlying problems of peace

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and development in a more normal atmosphere.

All best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

2. In delivering foregoing, you should suggest that USG desires ensure privacy this message and any subsequent exchange. You may add orally that Dept has instructed you make clear continued interest highest levels USG in maintaining closest contacts with His Majesty and top level SAG officials throughout the present critical period.

GP-3 END.

RUSK

209293

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

48-81-S

Origin NEA
Info:

ACTION: CIRCULAR IMMEDIATE

STATE 209293 CIRCULAR

JUN 8 3 58 PM '67

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1. UAR's deteriorating military situation is beginning have impact on ~~EGYPX~~ Egyptian mass opinion. There is clear and present danger of increased rioting and demonstrations. Nor can possibility be ruled out of serious breakdown of public ~~order~~ order. Based on previous experience, it is quite possible that rioting originally aimed at US and UK interests could quickly develop into attacks on Europeans generally. To this end we have suggested to Embassy Cairo that they consult with friendly colleague embassies in endeavor place question of protection of foreigners Egypt on as broad an international base as possible. We feel that cooperation along these lines by a number of powers represented in Egypt might just persuade UAR pf importance to its own interests of maintaining usual norms of behavior in relations among states. We recognize that decisions as to what can best be done in rapidly moving situation must perforce be left to diplomatic representatives on spot.

2. In view of imminent rupture our own direct diplomatic communications with Embassy Cairo, now under Spanish protection, we ask addressees approach FonOffs with request they communicate as rapidly as possible directly with their representatives in Cairo with authorization for consultations and possible multilateral diplomatic action.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA/UAR:DCBergus:cff 6/8/67	5092	NEA - Mr. Rockwell

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Stoessel
EUR/SPP - Mr. Funseth ~~Mr. Campbell~~
BMI - Mr. Judd

SECRET

FORM DS-322

SECRET

FOR MADRID: Please explain that while recognize and greatly appreciate Spain's acceptance of role of protecting power, we felt situation so grave in this instance and time so much of essence that it essential we communicate with other friendly governments directly.

FOR LONDON: Please advise FonOff and suggest XXXX they make similar efforts.

GP 1.

RUSK

TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
BERN
COPENHAGEN
LONDON
MADRID
PARIS
OSLO
ROME
STOCKHOLM

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

20 9202

Walsh

JUN 8 10 25 AM '67

45
Origin SAH

ACTION: CIRCULAR
ALL POSTS Priority

Info:
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ACDA

STATE 209202

FOR THE AMBASSADOR [redacted]

As you are undoubtedly aware, UAR, Syria and certain other Arab countries have been giving wide publicity both domestically and abroad to charges that the US and the UK have provided military assistance, especially air assistance to Israeli forces. This charge is without a shred of truth -- in the case of both the US and the UK. No repeat no US or UK planes have participated in either offensive or defensive operations on x the side of Israel. [redacted] Nasser and his colleagues are either preparing an alibi to cover their military defeat or [redacted] hoper to trap the Soviets into an active military role, or both.

We have categorically denied these charges and at the Security Council debate on June 6 Ambassador Goldberg invited a UN investigation and offered to permit UN observers to observe

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
S/AH:CLCooper:ml 6/7/67	3304	M - Eugene Rostow

Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle
USIA - Mr. Alan Carter (substance)
S/S - Mr. Walsh
DOD - Mr. Vance

CONFIDENTIAL

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the operations of Sixth Fleet. [redacted] ships of our/[redacted] In addition, we have invited the Government of Libya to station observers in the control tower of Wheelus Air Force Base.

Please take an early opportunity to meet with appropriate members of your host government for the purpose of countering Nasser's Quote big lie. Unquote. In the course of the next few days we will be releasing specific details with respect to the position and operations of our forces in the Mediterranean area and you should use this information freely with the local press and your host governments in countering Arab charges.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Walsh

205 18

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

48

Origin EUR

ACTION: AmEmbassy MOSCOW FLSAH

Info:

JUN 8 11 35 AM '67

STATE 209218

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At 0830 EDT USS Liberty, an auxiliary ship, was/torpedoed damaged by about 14 nautical miles north of UAR coastline. We instructed our carrier SARATOGA now in Mediterranean to despatch 8 aircraft to scene to investigate and offer whatever protection to vessel that may be necessary, and so advised Soviet Charge here at 10:15. Advise IFA that at 11:00 EDT Israelis advised us they were responsible for hitting ship by error and have apologized. We phoned this information to Soviet Charge at 11:01, and planes have now (11:25 a.m.) been called back to carrier.
GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EUR:SOV:MToon:erk:fc 6/8/67	6906	G - Mr. Kohler

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Read

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

7

UNCLASSIFIED

Origin NEA
Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD ACDA AID PC SR ORM SCA SCS O SY PER FBO OPR OC

ACTION: CIRCULAR TO ALL ARAB CAPITALS PRIORITY Jun 8 12 57 AM '67

STATE 209166 CIRCULAR

Israel officially confirmed late on June seven by note to UNSC President GOI acceptance immediate cease-fire "provided other parties accept". Note states GOI apprised of Jordan's acceptance "and cease-fire with that country has been in effect since 2000 GMT. We would welcome announcement of acceptance by other governments involved in hostilities".

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA Task Force:WDBrewer:mo
Tel. Ext. 3263
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA Task Force - W. D. Brewer
Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Send to following posts:

Amembassy RABAT
Amembassy ALGIERS
Amembassy TUNISIA
Amembassy TRIPOLI
Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy Baghdad
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy DAMASCUS
Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy TEL AVIV, and
Amembassy LONDON

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

45
Origin SAH

ACTION: CIRCULAR
ALL POSTS Priority

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Jun 8 10 25 AM '67

STATE 114202

FOR THE AMBASSADOR [redacted]

As you are undoubtedly aware, UAR, Syria and certain other Arab countries have been giving wide publicity both domestically and abroad to charges that the US and the UK have provided military assistance, especially air assistance to Israeli forces. This charge is without a shred of truth -- in the case of both the US and the UK. No repeat no US or UK planes have participated in either offensive or defensive operations on x the side of Israel. [redacted] Nasser and his colleagues are either preparing an alibi to cover their military defeat or [redacted] hope to trap the Soviets into an active military role, or both.

We have categorically denied these charges and at the Security Council debate on June 6 Ambassador Goldberg invited a UN investigation and offered to permit UN observers to observe

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Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle
S/S - Mr. Walsh
USIA - Mr. Alan Carter (substance)
DOD - Mr. Vance

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the operations of Sixth Fleet. [redacted] ships of our/[redacted] In addition, we have invited the Government of Libya to station observers in the control tower of Wheelus Air Force Base.

Please take an early opportunity to meet with appropriate members of your host government for the purpose of countering Nasser's Quote big lie. Unquote. In the course of the next few days we will be releasing specific details with respect to the position and operations of our forces in the Mediterranean area and you should use this information freely with the local press and your host governments in countering Arab charges.

GP-3

END

RUSK